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Shifting Sands For The Stateless Under The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Vivian Grosswald Curran

Articles

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) grants foreign sovereigns immunity from suit in U.S. courts, but also sets forth some exceptions. One exception to a foreign sovereign’s immunity occurs if its expropriation of property violates international law. Where the sovereign has expropriated property from its own nationals, however, the sovereign still remains immune from suit. This “domestic takings” rule is consistent with general principles of international law, although international law increasingly has been challenging a State’s right to mistreat its own nationals. In 2023, in Simon v. Republic of Hungary, the D.C. Circuit considered the issue of stateless plaintiffs, …

How Close Is Close Enough: A Step-By-Step Analysis To Resolve The Circuit Split Created By Misunderstanding The Spokeo Ruling, Cason Shipp

St. Mary's Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Born In The U.S.A.: Analyzing The Domesticity Of Judgments In The Civil Rico Context, Alex Reid

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Does The Discourse On 303 Creative Portend A Standing Realignment?, Richard M. Re

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Perhaps the most surprising feature of the last Supreme Court Term was the extraordinary public discourse on 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. According to many commentators, the Court decided what was really a “fake” or “made-up” case brought by someone who asserted standing merely because “she worries.” As a doctrinal matter, these criticisms are unfounded. But what makes this episode interesting is that the criticisms came from the legal Left, which has long been associated with expansive principles of standing. Doubts about standing in 303 Creative may therefore portend a broader standing realignment, in which liberal Justices become jurisdictionally hawkish. …

Biden V. Nebraska: The New State Standing And The (Old) Purposive Major Questions Doctrine, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Biden v. Nebraska does not sufficiently explain how Missouri has standing under established Article III doctrine, nor how the Court approaches the major questions doctrine as a method of statutory interpretation. Clarification can come from other opinions, even other cases entirely, in which Justice’s counterarguments are suggestive of the real arguments underlying the decisions.

MOHELA may have faced a concrete injury from the student debt waiver, but there was no evidence that Missouri would – and the majority had no answer for how Missouri had standing without an injury. A debate over special state …

Making Privacy Injuries Concrete, Peter Ormerod

Washington and Lee Law Review

In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the doctrine of Article III standing deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over some lawsuits involving intangible injuries. The lower federal courts are carrying out the Supreme Court’s instructions, and privacy injuries have borne the brunt of the Court’s directive. This Article identifies two incoherencies in the Court’s recent intangible injury decisions and builds on the work of privacy scholars to fashion a solution.

The first incoherency is a line-drawing problem: the Court has never explained why some intangible injuries create an Article III injury in fact while others …

Baby & Bathwater: Standing In Election Cases After 2020, Steven J. Mulroy

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The current consensus among commentators is that the flood of cases challenging the 2020 presidential election results was almost completely meritless. This consensus is correct as to the ultimate result, but not as to the courts’ treatment of standing. In their (understandable) zeal to reject sometimes frivolous attempts to overturn a legitimate election and undermine public confidence in our electoral system, many courts were too quick to rule that plaintiffs lacked standing. These rulings resulted in unjustified sweeping rulings that voters were not injured even if their legal votes were diluted by states accepting illegal votes; that campaigns did not …

Third-Party Standing And Abortion Providers: The Hidden Dangers Of June Medical Services, Elika Nassirinia

Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy

Standing is a long held, judicially-created doctrine intended to establish the proper role of courts by identifying who may bring a case in federal court. While standing usually requires that a party asserts his or her own rights, the Supreme Court has created certain exceptions that allow litigants to bring suit on behalf of third parties when they suffer a concrete injury, they have a “close relation” to the third party, and there are obstacles to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests. June Medical Services, heard by the Supreme Court on June 29, 2020, …

Free Exercise Standing: Extra-Centrality As Injury In Fact, Brendan T. Beery

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Part I of this Article surveys standing doctrine generally and tackles the problem of psychic insult—what might fairly, in some cases, be characterized as hurt feelings—as an injury. Part II addresses the special problems of finding concrete and palpable injuries in religion cases, noting that it is more difficult to identify such injuries in Establishment Clause cases than in free exercise cases. When free exercise is viewed as dynamic and kinetic, free exercise injuries are discernible and concrete: they occur when a person is forced to participate in religious undertakings or express beliefs against his or her will, or …

