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University of Georgia School of Law

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Common benefit fees

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Monopolies In Multidistrict Litigation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch Jan 2017

Monopolies In Multidistrict Litigation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

When transferee judges receive a multidistrict proceeding, they select a few lead plaintiffs’ lawyers to efficiently manage litigation and settlement negotiations. That decision gives those attorneys total control over all consolidated plaintiffs’ claims and rewards them richly in common-benefit fees. It’s no surprise then that these are coveted positions, yet empirical evidence confirms that the same attorneys occupy them time and again.

Anytime repeat players exist and exercise both oligopolistic leadership control across multidistrict proceedings and monopolistic power within a single proceeding, there is concern that they will use their dominance to enshrine practices and norms that benefit themselves at …


Judging Multidistrict Litigation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch Oct 2015

Judging Multidistrict Litigation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Presentations and Speeches

Professor Elizabeth Chamblee Burch presented "Judging Multidistrict Litigation" at Duke University School of Law's Mass-Tort MDL Program for Judicial Conference Committees on October 8, 2015.


Judging Multidistrict Litigation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch Apr 2015

Judging Multidistrict Litigation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

High-stakes multidistrict litigations saddle the transferee judges who manage them with an odd juxtaposition of power and impotence. On one hand, judges appoint and compensate lead lawyers (who effectively replace parties’ chosen counsel) and promote settlement with scant appellate scrutiny or legislative oversight. But on the other, without the arsenal class certification once afforded, judges are relatively powerless to police the private settlements they encourage. Of course, this power shortage is of little concern since parties consent to settle.

Or do they? Contrary to conventional wisdom, this Article introduces new empirical data revealing that judges appoint an overwhelming number of …