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Paternalism

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, And Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski Dec 2014

Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, And Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Legal scholars commonly argue that the widespread presence of cognitive errors in judgment justifies legal intervention to save people from predictable mistakes. Such arguments often fail to account for individual variation in the commission of such errors even though individual variation is probably common. If predictable groups of people avoid making the errors that others commit, then law should account for such differences because those who avoid errors will not benefit from paternalistic interventions and indeed may be harmed by them. The research on individual variation suggests three parameters that might distinguish people who can avoid error: cognitive ability, experience …


The Methodology Of The Behavioral Analysis Of Law, Avishalom Tor Nov 2013

The Methodology Of The Behavioral Analysis Of Law, Avishalom Tor

Avishalom Tor

This article examines the behavioral analysis of law, meaning the application of empirical behavioral evidence to legal analysis, which has become increasingly popular in legal scholarship in recent years. Following the introduction in Part I, this Article highlights four central propositions on the subject. The first, developed in Part II, asserts that the efficacy of the law often depends on its accounting for relevant patterns of human behavior, most notably those studied by behavioral decision scientists. This Part therefore reviews important behavioral findings, illustrating their application and relevance to a broad range of legal questions. Part III then argues that …


Nullificatory Juries, David A. Hoffman, Kaimipono D. Wenger Oct 2003

Nullificatory Juries, David A. Hoffman, Kaimipono D. Wenger

David A Hoffman

In this Article, we argue that current debates on the legitimacy of punitive damages would benefit from a comparison with jury nullification in criminal trials. We discuss critiques of punitive damages and of jury nullification, noting the surprising similarities in the arguments scholars use to attack these (superficially) distinct outcomes of the jury guarantee. Not only are the criticisms alike, the institutions of punitive damages and jury nullification also turn out to have many similarities: both are, we suggest, examples of what we call "nullificatory juries." We discuss the features of such juries, and consider recent behavioral data relating to …


How Relevant Is Jury Rationality?, David A. Hoffman Jul 2003

How Relevant Is Jury Rationality?, David A. Hoffman

David A Hoffman

This essay reviews "Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide" by Cass Sunstein, et al. The book provides a good example of a recent trend: the use of behavioralist research to justify surprisingly paternalistic legal reforms. While critics of behavioralism often contend that its theoretical foundations are weak, this approach is unlikely to prove an effective rejoinder in the new debate about what kinds of paternalism are made permissible by human "irrationality". A better approach: (1) notes the lack of a nexus between behavioralism and the supposed emergent necessity of paternalist reforms; and (2) suggests that juror unwillingness to apply cost-benefit formula …


Can Law And Economics Be Both Practical And Principled?, David A. Hoffman, Michael P. O'Shea Feb 2002

Can Law And Economics Be Both Practical And Principled?, David A. Hoffman, Michael P. O'Shea

David A Hoffman

This article describes important recent developments in normative law and economics, and the difficulties they create for the project of efficiency-based legal reform. After long proceeding without a well articulated moral justification for using economic decision procedures to choose legal rules, scholars have lately begun to devote serious attention to developing a philosophically attractive definition of well-being. At the same time, the empirical side of law and economics is also being enriched with an improved understanding of the complexities of individuals' decision-making behavior. That is where the problems begin. Scholars may have better, more plausible conceptions of well-being in hand, …