Law Commons^™

Checking The Staats: How Long Is Too Long To Give Adequate Public Notice In Broadening Reissue Patent Applications?, David M. Longo Ph.D., Ryan P. O’Quinn Ph.D.

Duke Law & Technology Review

A classic property rights question looms large in the field of patent law: where do the rights of inventors end and the rights of the public begin? The right of inventors to modify the scope of their claimed inventions, even after the patent issues, is in direct tension with the concepts of public notice and the public domain. The Patent Act currently permits broadening of claims so long as a reissue application demonstrating intent to broaden is filed within two years of the original patent issue. Over the years, however, this relatively straightforward statutory provision has sparked numerous disputes over …

The Classic 25% Rule And The Art Of Intellectual Property Licensing, Robert Goldscheider

Duke Law & Technology Review

Fifty years ago, Robert Goldscheider helped pioneer the use of a methodology known as “the 25% Rule,” a tool for determining reasonable royalties in intellectual property licensing negotiations. The Rule holds that licensees of intellectual property normally deserve the lion’s share of the profit because they usually bear the bulk of the business risk associated with bringing the intellectual property to market. Experts familiar with the art of intellectual property licensing frequently rely on the 25% Rule to rationally determine reasonable royalties in litigation and transactional settings.

The Rule’s prominence has been accompanied by unfortunate misunderstandings about its form and …

Non­–Per Se Treatment Of Buyer Price-Fixing In Intellectual Property Settings, Hillary Greene

Duke Law & Technology Review

The ability of intellectual property owners to earn monopoly rents and the inability of horizontal competitors to price fix legally are two propositions that are often taken as givens. This iBrief challenges the wholesale adoption of either proposition within the context of buyer price-fixing in intellectual property markets. More specifically, it examines antitrust law’s role in protecting patent holders’ rents through its condemnation of otherwise ostensibly efficient buyer price fixing. Using basic economic analysis, this iBrief refines the legal standards applicable at this point of intersection between antitrust and patent law. In particular, the author recommends the limited abandonment of …