Standing For Standing Rock?: Vindicating Native American Religious And Land Rights By Adapting New Zealand's Te Awa Tupua Act To American Soil, Malcolm Mcdermond

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

On February 23, 2017, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (“Tribe”) was forced to disband its nearly year-long protest against the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, which threatened the integrity of its ancestral lands. The Tribe sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, but the court ruled against the Tribe and failed to protect its interests. While the United States was forcibly removing Indigenous protesters, other countries were taking steps to protect Indigenous populations. In unprecedented legislative action, New Zealand took radical steps to protect the land and cultural rights of …

The Myth Of Morrison: Securities Fraud Litigation Against Foreign Issuers, Robert Bartlett, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon

All Faculty Scholarship

Using a sample of 388 securities fraud lawsuits filed between 2002 and 2017 against foreign issuers, we examine the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. We find that the description of Morrison as a steamroller, substantially ending litigation against foreign issuers, is a myth. Instead, we find that Morrison did not significantly change the type of litigation brought against foreign issuers, which, both before and after this case, focused on foreign issuers with a U.S. listing and substantial U.S. trading volume. Although dismissal rates rose post-Morrison, we find no evidence …

A Post-Spokeo Taxonomy Of Intangible Harms, Jackson Erpenbach

Michigan Law Review

Article III standing is a central requirement in federal litigation. The Supreme Court’s Spokeo decision marked a significant development in the doctrine, dividing the concrete injury-in-fact requirement into two subsets: tangible and intangible harms. While tangible harms are easily cognizable, plaintiffs alleging intangible harms can face a perilous path to court. This raises particular concern for the system of federal consumer protection laws where enforcement relies on consumers vindicating their own rights by filing suit when companies violate federal law. These plaintiffs must often allege intangible harms arising out of their statutorily guaranteed rights. This Note demonstrates that Spokeo’s …

State Standing In United States V. Texas: Opening The Floodgates To States Challenging The Federal Government Or Proper Federalism?, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court by an equally divided vote, 4 to 4, affirmed the decision of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that the State of Texas had Article III standing to challenge in federal court the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) directive establishing a Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program to grant lawful immigration status to millions of undocumented immigrants. A serious question is whether state standing in this case will open the floodgates to allow states to challenge virtually every federal executive action. On the other hand, …

Brief Of The National Association For Public Defense As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Byrd V. U.S. (U.S. June 12, 2017) (No. 16- 1371)., Janet Moore

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

More than two centuries after it was ratified, the Fourth Amendment continues to protect the “right of the people to be secure” from “unreasonable searches.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Modern technological advances and social developments do not render our rights “any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014). This Court plays an essential role in ensuring that the Fourth Amendment retains its vitality as an indispensable safeguard of liberty, even as Americans dramatically change the ways they organize their everyday affairs. This case calls for the Court to …

Legislative Exhaustion, Michael Sant’Ambrogio

William & Mary Law Review

Legislative lawsuits are a recurring by-product of divided government. Yet the Supreme Court has never definitively resolved whether Congress may sue the executive branch over its execution of the law. Some scholars argue that Congress should be able to establish Article III standing when its interests are harmed by executive action or inaction just like private parties. Others, including most prominently the late Justice Antonin Scalia, argue that intergovernmental disputes do not constitute Article III “cases” or “controversies” at all. Rather, the Framers envisioned the political branches resolving their differences through nonjudicial means.

