Law Commons^™

The Tragedy Of Justice Scalia, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

Justice Antonin Scalia was, by the time of his death last February, the Supreme Court’s best known and most influential member. He was also its most polarizing, a jurist whom most students of American law either love or hate. This essay, styled as a twenty-year retrospective on A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia’s Tanner lectures on statutory and constitutional interpretation, aims to prod partisans on both sides of our central legal and political divisions to better appreciate at least some of what their opponents see—the other side of Scalia’s legacy. Along the way, it critically assesses Scalia’s particular brand of …

The Original Meaning Of "God": Using The Language Of The Framing Generation To Create A Coherent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, Michael I. Meyerson

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The Supreme Court’s attempt to create a standard for evaluating whether the Establishment Clause is violated by religious governmental speech, such as the public display of the Ten Commandments or the Pledge of Allegiance, is a total failure. The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been termed “convoluted,” “a muddled mess,” and “a polite lie.” Unwilling to either allow all governmental religious speech or ban it entirely, the Court is in need of a coherent standard for distinguishing the permissible from the unconstitutional. Thus far, no Justice has offered such a standard.

A careful reading of the history of the framing …

What Lies Beneath: Interpretive Methodology, Constitutional Authority, And The Case Of Originalism, Christopher J. Peters

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It is a remarkable fact of American constitutional practice that we cannot agree on a methodology of constitutional interpretation. What can explain our disagreement? Is it the product of a deeper, principled dispute about the meaning of constitutional law? Or is it just a veneer – a velvet curtain obscuring what is really a back-room brawl over political outcomes?

This Article suggests that these, in essence, are the only viable possibilities. Either we disagree about interpretation because we disagree (or are confused) about constitutional authority – about why the Constitution binds us in the first place; or we disagree because …

Plenary No Longer: How The Fourteenth Amendment "Amended" Congressional Jurisdiction-Stripping Power, Maggie Blackhawk

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This Note proposes a solution to the long-standing debate among federal courts scholars as to where to draw the limits of congressional power to strip appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and to strip original jurisdiction from the lower federal courts. Although the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the possibility of limitations on congressional jurisdiction-stripping power, the few determinative cases to go before the Court reveal an acceptance of the orthodox view of plenary power. Proponents of the orthodox view maintain that state courts, bound to hear constitutional claims by their general jurisdictional grant and to enforce the Constitution by …

Judicial Restraint And Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez And Seminole Tribe Decisions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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The Senate hearings considering Elena Kagan’s Supreme Court nomination called new attention to the Constitution's Commerce Clause. That concern might seem odd, given the typical lack of strong grassroots concern over the commerce power. But the 2010 election year is different. One characteristic of the largely conservative "Tea Party" movement is a wish to roll back Constitutional time to the regime envisioned by its founders. As the New York Times reported in early July, 2010, members of the movement believe that the “commerce clause in particular has been pushed beyond recognition.” Members of the movement imagine that Congressional power over …