Law Commons^™

Do Differences In Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping In Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal And Empirical Analyses, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox, Lynn Bai

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Federal appellate courts have promulgated divergent legal standards for pleading fraud in securities fraud class actions after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights that could have resolved these differences, but did not do so. This article provides two significant contributions. We first show that Tellabs avoids deciding the hard issues that confront courts and litigants daily in the wake of the PSLRA's heightened pleading standard. As a consequence, the opinion keeps very much alive the circuits' disparate interpretations of the PSLRA's fraud pleading standard. …

Public And Private Enforcement Of The Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this paper, we examine how those corporations that have been the targets of SEC enforcement efforts compare in terms of their size and financial health vis-a-vis firms that are targeted only by the private securities class action. We also ask whether the SEC or the private bar systematically proceeds against violators that cause the greatest loss to investors. In this regard, we are intrigued by the most basic question posed by private suits, whether settlements bear any relationship to the losses suffered by the class and whether those losses bear any relationship to the size of either the firm …

The New Look Of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Shareholder litigation is the most frequently maligned legal check on managerial misconduct within corporations. Derivative lawsuits and federal securities class actions are portrayed as slackers in debates over how best to control the managerial agency costs created by the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. In each instance, early hopes these suits would effectively monitor managerial misconduct have been replaced with concerns about the size of the litigation agency costs of such representative litigation, which can arise when a self-selected plaintiff's attorney and her client that are appointed to pursue the claims of an entire class of …

Recent Cases, Law Review Staff

Vanderbilt Law Review

Constitutional Law--Due Process--Replevin Statutes Allowing Seizure of Property Without Notice and Opportunity for Hearing Violate Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment

Constitutional Law--Right to Counsel--Absent Waiver,No Defendant May Be Imprisoned Unless Represented By Counsel At Trial

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Class Action Alleging Similar Injury by Separate Defendants Who Acted Similarly but Independently Allowed Under Rule 23(b)(3)

Securities Regulation--Securities Act of 1933-Access Of All Offerees To Additional Desired Information Required For Section 4(2) Private Offering Exemption

Torts-Joint Tort-feasors--Apportionment of Damages Among Negligent Joint Tort-feasors Based upon Relative Responsibility of Parties