Law Commons^™

From Protecting Water Quality To Protecting States’ Rights: Fifty Years Of Supreme Court Clean Water Act Statutory Interpretation, Stephen Johnson

SMU Law Review

In 1972, a bipartisan Congress enacted the Clean Water Act “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” Almost fifty years have passed since Congress enacted the law, and during that time, the Supreme Court has played a significant role in the administration and evolution of the law. Since the dawn of the environmental era in the 1970s, the Supreme Court has heard more cases involving the Clean Water Act than any other environmental law. However, the manner in which the Court has analyzed the law has changed substantially over the last half century. …

Up To Interpretation—Highlighting The Texas Supreme Court’S “Ambiguous” Approach To Statutory Construction, Kyle Gromann

SMU Law Review

No abstract provided.

“And The Truth Shall Make You Free”: Schenck, Abrams, And A Hundred Years Of History, Rodney A. Smolla

SMU Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Lessons Of 1919, Lackland H. Bloom

SMU Law Review

One hundred years ago, the Supreme Court embarked on its first serious consideration of the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech. In 1919, the Court upheld four federal criminal convictions over First Amendment defenses. Three of the majority opinions were written by Justice Holmes. In the fourth, he offered a classic dissent. Two of the cases, Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States, are of middling significance. The other two, Schenck v. United States and Abrams v. United States, are iconic. From these cases have sprung an expansive and complex jurisprudence of free speech. The …

The Clear And Present Dangers Of The Clear And Present Danger Test: Schenck And Abrams Revisited, Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr.

SMU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Falsity And The First Amendment, G. Edward White

SMU Law Review

This Article considers the extent to which the exclusion of forms of speech from the coverage of the First Amendment has turned on the falsity of statements within the excluded categories. It does so, first, by reviewing the Supreme Court’s early and mid-twentieth century free speech decisions, to demonstrate that none of the principal cases in which the Court swept a particular category of expression within the First Amendment’s coverage involved speech that was false; and, second, by suggesting that when the Court first announced that some “breathing space” was required for factually inaccurate statements about public officials or private …

Article Iii, Judicial Restraint, And This Supreme Court, Joseph S. Diedrich

SMU Law Review

Article III of the U.S. Constitution establishes a federal judiciary with powers and functions separate and distinct from the other branches. During its October 2017 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases that turned on an interpretation of Article III power: Patchak v. Zinke, Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group, and Gill v. Whitford.

This Article argues that in each of those three cases, a majority of the

Court coalesced around a unifying principle of judicial restraint. By “judicial restraint,” this Article refers to the principle that the judiciary should respect and defer to the elected branches. …

Originalist Reflections On Constitutional Freedom Of Speech, Christopher Wolfe

SMU Law Review

In this brief Article, I would like to offer some reflections on the First Amendment freedom of speech and press guarantee from an originalist perspective. This area seems to me to be one that is particularly difficult for originalists, and I think that there is insufficient acknowledgment of that fact among them.

Deliberative Democracy, Truth, And Holmesian Social Darwinism, Alexander Tsesis

SMU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Richard Posner: A Class Of One, Robert C. Farrell

SMU Law Review

Judge Richard Posner, best known for his contributions to the field of law and economics, has also made an outsized contribution to another area of the law—the equal protection class-of-one claim. By some combination of happenstance and design, Posner was able to shape the class-of-one doctrine even where his views were inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court’s initial exposition of the doctrine had identified an equal protection violation when there was intentionally different treatment of similarly situated persons without a rational basis for the difference in treatment. Posner insisted that this language included within it a requirement that …