Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Forward: Some Puzzles Of State Standing, Tara Leigh Grove
Forward: Some Puzzles Of State Standing, Tara Leigh Grove
Faculty Publications
When should states have standing? In recent years, there has been an explosion in literature on that question.1 Yet, even today, there seem to be as many questions as answers. In this Foreword to the Notre Dame Law Review’s 2019 Federal Courts, Practice, and Procedure Symposium on state standing, I discuss a few such puzzles. First, should states have “special” standing when they sue the federal government—that is, greater access to federal court than private parties? Second, and conversely, should states have at least “equal” access to federal court, or should they face more barriers than private parties? These questions …
Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, And Fifty Approaches To The Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash
Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, And Fifty Approaches To The Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash
Faculty Publications
Whether a state attorney general has a duty to defend the validity of state law is a complicated question, one that cannot be decided by reference either to the oath state officers must take to support the federal Constitution or the supremacy of federal law. Instead, whether a state attorney general must defend state law turns on her own state’s laws. Each state has its own constitution, statutes, bar rules, and traditions, and not surprisingly, the duties of attorneys general vary across the states. To simplify somewhat, we believe that there are three types of duties. One set of attorneys …
Vertical Power, Michael S. Green
Vertical Power, Michael S. Green
Faculty Publications
Many legal scholars and federal judges - including Justices Ginsburg and Scalia - have implicitly assumed that a state can extend its procedural law solely to federal courts within its borders. To date, however, no one has identified this assumption, much less defended it. Drawing upon an example discussed by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), I argue that such vertical power does not exist. Not only do states lack a legitimate interest in extending their law vertically, a state's assertion of vertical power would improperly discriminate against federal courts. If state …