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Full-Text Articles in Law
Apparent Consistency Of Religion Clause Doctrine, The The Rehnquist Court And The First Amendment, Abner S. Greene
Apparent Consistency Of Religion Clause Doctrine, The The Rehnquist Court And The First Amendment, Abner S. Greene
Faculty Scholarship
A hallmark of religion clause scholarship is the complaint that the doctrine is a hopeless muddle. However, the Rehnquist Court brought a considerable amount of consistency-well, apparent consistency- to the doctrine. I say "apparent consistency" because, just as a paradox is only a seeming contradiction, so was the Rehnquist Court's religion clause jurisprudence only seemingly consistent. The doctrine focuses on whether the government singles out religion for special benefit (generally problematic under the Establishment Clause) or for special burden (generally problematic under the Free Exercise Clause). If, on the other hand, the government benefits religion as part of a more …
The First Amendment: Churches Seeking Sanctuary For The Sins Of The Fathers, Jeffrey R. Anderson, Mark A. Wendorf, Frances E. Baillon, Brant D. Penney
The First Amendment: Churches Seeking Sanctuary For The Sins Of The Fathers, Jeffrey R. Anderson, Mark A. Wendorf, Frances E. Baillon, Brant D. Penney
Fordham Urban Law Journal
This article examines whether the Free Exercise Clause or Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, or the judicial abstention doctrine, shields religious institutions from otherwise cognizable tort claims caused by their agents or employees. It concludes that the Constitution does not provide a religious institution with the right or privilege to operate as a law unto itself -- the institution must comply with the law of civil government. Part I provides a brief introduction and background on the First Amendment. Parts II, III, and IV analyze the Free Exercise Clause, judicial abstention doctrine, and the Establishment Clause, respectively, and how …
The Collision Of Church And State: A Primer To Beth Din Arbitrarion And The New York Secular Courts, Ginnine Fried
The Collision Of Church And State: A Primer To Beth Din Arbitrarion And The New York Secular Courts, Ginnine Fried
Fordham Urban Law Journal
This Comment analyzes the interaction between secular courts and beth din proceedings (arbitration panels made up of specialists in halacha, or Jewish law). Part I examines the reasons why an independent Jewish religious court system is required and utilized despite the existence of a fair and equitable secular court system. It describes the Jewish legal principles involved, and how they impact both Jewish litigants and lawyers. Part II describes the mechanics of transforming a religious tribunal into a legally binding arbitration panel in New York State. Part III discusses the limited grounds upon which a beth din award may be …
Rethinking The Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach To Questions Of Religious Practice And Belief, Samuel J. Levine
Rethinking The Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach To Questions Of Religious Practice And Belief, Samuel J. Levine
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Part I of this Article discusses Supreme Court cases prior to 1981, in which the Court first expressed its hands-off approach to deciding questions of religious practice and belief. This Part suggests that in these decisions, as a result of a proper concern for religious autonomy, the Court already began the process of expanding the principle of judicial non-interference, at the cost of sacrificing effective adjudication of important constitutional issues. Part II of this Article critiques the Court's approach in Free Exercise Clause cases, identifying different problems that have arisen as a result of the Court's approach. This Part argues …
The Political Balance Of The Religion Clauses, Abner S. Greene
The Political Balance Of The Religion Clauses, Abner S. Greene
Faculty Scholarship
When the Supreme Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect religious practices from otherwise valid laws that incidentally burden those practices, it followed a particular theory of democratic politics. That some laws might unintentionally burden certain religious practices is, said the Court, an "unavoidable consequence of democratic government [that] must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself." The Court was certainly right in one sense: To claim that conscientious objection to an otherwise valid law should exempt one from that law is to claim that …