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Full-Text Articles in Law

Constitutional Law's Conflicting Premises, Maxwell L. Stearns Dec 2020

Constitutional Law's Conflicting Premises, Maxwell L. Stearns

Notre Dame Law Review

Doctrinal inconsistency is constitutional law’s special feature and bug. Virtually every salient doctrinal domain presents major precedents operating in tension. Bodies of precedent are rarely abandoned simply because a newer strand makes an older one appear out of place. And when an earlier strand is redeployed or substituted, the once-newer strand likewise persists. This dynamic process tasks law students, often for the first time, with reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable.

These doctrinal phenomena share as their root cause dual persistent conflicting premises. Some examples: Standing protects congressional power to monitor the executive branch, or it limits congressional monitoring when the selected …


Forgotten Federal-Missionary Partnerships: New Light On The Establishment Clause, Nathan S. Chapman Dec 2020

Forgotten Federal-Missionary Partnerships: New Light On The Establishment Clause, Nathan S. Chapman

Notre Dame Law Review

Americans have long debated whether the Establishment Clause permits the government to support education that includes religious instruction. Current doctrine permits states to do so by providing vouchers for private schools on a religiously neutral basis. Unlike most Establishment Clause doctrines, however, the Supreme Court did not build this one on a historical foundation. Rather, in cases from Everson v. Board of Education (1947) to Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020), opponents of religious-school funding have claimed American history supports a strict rule of no-aid.

Yet the Court and scholars have largely ignored a practice that casts light on …


One Ring To Rule Them All: Individual Judgments, Nationwide Injunctions, And Universal Handcuffs, Paul J. Larkin Jr., Giancarlo Canaparo Dec 2020

One Ring To Rule Them All: Individual Judgments, Nationwide Injunctions, And Universal Handcuffs, Paul J. Larkin Jr., Giancarlo Canaparo

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

A large and growing body of literature criticizes nationwide injunctions, although a handful of scholars have come to their qualified defense. The literature has focused on whether universal injunctions comport with the historic scope of federal courts’ equitable powers and are good policy to boot. Largely missing from the debate is a fulsome analysis of whether the Constitution or the Judicial Code authorizes federal courts to issue such injunctions and whether they are permissible under existing Supreme Court precedent. We argue that the answer to each question is “no.”

Parts I and II explain that no positive law authorizes universal …


Distinguishing Permissible Preemption From Unconstitutional Commandeering, Edward A. Hartnett Nov 2020

Distinguishing Permissible Preemption From Unconstitutional Commandeering, Edward A. Hartnett

Notre Dame Law Review

For years, the preemption doctrine and the anticommandeering doctrine lived in an uneasy tension, with each threatening to consume the other. On the one hand, preemption permits Congress to insist that state law give way to congressional demands. On the other hand, the anticommandeering doctrine prohibits Congress from commandeering state legislatures or state executives. Without some way to establish a boundary between the two, preemption could swallow the anticommandeering doctrine by allowing Congress to control state law. Alternatively, absent some boundary, anticommandeering could swallow preemption by empowering states to refuse to be governed by the commands of federal law. Either …


The Great Writ And Federal Courts: Judge Wood's Solution In Search Of A Problem, William H. Pryor Jr. Jun 2020

The Great Writ And Federal Courts: Judge Wood's Solution In Search Of A Problem, William H. Pryor Jr.

Notre Dame Law Review

Judge Diane Wood provides, in her characteristically efficient prose, a thoughtful overview of the history of the Great Writ in service of a thesis that her essay otherwise fails to support. Judge Wood invokes Judge Henry Friendly’s classic article, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, to suggest that the writ of habeas corpus should be expanded to allow federal courts to review the petitions of state prisoners who allege their actual innocence without otherwise identifying any violation of federal law in securing their convictions. But that thesis cannot be squared with the proposal Judge Friendly championed in …


Certification Comes Of Age: Reflections On The Past, Present, And Future Of Cooperative Judicial Federalism, Kenneth F. Ripple, Kari Anne Gallagher Jun 2020

Certification Comes Of Age: Reflections On The Past, Present, And Future Of Cooperative Judicial Federalism, Kenneth F. Ripple, Kari Anne Gallagher

Notre Dame Law Review

In 1995, the American Judicature Society (AJS) undertook a comprehensive survey of certification. This Article uses the AJS’s survey as a starting point to examine the development of certification over the past twenty-five years. Were the fears of its critics well founded, or have the federal and state judiciaries adapted to mitigate the shortcomings of certification? Has certification been a useful tool in allowing for development of state law by the state judiciary, or has it been an imposition on the judiciary of a coequal sovereign?

