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Application Of The Due Diligence Principle To Cyber Operations, Tomohiro Mikanagi Jul 2021

Application Of The Due Diligence Principle To Cyber Operations, Tomohiro Mikanagi

International Law Studies

The discreet use of proxies by States renders it difficult to prove attribution to States under the existing rules of attribution. On the other hand, the due diligence principle, if applicable, does not require attribution but can lead to the invocation of State responsibility for cyber operations emanating from the territory of other States. In the Corfu Channel judgment the ICJ recognized “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States,” and UN Member States agreed that existing international law applies to cyber operations. However, the UN Members …


Foreign Cyber Interference In Elections, Michael N. Schmitt Mar 2021

Foreign Cyber Interference In Elections, Michael N. Schmitt

International Law Studies

In the 2020 U.S. elections, Russia authorized and conducted influence operations designed to support former President Trump, although it did not attempt to alter any technical aspect of the voting process. Russia was not alone. Iran mounted a multi-pronged covert influence campaign intended to undercut Trump’s reelection prospects, while other foreign actors–like Lebanese Hizballah, Cuba, and Venezuela–also tried to influence the election. Interestingly, China did not conduct operations designed to alter the outcome, although it did consider doing so. The phenomenon of election meddling, however, extends well beyond the United States to such countries as Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, …


An International Attribution Mechanism For Hostile Cyber Operations, Yuval Shany, Michael N. Schmitt Jul 2020

An International Attribution Mechanism For Hostile Cyber Operations, Yuval Shany, Michael N. Schmitt

International Law Studies

This article is the result of an international research project organized by the Federmann Cyber Security Research Center at Hebrew University to consider the feasibility of establishing an international attribution mechanism for hostile cyber operations, as well as the usefulness of such a body. The authors observe that, at present, states wielding significant cyber capability have little interest in creating such a mechanism. These states appear to be of the view that they can generate sufficient accountability and deterrence based on their independent technological capacity, access to expertise and to offensive (active defense) cyber tools, political clout, security alliances, and …