Law Commons^™

Judges Should Be Discerning Consensus, Not Evaluating Scientific Expertise, David S. Caudill, Harry Collins, Robert Evans

University of Cincinnati Law Review

One of the most constructive critiques of the Daubert admissibility regime is Professor Edward Cheng’s recent proposal for a new Consensus Rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rejecting the notion that judges and juries have the capacity to evaluate scientific expertise, Cheng’s proposal would eliminate Daubert hearings—and judicial gatekeeping concerning expert testimony—and require judges and juries, in their verdicts, to follow consensus in the relevant scientific community. Significantly, Cheng argues that judges and juries would have an easier time identifying consensus than they have in deciding between experts who disagree.

We find Cheng’s emphasis on consensus compelling, and …

How Daubert And Its Progeny Have Failed Criminalistics Evidence And A Few Things The Judiciary Could Do About It, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

A recent report of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology questioned the validity of several types of criminalistics identification evidence and recommended “a best practices manual and an Advisory Committee note, providing guidance to Federal judges concerning the admissibility under Rule 702 of expert testimony based on forensic feature-comparison methods.” This article supplies information on why and how judicial bodies concerned with possible rules changes—and courts applying the current rules—can improve their regulation of criminalistics identification evidence. First, it describes how courts have failed to faithfully apply Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical’s criteria for scientific validity to …

The Forensic Community Can Educate Lawyers, Judges, Robert M. Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

Cell Phones, Brain Cancer, And Scientific Outliers In Murray V. Motorola, David H. Kaye

David Kaye

Pending before the District of Columbia's highest court in a case asking whether cell phones can cause cancer is whether to replace the jurisdiction's venerable Frye standard for reviewing the admissibility of scientific evidence with the approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow. The author analyzes one aspect of the two evidentiary standards that leads him to question the trial judge's suggestion in Murray v. Motorola that adopting the Daubert perspective would allow greater leeway in excluding the plaintiff's evidence.

Choice And Boundary Problems In Logerquist, Hummert, And Kumho Tire, David H. Kaye

David Kaye

This article, part of a symposium on the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Logerquist v. McVey, questions that court’s rationales for refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to psychiatric testimony about the retrieval of repressed memories. It also challenges the court’s use of a “personal observations” exception to the heightened scrutiny standard of Frye v. United States. It proposes that a better solution to problems of scientific and expert evidence would be to adopt a sliding scale that attends to the use to which the evidence is put and the degree to which it has been shown to be …

Small Data Surveillance V. Big Data Cybersurveillance, Margaret Hu

Margaret Hu

This Article highlights some of the critical distinctions between small data surveillance and big data cybersurveillance as methods of intelligence gathering. Specifically, in the intelligence context, it appears that “collect-it-all” tools in a big data world can now potentially facilitate the construction, by the intelligence community, of other individuals' digital avatars. The digital avatar can be understood as a virtual representation of our digital selves and may serve as a potential proxy for an actual person. This construction may be enabled through processes such as the data fusion of biometric and biographic data, or the digital data fusion of the …

Experts, Statistics, Science & Bad Science, Curtis E.A. Karnow

Curtis E.A. Karnow

Articles, books, and other online resources relating to expert testimony with a specific focus on problems with peer review, bad science, and statistics

Small Data Surveillance V. Big Data Cybersurveillance, Margaret Hu

Pepperdine Law Review

This Article highlights some of the critical distinctions between small data surveillance and big data cybersurveillance as methods of intelligence gathering. Specifically, in the intelligence context, it appears that “collect-it-all” tools in a big data world can now potentially facilitate the construction, by the intelligence community, of other individuals' digital avatars. The digital avatar can be understood as a virtual representation of our digital selves and may serve as a potential proxy for an actual person. This construction may be enabled through processes such as the data fusion of biometric and biographic data, or the digital data fusion of the …

Dumping Daubert, Popping Popper And Falsifying Falsifiability: A Re-Assessment Of First Principles, Barbara P. Billauer Esq

barbara p billauer esq

Abstract: The Daubert mantra demands that judges, acting as gatekeepers, prevent para, pseudo or bad science from infiltrating the courtroom. To do so, the Judges must first determine what is ‘science’ and what is ‘good science.’ It is submitted that Daubert is deeply polluted with the notions of Karl Popper who sets ‘falsifiability’ and ‘falsification’ as the demarcation line for that determination. This philosophy has intractably infected case law, leading to bad decisions immortalized as stare decisis, and an unworkable system of decision-making, which negatively impacts litigant expectations. Among other problems is the intolerance of Popper’s system for multiple causation, …

Cell Phones, Brain Cancer, And Scientific Outliers In Murray V. Motorola, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

Pending before the District of Columbia's highest court in a case asking whether cell phones can cause cancer is whether to replace the jurisdiction's venerable Frye standard for reviewing the admissibility of scientific evidence with the approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow. The author analyzes one aspect of the two evidentiary standards that leads him to question the trial judge's suggestion in Murray v. Motorola that adopting the Daubert perspective would allow greater leeway in excluding the plaintiff's evidence.

