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Full-Text Articles in Law

How Practices Make Principles, And How Principles Make Rules, Mitchell N. Berman Jan 2022

How Practices Make Principles, And How Principles Make Rules, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

The most fundamental question in general jurisprudence concerns what makes it the case that the law has the content that it does. This article offers a novel answer. According to the theory it christens “principled positivism,” legal practices ground legal principles, and legal principles determine legal rules. This two-level account of the determination of legal content differs from Hart’s celebrated theory in two essential respects: in relaxing Hart’s requirement that fundamental legal notions depend for their existence on judicial consensus; and in assigning weighted contributory legal norms—“principles”—an essential role in the determination of legal rights, duties, powers, and permissions. Drawing …


The Mystery Of Law: A Critical Analysis Of H.L.A Hart’S The Concept Of Law, Stephen Mark Gray Ii Apr 2020

The Mystery Of Law: A Critical Analysis Of H.L.A Hart’S The Concept Of Law, Stephen Mark Gray Ii

Honors Theses

This thesis explores the role of morality in law through a critical examination of the work of one of the most widely cited and renowned judicial scholars, H.L.A. Hart. His modified theory of positivism, which denotes that law and morality are separable and that legal rules may have any content, has had an enduring impact on the landscape of judicial thought in the last century. As Hart’s work has had an indelible hand in shaping analytical jurisprudence and as it exemplifies the antithesis of my argument, it will serve as a theoretical foil. From it, I hope to articulate my …


Our Principled Constitution, Mitchell N. Berman Jan 2018

Our Principled Constitution, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

Suppose that one of us contends, and the other denies, that transgender persons have constitutional rights to be treated in accord with their gender identity. It appears that we are disagreeing about “what the law is.” And, most probably, we disagree about what the law is on this matter because we disagree about what generally makes it the case that our constitutional law is this rather than that.

Constitutional theory should provide guidance. It should endeavor to explain what gives our constitutional rules the contents that they have, or what makes true constitutional propositions true. Call any such account a …


Models Of Law, Christian Turner Jan 2018

Models Of Law, Christian Turner

Scholarly Works

The more we examine what is behind our most difficult legal questions, the more puzzling it can seem that we continue both to disagree strongly and, yet, to cooperate. If law is a reasoned enterprise, how is it that we are neither torn apart nor homogenized by our long social practice of it? I resolve this puzzle, and arrive at a richer understanding of law, using the idea of modeling familiar from the natural sciences and mathematics. I show (a) that theorists can model legal systems as abstract systems of institutions, information flows, and institutional processing or reasoning and (b) …


The Work Of International Law, Monica Hakimi Jan 2017

The Work Of International Law, Monica Hakimi

Articles

This Article crystallizes and then critiques a prominent view about the role of international law in the global order. The view - what I call the "cooperation thesis" - is that international law serves to help global actors cooperate, specifically by: (1) curbing their disputes, and (2) promoting their shared goals. The cooperation thesis often appears as a positive account of international law; it purports to explain or describe what international law does. But it also has normative force; international law is widely depicted as dysfunctional when it does not satisfy the thesis. In particular, heated or intractable conflict is …


Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram Oct 2013

Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram

David Ingram

It is well known that Hans Kelsen and Jürgen Habermas invoke realist arguments drawn from social science in defending an international, democratic human rights regime against Carl Schmitt’s attack on the rule of law. However, despite embracing the realist spirit of Kelsen’s legal positivism, Habermas criticizes Kelsen for neglecting to connect the rule of law with a concept of procedural justice (Part I). I argue, to the contrary (Part II), that Kelsen does connect these terms, albeit in a manner that may be best described as functional, rather than conceptual. Indeed, whereas Habermas tends to emphasize a conceptual connection between …


Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram Jan 2013

Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram

Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works

It is well known that Hans Kelsen and Jürgen Habermas invoke realist arguments drawn from social science in defending an international, democratic human rights regime against Carl Schmitt’s attack on the rule of law. However, despite embracing the realist spirit of Kelsen’s legal positivism, Habermas criticizes Kelsen for neglecting to connect the rule of law with a concept of procedural justice (Part I). I argue, to the contrary (Part II), that Kelsen does connect these terms, albeit in a manner that may be best described as functional, rather than conceptual. Indeed, whereas Habermas tends to emphasize a conceptual connection between …


