Law Commons^™

Marshall V Madison: The Supreme Court And Original Intent, 1803-1835, Gordon Lloyd

School of Public Policy Working Papers

Should the justices of the Supreme Court rely on “original intent” as the foundation for constitutional interpretation? Or should they be free to interpret the Constitution in light of hermeneutical approaches created by current philosophies of law? This essay examines the Marshall Court to determine whether its opinions take their bearings from the American Founding or instead rely on a philosophy of jurisprudence that can be separated from the Founding. The purposes of this essay are fourfold: 1) to provide a comprehensive account of the use of the Framers by the Marshall Court, 2) address the normative question of the …

Conference Summary: Water, Climate And Uncertainty: Implications For Western Water Law, Policy, And Management, Steve Bailey

Water, Climate and Uncertainty: Implications for Western Water Law, Policy, and Management (Summer Conference, June 11-13)

7 pages.

"Steve Bailey, National Center for Atmospheric Research"

“Don't Buy Another Vote. I Won't Pay For A Landslide": The Sordid And Continuing History Of Political Corruption In West Virginia, Allen Hayes Loughry Ii

SJD Dissertation Abstracts

This study documents the long and sordid history of corruption--both perceived and corroborated--in the West Virginia political process. The researcher explores the considerable amounts of money spent by wealthy individuals for election or re-election. It documents the effect of high-cost elections, an effect which in many instances has spawned criminal activity. The author relates ostensibly ceaseless measures of corruption at the executive, legislative, and judicial levels. The findings indicate the existence of problems in West Virginia politics since the State's inception in 1863, including vote buying, vote rigging, undue geographical barriers, and lawlessness leading to numerous declarations of martial law. …

Legal Transitions: Some Welfarist Remarks, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

This essay offers a sympathetic, utilitarian critique of Louis Kaplow's famous argument for legal retroactivity in his 1986 article, "An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions." The argument, very roughly, is that the prospect of retroactivity is desirable if citizens are rational because it gives them a desirable incentive to anticipate legal change. My central claim is that this argument trades upon a dubious, objective view of probability that assumes rational citizens assign the same probabilities to states as rational governmental officials. But it is subjective, not objective probabilities that bear on rational choice, and the subjective probabilities of rational citizens …