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Full-Text Articles in Law
Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, David H. Webber
Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, David H. Webber
Faculty Scholarship
In this Article, I imagine a post-class action landscape for shareholder litigation. Assuming, for the sake of this exercise, an environment in which both securities-fraud and transactional class actions are hobbled by procedural or substantive reforms — most likely through the adoption of mandatory-arbitration provisions or fee-shifting provisions — I assess what shareholder litigation would disappear, what would remain, and what a post-class action landscape would look like. I argue that loss of the class action would remove a layer of legal insulation that prevents institutional investors from having to pursue positive value claims against companies. Currently, the class action …
Federalizing Fiduciary Duty: The Altered Scope Of Officer Fiduciary Duty Following Orderly Liquidation Under Dodd-Frank, Dorothy S. Lund
Federalizing Fiduciary Duty: The Altered Scope Of Officer Fiduciary Duty Following Orderly Liquidation Under Dodd-Frank, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
The financial crisis of 2008 ushered in a new era of regulatory reform in the United States. The failure of several large banks prompted Congressional scrutiny ofthe U.S. bank regulatory system. Many critics highlighted the government's failure to intervene to prevent Lehman Brothers' insolvency, which resulted in economic turmoil not yet resolved. Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank") in July 2010.
Dodd-Frank mandates institutional changes to minimize economic instability and establishes regulatory processes to guide the government's response to future bank failures. At the heart of the regulation is the Orderly …
The Missing Link Between Insider Trading And Securities Fraud, Richard A. Booth
The Missing Link Between Insider Trading And Securities Fraud, Richard A. Booth
Faculty Scholarship
In a recent article, I argued that diversified investors - the vast majority of investors - would prefer that securities fraud class actions under the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 be dismissed in the absence of insider trading or similar offenses during the fraud period. See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 Berk. Bus. L. J. 1 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=683197. In this article, I draw on the classic case, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Company, to show that the federal courts originally viewed securities fraud as inextricably connected to insider trading …
Stockholders, Stakeholders, And Bagholders (Or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law
Stockholders, Stakeholders, And Bagholders (Or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law
Faculty Scholarship
The traditional wisdom is that management should serve the interests of the corporation and the stockholders who own it by maximizing stockholder wealth. But a significant number of legal scholars argue that management duty should be more broadly construed to include other constituencies ("stakeholders"), such as employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and the community at large. The broader view of management duty means that management has more discretion and that stockholders will seldom have recourse if management fails to maximize profits. Nevertheless, many states have adopted so-called other constituency statutes permitting management to consider such other interests. The difference between the …