Empiricism In Daubert And The California Supreme Court In Sargon, Robert Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

California has become a Daubert state. In Sargon v. The University of Southern California, the California Supreme Court held that judges are the “gatekeepers” with regard to expert or scientific evidence in this state, just as has been the case in the federal system (and many other states) since the decision in Daubert. Now that California is avowedly a Daubert state, it is important to understand why courtroom evidence – scientific, expert or, for that matter, otherwise – is properly grounded in empiricism. Empiricism is the theory that knowledge is derived from experience. Understanding this empirical basis for both Daubert …

Logic, Not Evidence, Supports A Change In Expert Testimony Standards: Why Evidentiary Standards Promulgated By The Supreme Court For Scientific Expert Testimony Are Inappropriate And Inefficient When Applied In Patent Infringement Suits, Claire R. Rollor

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Reliable Science: Overcoming Public Doubts In The Climate Change Debate, Michelle S. Simon

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This article will consider the case for instituting a domestic agency that would evaluate the findings from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessments to improve the credibility and legitimacy of those claims and conclusions for multiple purposes. The proposed agency would consider the robustness of an assessment's conclusions by construing the evidence through the lens of Daubert rather than Frye. Part I will outline the public debate about climate science-what the debate is about and why it exists. Part II will examine the current role of the IPCC-what it is and why it has not been successful in legitimating …

Whose Fault?—Daubert, The Nas Report, And The Notion Of Error In Forensic Science, D. Michael Risinger

Fordham Urban Law Journal

The notion of “error” and “error rates” is central both to the Daubert opinion and to the recent NAS Report on the strengths and weaknesses of forensic science in the United States. I will not be attempting a full-scale examination of the concept of error in this paper, however, I believe there are some observations that can be made that may be helpful in domesticating in helpful ways the notion of error as it might apply to forensic science expertise. I conclude that we should work to improve diagnosticity for old processes, or to invent or adopt new ones with …

Independent Judicial Research In The "Daubert" Age, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court's Daubert trilogy places judges in the unenviable position of assessing the reliability of often unfamiliar and complex scientific expert testimony. Over the past decade, scholars have therefore explored various ways of helping judges with their new gatekeeping responsibilities. Unfortunately, the two dominant approaches, which focus on doctrinal tests and external assistance mechanisms, have been largely ineffective. This Article advocates for a neglected but important method for improving scientific decision making-independent judicial research. It argues that judges facing unfamiliar and complex scientific admissibility decisions can and should engage in independent library research to better educate themselves about the …

The Overlapping Magisteria Of Law And Science: When Litigation And Science Collide, William G. Childs

ExpressO

The Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals transformed courts’ evaluation of expert testimony. Many courts, applying Daubert, focus extensively on whether the purported expert’s methodology has been published in a peer-reviewed journal.

This focus on peer review results in two unintended consequences that have triggered criticism: litigation-driven scholarship and litigants taking discovery into the peer review process. Critics contend that litigation-driven scholarship is irredeemably biased and that peer review discovery is too often an effort to intimidate scholars from speaking on subjects of public concern.

In this Article, I explore these phenomena and the criticisms of …

Does Frye Or Daubert Matter? A Study Of Scientific Admissibility Standards, Edward K. Cheng, Albert Yoon

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Nearly every treatment of scientific evidence begins with a faithful comparison between the Frye and Daubert standards. Since 1993, jurists and legal scholars have spiritedly debated which standard is preferable and whether particular states should adopt one standard or the other. These efforts beg the question: Does a state's choice of scientific admissibility standard matter? A growing number of scholars suspect that the answer is no. Under this theory, the import of the Supreme Court's Daubert decision was not in its doctrinal standard, but rather in the general consciousness it raised about the problems of unreliable scientific evidence. This Article …

Daubert Asks The Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find The Right Answers, Christopher B. Mueller

Publications

No abstract provided.

Choice And Boundary Problems In Logerquist, Hummert, And Kumho Tire, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

This article, part of a symposium on the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Logerquist v. McVey, questions that court’s rationales for refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to psychiatric testimony about the retrieval of repressed memories. It also challenges the court’s use of a “personal observations” exception to the heightened scrutiny standard of Frye v. United States. It proposes that a better solution to problems of scientific and expert evidence would be to adopt a sliding scale that attends to the use to which the evidence is put and the degree to which it has been shown to be …