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Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Law
Is The Public Utility Holding Company Act A Model For Breaking Up The Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail, Roberta S. Karmel
Is The Public Utility Holding Company Act A Model For Breaking Up The Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail, Roberta S. Karmel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Upper-Level Courses: Three Exemplars, Eric J. Gouvin, Mark Fagan, Tamar Frankel, Kathy Z. Heller
Upper-Level Courses: Three Exemplars, Eric J. Gouvin, Mark Fagan, Tamar Frankel, Kathy Z. Heller
Faculty Scholarship
This Article presents three exemplars of upper-level law school classes, and is divided into three parts. Part I discusses "Securitization and Asset-Backed Securities"; Part II discusses "Using Transactions to Teach Secured Transactions"; and Part III discusses "Teaching Deals Through a Focus on the Entertainment Industry."
Chapman Dialogue And Law Review Symposium Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches To Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz
Chapman Dialogue And Law Review Symposium Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches To Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Ideal financial regulation would work ex ante, to prevent financial failures. Once a failure occurs, there may already be economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from spreading and becoming systemic. The reality, though, is that preventing financial failures should be only one role for regulators. Even an optimal prophylactic regulatory regime cannot anticipate and prevent every failure. This paper, which formed my Chapman Dialogue Address at Chapman University School of Law and the keynote speech at Chapman Law Review’s 2011 Symposium on the Future of Financial Regulation, attempts to contrast fundamental differences between ex ante …
Keynote Address: Identifying And Managing Systemic Risk: An Assessment Of Our Progress, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Address: Identifying And Managing Systemic Risk: An Assessment Of Our Progress, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This short address attempts to provide a succinct overview, critiquing how well the Dodd-Frank Act identifies and manages systemic risk.
Drafting A Model Collective Action Clause For Eurozone Sovereign Bonds, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit
Drafting A Model Collective Action Clause For Eurozone Sovereign Bonds, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit
Faculty Scholarship
In the wake of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the European financial authorities announced last November that all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after mid-2013 must contain an identical collective action clause (CAC) in order, if necessary, to facilitate a restructuring of those
instruments.
CACs in sovereign bonds have been the subject of considerable attention over the last ten years. They were introduced into sovereign bonds governed by U.S. law only in early 2003. Yet a surprising number of versions of the clause can be found in modern sovereign bonds.
The history of the research and development of this contractual provision …
Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Barbarians At The Gate?, Michelle M. Harner
Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Barbarians At The Gate?, Michelle M. Harner
Faculty Scholarship
The term “corporate raiders” previously struck fear in the hearts of corporate boards and management teams. It generally refers to investors who target undervalued, cash-flush or mismanaged companies and initiate a hostile takeover of the company. Corporate raiders earned their name in part because of their focus on value extraction, which could entail dismantling a company and selling off its crown jewels. Today, the term often conjures up images of Michael Milken, Henry Kravis or the movie character Gordon Gekko, but the alleged threat posed to companies by corporate raiders is less prevalent—at least with respect to the traditional use …
Overwhelming A Financial Regulatory Black Hole With Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’S Attack On Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused By An Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, Michael Greenberger
Faculty Scholarship
It is now accepted wisdom that it was the non-transparent, poorly capitalized and almost wholly unregulated over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market that lit the fuse that exploded the highly vulnerable worldwide economy in the fall of 2008.[1] Because tens of trillions of dollars of these financial products were pegged to the economic performance of an overheated and highly inflated housing market, the sudden collapse of that market triggered under-capitalized OTC derivative guarantees of the subprime housing market; and the guarantors’ multi-trillion dollar interconnectedness with thousands of other OTC derivatives’ counterparties within that OTC market (through interest rate, currency, foreign exchange, and …
Will The Cftc Defy Congress's Mandate To Stop Excessive Speculation In Commodity Markets And Aid And Abet Hyperinflation In World Food And Energy Prices: Analysis Of The Cftc's Proposed Rules On Speculative Position Limits, Michael Greenberger
Faculty Scholarship