Natural Law, Slavery, And The Right To Privacy Tort, Anita L. Allen Dec 2012

Natural Law, Slavery, And The Right To Privacy Tort, Anita L. Allen

All Faculty Scholarship

In 1905 the Supreme Court of Georgia became the first state high court to recognize a freestanding “right to privacy” tort in the common law. The landmark case was Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. Must it be a cause for deep jurisprudential concern that the common law right to privacy in wide currency today originated in Pavesich’s explicit judicial interpretation of the requirements of natural law? Must it be an additional worry that the court which originated the common law privacy right asserted that a free white man whose photograph is published without his consent in …


Separation Of Powers Doctrine On The Modern Supreme Court And Four Doctrinal Approaches To Judicial Decision-Making, R. Randall Kelso Nov 2012

Separation Of Powers Doctrine On The Modern Supreme Court And Four Doctrinal Approaches To Judicial Decision-Making, R. Randall Kelso

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.


From Enlightened Positivism To Cosmopolitan Justice: Obstacles And Opportunities, Steven Ratner Jan 2011

From Enlightened Positivism To Cosmopolitan Justice: Obstacles And Opportunities, Steven Ratner

Book Chapters

This paper explores the possibilities for linkages between various forms of positivism accepted by many international lawyers and various forms of cosmopolitanism advocated by scholars of global justice. Building on Bruno Simma's conception of "enlightened positivism," it identifies areas in which cosmopolitan trends have already seeped into the fabric of international law and the key gaps between positivist and cosmopolitan visions of international law and the international community. Emphasizing the contributions that philosophical inquiry can add to international legal scholarship, and vice-versa, it concludes with some thoughts on further integration of cosmopolitan thinking into positivist methodologies.


The Limits Of Legal Realism, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

The Limits Of Legal Realism, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

This article will address some criticisms of legal realism, primarily those of H.L.A. Hart, that have been unanswered in the literature and have appeared to discredit the realist approach to law. The article will also articulate what I believe to be more difficult problems with legal realism.


Constitutional Theory And The Rule Of Recognition: Toward A Fourth Theory Of Law, Mitchell N. Berman Jan 2009

Constitutional Theory And The Rule Of Recognition: Toward A Fourth Theory Of Law, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay, a contribution to a forthcoming edited volume on Hart's rule of recognition and the U.S. Constitution, advances one argument and pitches one proposal. The argument is that Hart's theory of law does not succeed. On Hart's account, legal propositions are what they are - that is, they have the particular content and status that they do - by virtue of their satisfying necessary and sufficient conditions that are themselves established by a special sort of convergent practice among officials. American constitutional theorists are often troubled by this account because it seems to imply that in the "hard cases" …


Exploring The Foundations Of Dworkin's Empire: The Discovery Of An Underground Positivist, Brian M. Mccall Dec 2008

Exploring The Foundations Of Dworkin's Empire: The Discovery Of An Underground Positivist, Brian M. Mccall

Brian M McCall

This review essay examines the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin as presented in the anthology: Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, edited by Scott Hershovitz. Notwithstanding the influence Dworkin's jurisprudence has had on the reconsideration of moral reasoning within legal reasoning, the essay concludes that at its foundation Dworkin's jurisprudence is based upon Legal Positivist principles. The essay first summarizes the jurisprudence of Dworkin and then contrasts his jurisprudence with traditional Natural Law Legal Theory and finally exposes the Positivist foundations of Dworkin's Legal Empire.


How And Understanding Of The Second Personal Standpoint Can Change Our Understanding Of The Law: Hart's Unpublished Response To Exclusive Legal Positivism, Robin B. Kar Aug 2005

How And Understanding Of The Second Personal Standpoint Can Change Our Understanding Of The Law: Hart's Unpublished Response To Exclusive Legal Positivism, Robin B. Kar

ExpressO

This Article describes recent developments in moral philosophy on the “second personal standpoint,” and argues that they will have important ramifications for legal thought. Moral, legal and political thinkers have, for some time now, understood important distinctions between the first personal perspective (of deliberation) and the third personal perspective (of observation, cause and effect), and have plumbed these distinctions to great effect in their thought. This distinction is, in fact, implicit the law and economics movement’s “rational actor” model of decision, which currently dominates much legal academic thought. Recent developments in value theory due to philosopher Stephen Darwall suggest, however, …


Pragmatism Regained, Christopher Kutz Jan 2002

Pragmatism Regained, Christopher Kutz

Michigan Law Review

Jules Coleman's The Practice of Principle serves as a focal point for current, newly intensified debates in legal theory, and provides some of the deepest, most sustained reflections on methodology that legal theory has seen. Coleman is one of the leading legal philosophers in the Anglo-American world, and his writings on tort theory, contract theory, the normative foundations of law and economics, social choice theory, and analytical jurisprudence have been the point of departure for much of the most interesting activity in the field for the last three decades. Indeed, the origin of this book lies in Oxford University's invitation …


