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Full-Text Articles in Law
Comparative Analysis Of U.S. And Saudi Arabia Investment Funds Regulations, Gabriella Tang
Comparative Analysis Of U.S. And Saudi Arabia Investment Funds Regulations, Gabriella Tang
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
The investment funds sector has always been a major player in the financial industry globally. As such, many countries with mature financial markets have enacted regulations to govern the activity and management of investment funds. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940(the Act) as an effort to restore investor confidence in investment funds and safeguard investors from future abuses after the market crash in 1929. On the other hand, emerging financial markets started to take part in regulations in the hope to attract more investors and outside resources. The Capital Market Authority of …
The Indian Securities Fraud Class Action: Is Class Arbitration The Answer?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Randall S. Thomas
The Indian Securities Fraud Class Action: Is Class Arbitration The Answer?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Randall S. Thomas
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Abstract:
In 2013, India enacted one of the most robust private enforcement regimes for securities fraud violations in the world. Unlike in most other countries, Indian shareholders can now initiate securities fraud lawsuits on their own, represent all other defrauded shareholders unless those shareholders affirmatively opt out, and collect money damages for the entire class. The only thing missing is a better financing mechanism: unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia, India does not permit contingency fees, so class action lawyers cannot front the costs of litigation in exchange for collecting a percentage of what they recover. On the other …
Crowding Out Theory: Protecting Shareholders By Balancing Executives’ Incentives In France, The United States, & China, Palden Flynn
Crowding Out Theory: Protecting Shareholders By Balancing Executives’ Incentives In France, The United States, & China, Palden Flynn
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
This paper explores the differences between executive compensation regimes in France, the United States, and China. It asks whether there is a link between state regulation of real options as a form of executive compensation and state regulation of shareholder protections. This paper argues that if a country regulates the use of real options as compensation, then that country is also more likely to have strong shareholder protection laws. This argument seems to be true based on a descriptive review of executive compensation law and shareholder protections in France, the United States, and China.
If it is true that countries …