On January 26, 2011, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Position Limits for Derivatives pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The proposed rules are designed to implement the historic Congressional mandate of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by Section 737 of the Dodd-Frank Act, to ban excessive speculation from the derivatives market, i.e., the speculation which exceeds the need for liquidity by commercial handlers hedging price risk in these markets. Section 737 is the result of multi-year consideration by Congress, during which a strong consensus was reached …
What Happened To The "Up-Tick" Rule?, Constantine N. Katsoris
What Happened To The "Up-Tick" Rule?, Constantine N. Katsoris
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards An Analytical Framework, Steven L. Schwarcz, Iman Anabtawi
Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards An Analytical Framework, Steven L. Schwarcz, Iman Anabtawi
Faculty Scholarship
The global financial crisis demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of financial market participants to safeguard the stability of the financial system. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to attempting to prevent them from arising. Governments and international organizations are responding with measures intended to make the financial system more resilient to economic shocks, many of which will be implemented by regulatory bodies over time. These measures suffer, however, from the lack of a theoretical account of how systemic risk propagates within the financial system and why regulatory …
Potentially Perverse Effects Of Corporate Civil Liability, Samuel W. Buell
Potentially Perverse Effects Of Corporate Civil Liability, Samuel W. Buell
Faculty Scholarship
Inadequate civil regulatory liability can be an incentive for public enforcers to pursue criminal cases against firms. This incentive is undesirable in a scheme with overlapping forms of liability that is meant to treat most cases of wrongdoing civilly and to reserve the criminal remedy for the few most serious institutional delicts. This effect appears to exist in the current scheme of liability for securities law violations, and may be present in other regulatory structures as well. In this chapter for a volume on "Prosecutors in the Boardroom," the author argues that enhancements of the SEC's enforcement processes likely would …
Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This accessible analysis of systemic risk regulation was delivered as the keynote speech at an October 20, 2011 European Central Bank conference on regulation of financial services. Many regulatory responses, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or not they exist). To be most effective, however, the regulation must be situated within a more analytical framework. In this speech, I attempt to build that framework, showing that preventive regulation is insufficient and that regulation also must be designed to limit the transmission of systemic risk …
Political Risk And Sovereign Debt Contracts, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner
Political Risk And Sovereign Debt Contracts, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner
Faculty Scholarship
Default on sovereign debt is a form of political risk. Issuers and creditors have responded to this risk both by strengthening the terms in sovereign debt contracts that enable creditors to enforce their debts judicially and by creating terms that enable sovereigns to restructure their debts. These apparently contradictory approaches reflect attempts to solve an incomplete contracting problem in which debtors need to be forced to repay debts in good states of the world; debtors need to be granted partial relief from debt payments in bad states; debtors may attempt to exploit divisions among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce …
The Paradoxes Of Dodd-Frank, James D. Cox
Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox
Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox
Faculty Scholarship
The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market provides a wide-ranging criticism of and thoughtful reforms for securities class actions....However, both their critique of contemporary class actions and their model of the reforms they propose leave unexamined a good many matters relevant to both the criticism and reform of securities class actions....Bratton and Wachter earn high marks for being less passionate and much more thoughtful than others in the chorus calling for reform; indeed, their observations are among the most thoughtful to be found in this area. Nonetheless, their analysis is incomplete in many important areas, and in addition to …
Upper-Level Courses: Three Examplars, Mark Fagan, Tamar Frankel, Eric J. Gouvin, Kathy Z. Heller
Upper-Level Courses: Three Examplars, Mark Fagan, Tamar Frankel, Eric J. Gouvin, Kathy Z. Heller
Faculty Scholarship
I'm Mark Fagan, and I co-teach a course on securitization with Tamar Frankel at Boston University School of Law. We have come together to teach several interdisciplinary courses that combine law, business and public policy. Our course on securitization is a wonderful exemplar because it touches so many aspects of law as well as business and public policy.
We spent quite a bit of time wrestling with how to teach it. Do you teach it in a process fashion? Do you teach it by legal topic? Do you take examples and examine them? After much debate and discussion, we actually …