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Comments On Maki V. Frelk, Harry Kalven Jr.
Comments On Maki V. Frelk, Harry Kalven Jr.
Vanderbilt Law Review
My first reaction to the performance of the Illinois Appellate Court in Maki v. Frelk was to recall the old joke about the man who, when asked if he believed in baptism, replied: "Believe in it, hell, I've seen it done!" In any event the decision provides a twin stimulus to the commentator: first, to say something about the limits of common law change, and second, to say something about comparative negligence itself. Despite the spectacular novelty of the court's action, these re-main well-worn topics on which it will not be easy to say anything fresh. I am, however, moved …
Comment, John W. Wade
Comment, John W. Wade
Vanderbilt Law Review
The majority opinion in the Illinois Supreme Court held that if a change was to be made, the task was for the legislature, not the court. The five in the majority were not ready to deliver an opinion like that in MacPherson, Henningsen, Greenman.' If they had, there is real reason to believe that a similar consequence of an immediate and substantial judicial following would have developed. Without saying so, they seemed to be influenced by the thought that they would be complete pioneers in uncharted territory, with no precedents to rely upon or to interpret. Are there any judicial …
Comment, Robert A. Leflar
Comment, Robert A. Leflar
Vanderbilt Law Review
It is increasingly common today for courts to render opinions as they did in an earlier common law era, that is, to answer the principally litigated issue first, then to give answers to incidental questions that are apt to arise thereafter. Admittedly these incidental answers are dicta only, but they are substantially authoritative and serve useful purposes. By employing such a technique, appellate courts can do a better job than legislatures usually have done in promulgating comparative negligence rules. With respect to matters upon which the legislature has never taken any position, legislative inaction constitutes no affirmative assertion of legislative …
Comments On Maki V. Frelk--Comparative V.Contributory Negligence: Should The Court Or Legislature Decide?, Fleming James Jr., Harry Kalven Jr., Robert E. Keeton, Robert A. Leflar, Wex S. Malone, John W. Wade
Comments On Maki V. Frelk--Comparative V.Contributory Negligence: Should The Court Or Legislature Decide?, Fleming James Jr., Harry Kalven Jr., Robert E. Keeton, Robert A. Leflar, Wex S. Malone, John W. Wade
Vanderbilt Law Review
Believing that the holdings and opinions in the case of Maki v. Frelkare significant legal developments, the Vanderbilt Law Review has solicited comments on these decisions, which it is now pleased to publish. These comments by six distinguished torts teachers and writers bear on the relative merits of comparative and contributory negligence, but more importantly, they discuss whether the judicial or legislative method is most appropriate for adoption of a rule of comparative negligence. It is hoped that these comments will be used as a sound basis for action, whether the problem arises before the courts or legislatures.
Inadequate Damages In P.I. Actions: Trends In Appellate Decisions, Owen T. Palmer Jr.
Inadequate Damages In P.I. Actions: Trends In Appellate Decisions, Owen T. Palmer Jr.
Cleveland State Law Review
There is no mystery in the language which courts from time immemorial expressed in an attempt to explain when they will interfere with a verdict which has been challenged on the grounds of either excessiveness or inadequacy. Lip service is given to the rule that the size of the verdict alone is not the criteria for interference with the verdict of a jury. The usual language is that excessiveness or inadequacy, to warrant interference, must evince or carry an implication of passion or prejudice, corruption, partiality, improper influences, or the like. An analysis of the decisions, however, justifies "the conclusion …