This Article proposes a different approach to …

A House Built On Shifting Sands: Standing Under The Fair Housing Act After Thompson V. North American Stainless, Eric Vanderhoef

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

For decades, the Supreme Court construed standing under the Fair Housing Act broadly; any party could bring suit as long as it met Constitutional Standing requirements. In January 2011, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, the Court restricted standing under Title VII—a statute with similar empowering language to the Fair Housing Act. The Court will address Fair Housing Act standing post-Thompson in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami. This commentary argues that standing under the Fair Housing Act should be restricted. Additionally, it argues that the allegations of the Plaintiff-Respondent, City of Miami, of widespread reductions in tax …

Spokeo Misspeaks, Lauren E. Willis

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Most commentators have critiqued the Supreme Court’s opinion in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins for failing to answer the question presented. But in important ways, the Spokeo opinion does not merely fail to speak—it affirmatively misspeaks. This essay suggests that underlying the Justices’ inability to see how standing law ought to apply to the facts in Spokeo is a failure to appreciate the power that consumer reports have over individuals’ life prospects today. Worse, the Justices’ unawareness of their own ignorance leads them to afford Congress little deference in identifying injuries occurring in our new information society. Their meta-ignorance also induces …

Standing After Snowden: Lessons On Privacy Harm From National Security Surveillance Litigation, Margot E. Kaminski

Publications

Article III standing is difficult to achieve in the context of data security and data privacy claims. Injury in fact must be "concrete," "particularized," and "actual or imminent"--all characteristics that are challenging to meet with information harms. This Article suggests looking to an unusual source for clarification on privacy and standing: recent national security surveillance litigation. There we can find significant discussions of what rises to the level of Article III injury in fact. The answers may be surprising: the interception of sensitive information; the seizure of less sensitive information and housing of it in a database for analysis; and …

Law Enforcement As Political Question, Zachary S. Price

Notre Dame Law Review

Across a range of contexts, federal courts have crafted doctrines that limit judicial secondguessing of executive nonenforcement decisions. Key case law, however, carries important ambiguities of scope and rationale. In particular, key decisions have combined rationales rooted in executive prerogative with concerns about nonenforcement’s “unsuitability” for judicial resolution. With one nonenforcement initiative now before the Supreme Court and other related issues percolating in lower courts, this Article makes the case for the latter rationale. Judicial review of nonenforcement, on this account, involves a form of political question, in the sense of the “political question doctrine”: while executive officials hold a …

Hurdles To The Court: The Doctrine Of Standing Under Statutory Violations, Priya Khangura

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

Standing is a precondition for any suit brought in federal court. This Commentary analyzes a Supreme Court case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, which will address whether a violation of a federal statute grants a plaintiff standing to sue. The Author argues that such a violation is sufficient for establishing standing because the plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact which the legisture intended to prevent. That harm is both traceable to the violation and redressible by statute. Thus, the requisite elements of constitutional standing exist in this case. Such a holding follows from existing standing jurisprudence and ensures that plaintiffs can have …

The Indefinite Deflection Of Congressional Standing, Nat Stern

Pepperdine Law Review

Recent litigation brought or threatened against the administration of President Obama has brought to prominence the question of standing by Congress or its members to sue the President for nondefense or non-enforcement of federal law. While scholars divide over the normative propriety of such suits, the Court has never issued a definitive pronouncement on their viability. Nevertheless, the Court’s rulings when the issue has arisen have displayed a distinct pattern. While the Court has not formally repudiated suits of this nature, neither has it issued a decision that hinges on the presence of congressional standing. On the contrary, the Court …

Article Iii Standing For Private Plaintiffs Challenging Greenhouse Gas Regulations, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

An important unresolved question is whether non-state plaintiffs have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to sue in federal courts in climate change cases. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held a state government could sue the U.S. government to address climate change issues, and suggested, but did not decide, that private litigants might have lesser rights than states. In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, the Ninth Circuit held that private groups did not have standing to challenge Washington State’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from five oil refineries, and implied that private plaintiffs may …

Does A House Of Congress Have Standing Over Appropriations?: The House Of Representatives Challenges The Affordable Care Act, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In U.S. House of Representatives v. Sylvia Matthews Burwell, the District Court for D.C. in 2015 held that the House of Representatives has Article III standing to challenge certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act as violations of the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on legislative standing is complicated. The Court has generally avoided the contentious question of whether Congress has standing to challenge certain presidential actions because of the difficult separation-of-powers concerns in such cases. In Raines v. Byrd, the Court held that individual members of Congress generally do not have Article III standing by simply holding …