Further Thoughts On Customary International Law, Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner Jan 2001

Further Thoughts On Customary International Law, Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner

Michigan Journal of International Law

In two earlier articles, the tools of game theory were used to sketch a positive theoretical account of customary international law ("CIL"). This theory rejected as question-begging the usual explanations of CIL based on legality, morality, opinio juris, and related concepts. It was argued instead that CIL emerges from nations' pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage. This approach helps explain many overlooked features of CIL, including how CIL originates and changes, why the content of CIL tracks the interest of powerful nations, and why nations change their views of CIL when their interests change. Finally, the practices …


Game Theory And Customary International Law: A Response To Professors Goldsmith And Posner, Mark A. Chinen Jan 2001

Game Theory And Customary International Law: A Response To Professors Goldsmith And Posner, Mark A. Chinen

Michigan Journal of International Law

In a pair of recent articles, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have used game theoretic principles to challenge the positivist account of customary international law. Their writings join other early attempts to apply game theory to the international law sources. The author has two purposes in this Article. The first is to evaluate game theory's potential for yielding greater insight into customary international law and international law more generally. The second is to respond to the conclusions about customary international law drawn by Professors Goldsmith and Posner.


The Gift Of Language, Joseph Vining Jan 1998

The Gift Of Language, Joseph Vining

Articles

Style and substance cross-are genetically related as we now might want to say. Each draws on and is implied by the other. One point at which they cross is our sense of the nature of human language, what language is and can be, what it is not and can never be. The language of law is part of human language. Law is a distinctive form of thought, but it lives in human language. "Rule" might be thought synonymous with "law," but for all its talk of rules, the practice of law does not begin with a descriptive statement, or a …


Misunderstanding Positivism, Anthony J. Sebok Jun 1995

Misunderstanding Positivism, Anthony J. Sebok

Michigan Law Review

It is important that I point out the limited purposes of this article. I cannot, in the context of the argument I make, prove that positivism will not inevitably collapse into a conservative theory of law. Nor can I prove that positivism is not vulnerable to jurisprudential arguments unrelated to the attempt to link positivism with formalism, legal process, and originalism. I recognize that strong arguments have been made that modem positivism's attempts to divorce itself from classical positivism's command theory of law has opened up more problems than it has solved. I have certain views on whether that divorce …


Positivism Regained, Nihilism Postponed, Jose E. Alvarez Jan 1994

Positivism Regained, Nihilism Postponed, Jose E. Alvarez

Michigan Journal of International Law

Review of Law-Making in the International Community by G.M. Danilenko


The Moral Dilemma Of Positivism, Anthony D'Amato Jan 1986

The Moral Dilemma Of Positivism, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

I think there has been an advance in positivist thinking, and that advance consists of the recognition by MacCormick, a positivist, that positivism needs to be justified morally (and not just as an apparent scientific and objective fact about legal systems). But the justification that is required cannot consist in labelling "sovereignty of conscience" as a moral principle, nor in compounding the confusion by claiming that positivism minimally and hence necessarily promotes sovereignty of conscience. We need, from the positivists, a more logical and coherent argument than that. Until one comes along, I continue to believe that positivists inherently have …


Jurisprudence As Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis Of Modern Legal Theory, Robin West Jan 1985

Jurisprudence As Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis Of Modern Legal Theory, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Recent legal scholarship has engaged in a growing dialogue tying literary criticism to jurisprudence. In this article, Professor Robin West adds her voice by advocating the reading of legal theory as a form of narrative. Drawing from Northrop Frye's “Anatomy of Criticism,” Professor West first details four literary myths that combine contrasting world visions and narrative methods. She then applies Frye's categories to Anglo-American jurisprudential traditions and employs aesthetic principles to analyze influential legal theorists within these traditions. Finally, Professor West argues that recognizing the aesthetic dimension of legal debate frees us to realize our moral ideals.


Legal Theory And The Problem Of Definition, Philip E. Soper Jan 1983

Legal Theory And The Problem Of Definition, Philip E. Soper

Reviews

Natural Law and Natural Rights is a refreshingly direct book about some decidedly difficult matters. It is also a book that refuses to do homage to the complexity of its subject by limiting the topics covered. Here is virtually a mini-treatise in moral philosophy, with illuminating discussions on the whole range of human value and on a good part of the related range of metaethics, legal theory, political theory, and the problems of methodology in the descriptive social sciences.