Beyond these questions, this Article also will look at how certification has expanded beyond …


The Enduring Challenges For Habeas Corpus, Diane P. Wood Jun 2020

The Enduring Challenges For Habeas Corpus, Diane P. Wood

Notre Dame Law Review

Habeas corpus law has not remained static during the half century since Judge Friendly wrote, but neither has it provided satisfactory answers to the problems that he highlighted in his article. Unfortunately, many of the changes—well intended as they were by the enactors and implementers— have done nothing but create endless hurdles, loops, and traps for potential users. Enormous resources are poured into this elusive remedy. The rule of law is not well served when people are told that they have a remedy, but in fact they do not. Far better to have truth-in-labeling, so that the cases that deserve …


Does Docket Size Matter? Revisiting Empirical Accounts Of The Supreme Court's Incredibly Shrinking Docket, Michael Heise, Martin T. Wells, Dawn M. Chutkow May 2020

Does Docket Size Matter? Revisiting Empirical Accounts Of The Supreme Court's Incredibly Shrinking Docket, Michael Heise, Martin T. Wells, Dawn M. Chutkow

Notre Dame Law Review

Drawing on data from every Supreme Court Term between 1940 and 2017, this Article revisits, updates, and expands prior empirical work by Ryan Owens and David Simon (2012) finding that ideological, contextual, and institutional factors contributed to the Court’s declining docket. This Article advances Owens and Simon’s work in three ways: broadening the scope of the study by including nine additional Court Terms (through 2017), adding alternative ideological and nonideological variables into the model, and considering alternative model specifications. What emerges from this update and expansion, however, is less clarity and more granularity and complexity. While Owens and Simon emphasized …


Stare Decisis And The Supreme Court(S): What States Can Learn From Gamble, Zachary B. Pohlman May 2020

Stare Decisis And The Supreme Court(S): What States Can Learn From Gamble, Zachary B. Pohlman

Notre Dame Law Review

While almost all questions before the Supreme Court require statutory or constitutional interpretation, state courts of last resort occupy a unique place in the American judicial landscape. As common-law courts, state supreme courts are empowered to develop common-law doctrines in addition to interpreting democratically enacted texts. This Note argues that these two distinct state court functions—interpretation of statutes and constitutions, and common-law judging—call for two distinct approaches to stare decisis, a distinction that is often muddied in practice. Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Gamble v. United States provides the framework for each approach, a framework based on the genesis and development …


The Needle And The Damage Done: Mitchell V. Wisconsin'S Sweeping Rule For Warrantless Blood Draws On Unconscious Dui Suspects, Dyllan Taxman May 2020

The Needle And The Damage Done: Mitchell V. Wisconsin'S Sweeping Rule For Warrantless Blood Draws On Unconscious Dui Suspects, Dyllan Taxman

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

In a normal year, the annual death toll from drunk driving accidents in the United States will roughly equal the total number of victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks and service members killed in the War on Terror combined. And while every state has enacted increasingly progressive laws to prevent and punish driving under the influence (DUI), episodes of drunk driving remain consistent year to year and less than one percent of self-reported drunk drivers are arrested. Drunken and drugged driving is, both in lay terms and legally speaking, a compelling public issue. But the Fourth Amendment of the …


Public Rights After Oil States Energy, Adam J. Macleod Mar 2020

Public Rights After Oil States Energy, Adam J. Macleod

Notre Dame Law Review

The concept of public rights plays an important role in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States. But as the decision in Oil States last Term revealed, the Court has often used the term to refer to three different concepts with different jurisprudential implications. Using insights drawn from historical and analytical jurisprudence, this Article distinguishes the three concepts and examines how each of them is at work in patent law. A precise reading of Oil States also bears lessons for other areas of law that implicate both private rights and duties and the administration of public, regulatory …


The Supreme Court Bar At The Bar Of Patents, Paul R. Gugliuzza Mar 2020

The Supreme Court Bar At The Bar Of Patents, Paul R. Gugliuzza

Notre Dame Law Review

Over the past two decades, a few dozen lawyers have come to dominate practice before the U.S. Supreme Court. By many accounts, these elite lawyers—whose clients are often among the largest corporations in the world—have spurred the Court to hear more cases that businesses care about and to decide those cases in favor of their clients. The Supreme Court’s recent caselaw on antitrust, arbitration, punitive damages, class actions, and more provides copious examples.

Though it is often overlooked in discussions of the emergent Supreme Court bar, patent law is another area in which the Court’s agenda has changed significantly in …


The Traditions Of American Constitutional Law, Marc O. Degirolami Mar 2020

The Traditions Of American Constitutional Law, Marc O. Degirolami

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article identifies a new method of constitutional interpretation: the use of tradition as constitutive of constitutional meaning. It studies what the Supreme Court means by invoking tradition and whether what it means remains constant across the document and over time. Traditionalist interpretation is pervasive, consistent, and recurrent across the Court’s constitutional doctrine. So, too, are criticisms of traditionalist interpretation. There are also more immediate reasons to study the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation. The Court’s two newest members, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, have indicated that tradition informs their understanding of constitutional meaning. The study of traditionalist …


Untangling Entanglement, Stephanie H. Barclay Jan 2020

Untangling Entanglement, Stephanie H. Barclay

Journal Articles

The Court has increasingly signaled its interest in taking a more historical approach to the Establishment Clause. And in its recent American Legion decision, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the three-prong Lemon test is essentially dead letter. Such a result would make sense for the first two prongs of the Lemon test about secular purpose and the effects. Many scholars have observed that these aspects of the prong are judicial creations far afield of the Establishment Clause history. But what of the entanglement prong of the test? If we rejected all applications of this prong of the analysis, would …