Data Breaches, Identity Theft And Article Iii Standing: Will The Supreme Court Resolve The Split In The Circuits, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In data breach cases, the lower federal courts have split on the question of whether the plaintiffs meet Article III standing requirements for injury and causation. In its 2013 decision Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court, in a case involving alleged electronic surveillance by the U.S. government’s National Security Agency, declared that a plaintiff alleging that it will suffer future injuries from a defendant’s allegedly improper conduct must show that such injuries are “certainly impending.” Since the Clapper decision, a majority of the lower federal courts addressing “lost data” or potential identity theft cases in which there is …

The Supreme Court Acknowledges Congress’ Authority To Confer Informational Standing In Spokeo, Inc. V. Robins, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins does not fully resolve when an intangible injury such as a defendant’s misreporting of a plaintiff’s personal information is sufficient to constitute a “concrete injury” for Article III standing. However, the Spokeo decision makes clear that Congress has a significant role in defining intangible injuries for Article III standing beyond what was considered an injury under the American or English common law. Some commentators had thought Spokeo might overrule the Court’s prior decisions in Akins and Public Citizen, which both held that a plaintiff may have standing based solely upon …

Standing In The Way Of The Ftaia: Exceptional Applications Of Illinois Brick, Jennifer Fischell

Michigan Law Review

In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Antitrust Trade Improvements Act (FTAIA) to resolve uncertainties about the international reach and effect of U.S. antitrust laws. Unfortunately, the FTAIA has provided more questions than answers. It has been ten years since the Supreme Court most recently interpreted the FTAIA, and crucial questions and circuit splits abound. One of these questions is how to understand the convergence of the direct purchaser rule (frequently referred to as the Illinois Brick doctrine) and the FTAIA. Under the direct purchaser rule, only those who purchase directly from antitrust violators are typically permitted to sue under section …

Injury-In-Fact In Chilling Effect Challenges To Public University Speech Codes, Jennifer L. Bruneau

Catholic University Law Review

Campus speech codes began to spring up on university campuses during the 1980s and continue to operate today. The codes regulate various forms of arguably offensive speech, including speech regarding race, gender, sexual orientation, ideology, views, and political affiliation. Numerous litigants have challenged the chilling effect these policies have on student and faculty speech, but in cases where the challenged code has not yet been enforced, some courts find that the plaintiff has not met the “injury-in-fact” requirement for Article III standing. The Supreme Court has not ruled on standing requirements in speech code challenges and lower courts are divided. …

Standing; Assertion Of Jus Tertii; Sex Discrimination; Equal Protection; Twenty-First Amendment; Craig V. Boren, Anthony Sadowski

Akron Law Review

"A PPELLANTS brought an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint charged that the operation of two Oklahoma statutes, which prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 while allowing females over the age of 18 to purchase the commodity, violated the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. The three-judge court held that the gender-based classification did not violate the equal protection clause. In Craig v. Boren, on direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the gender-based classification could …

Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard For Fear-Based Injury In Clapper V. Amnesty International Usa, Andrew C. Sand

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff can have Article III standing based on a fear of future harm, or fear-based injury. The Court’s approach to fear-based injury, however, has been unclear and inconsistent. This Note seeks to clarify the Court’s doctrine using principles from probability theory. It contends that fear-based injury should be governed by a substantial-risk standard that encapsulates the probability concept of expected value. This standard appears in footnote 5 of Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, a recent case in which the Court held that a group of plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of …

Fixing Hollingsworth: Standing In Initiative Cases, Karl Manheim, John S. Caragozian, Donald Warner

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal filed by the “Official Proponents” of California’s Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in California. Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion held that initiative sponsors lack Article III standing to defend their ballot measures even when state officials refuse to defend against constitutional challenges. As a result, Hollingsworth provides state officers with the ability to overrule laws that were intended to bypass the government establishment—in effect, an “executive veto” of popularly-enacted initiatives.

The Article examines this new “executive veto” in depth. It places Hollingsworth in context, discussing the initiative process …