Law Commons^™

Incidental Burdens On First Amendment Freedoms, Charles F. Capps

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

The Supreme Court is currently reconsidering the question when, if ever, the Free Exercise Clause requires exemptions to neutral laws of general applicability. This Essay proposes an answer that is based on the idea—which this Essay labels the “Principle of Consistency”—that the First Amendment requires comparable levels of protection for speech and religious exercise. Other scholars applying the Principle of Consistency have discussed the implications of United States v. O’Brien, which prescribed intermediate scrutiny for incidental burdens on speech, for the problem of exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause. But no one has discussed the implications of two lines …

Fruit Of The Poisonous Lemon Tree: How The Supreme Court Created Offended-Observer Standing, And Why It's Time For It To Go, Joseph C. Davis, Nicholas R. Reaves

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Can individuals who observe what they consider to be offensive government speech or conduct sue to stop it? Typically not—absent additional evidence of a direct and particularized injury. Yet in one area of the law, the fundamental requirements of Article III (limiting federal standing to actual “cases” or “controversies”) are relaxed: the Establishment Clause. At least ten circuits have held that the mere observation of a display containing religious content (the Ten Commandments, a cross, a menorah, and the like) on public property suffices to create an injury-in-fact that opens the doors to federal court.

This Essay addresses the continued …

How Would The European Court Of Human Rights Decide Holt V. Hobbs?, Francesca M. Genova

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

This Essay inquires: How would the ECtHR decide Holt v. Hobbs, given the same evidence provided at the district court level and the reasoning of the court of appeals? Analyzing this case through the ECtHR’s lens will elucidate the implications of the proportionality test in American jurisprudence. To do so, Part I will compare the two jurisdictions. Part II will summarize Holt v. Hobbs. Part III will describe the ECtHR’s relevant recent free exercise jurisprudence. Part IV will discuss how, based on this analysis, the ECtHR could decide Holt v. Hobbs in light of its overarching principles. Finally, …

Employment Division V. Smith And State Free Exercise Protections: Should State Courts Feel Obligated To Apply The Federal Standard In Adjudicating Alleged Violations Of Their State Free Exercise Clauses?, Matthew Linnabary

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

State courts should feel free to apply whatever test is most appropriate based on the textual provisions of their state constitution that protects the free exercise or worship of its citizens. Of course, such freedom to the state courts is greatly limited in many states by the passage of their own Religious Freedom Restoration Acts. These acts generally set forth precisely how the courts must determine whether or not a law violates the free exercise or worship of a claimant. Even if not limited by a RFRA—which would generally require strict scrutiny—a state court should apply strict scrutiny to violations …

Islam And Religious Freedom: The Experience Of Religious Majorities And Minorities, Brett G. Scharffs

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

It seems likely that change in Islam will be affected both by outside and internal sources, as was the case for the Catholic Church and its journey to Dignitatis Humanae. However, one thing the Catholic experience suggests is that meaningful and profound change does not simply come from outside pressures; it comes from authentic and sincere evaluation and interpretation by insiders of a religious tradition of that tradition itself. Thus, if Islam is going to come to embrace religious freedom as an important value, this will be the result, significantly if not primarily, of Muslims interpreting their own sacred …

There Is A Place For Muslims In America: On Different Understandings Of Neutrality, Mark A. Goldfelder

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

American neutrality is not about the government making sure religion is not visible or even treated benevolently. The American concept of neutrality just means that the government should not treat religion as special, for better or for worse, simply because it is religion. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that laws touching religion must have a valid secular purpose, and not serve primarily to advance or inhibit religion. But that does not mean that religion should not be respected. The key to the American conception of religious neutrality lies in the understanding that religion is valuable—despite what strict …

A Critique Of Hobby Lobby And The Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach To Religion, Samuel J. Levine

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Part I of this Essay provides a brief overview for analyzing the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to religious doctrine. Specifically, this Part presents a summary of problems posed by the hands-off approach, followed by a brief taxonomy of different forms of judicial inquiry into religion. This Part aims to clarify which forms of inquiry are permissible—and typically necessary—for adjudication of a case involving a religious claim, and which forms of inquiry are precluded under the hands-off doctrine. Part II of this Essay applies the hands-off framework to the Hobby Lobby decision, considering the taxonomy of forms of judicial inquiry into …

Quasi-Rights For Quasi-Religious Organizations: A New Framework Resolving The Religious-Secular Dichotomy After Burwell V. Hobby Lobby, Krista M. Pikus

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

This Comment aims to break free of the limiting religious-secular dichotomy by proposing a “quasi-religious” classification in order to achieve a more nuanced assignment of corporate religious exercise rights. Part I addresses the current legal standard for classifying organizations as religious and how the Hobby Lobby decision engaged that standard. Part II identifies and discusses the problems with the religious-secular dichotomy. Lastly, Part III proposes a new solution to the problem of corporate religious exercise rights that transcends the limitations of the religious-secular dichotomy and may also bring clarity to the Hobby Lobby decision.