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Full-Text Articles in Law
Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs, Charles Angelucci, Martijn Han
Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs, Charles Angelucci, Martijn Han
Martijn A. Han
Compliance programs entail monitoring of employees' behavior with the claimed objective of fighting corporate crime. (Competition) Authorities promote such intra-firm monitoring. In a three-tier hierarchy model, authority-shareholder-manager, we study the impact of monitoring through a compliance program on contracting within the firm and the authority's optimal sanctions and leniency policy. We find that compliance programs are beneficial in the fight against corporate crime if and only if the managerial sanction is low. Moreover, when the shareholder blows the whistle, the authority optimally grants partial corporate leniency, while not granting individual leniency to the involved employees. Conversely, when the employee blows …
The Overcharge As A Measure For Antitrust Damages, Martijn Han, Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra
The Overcharge As A Measure For Antitrust Damages, Martijn Han, Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra
Martijn A. Han
Victims of antitrust violations can recover damages in court. Yet, the quantification of antitrust damages and to whom they accrue is often complex. An illegal price increase somewhere in the chain of production percolates through to the other layers in a ripple of partial pass-ons. The resulting reductions in sales and input demands lead to additional harm to both downstream (in)direct purchasers and upstream suppliers. Nevertheless, U.S. civil antitrust litigation is almost exclusively concerned with direct purchaser claims for (treble) damages calculated on the basis of the overcharge. Similar best practice rules are emerging in Europe. In this paper, we …