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The Dissolution Of The Matrimonial Property Regime And The Succession Rights Of The Surviving Spouse, Maria Álvarez Torné

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

These pages are addressed to examining the problems arising from the regulation of the dissolution of the matrimonial property regime on the death of one of the spouses in relation to the determination of the succession rights of the surviving spouse in Private International Law (from now on, PIL). I will specifically try to analyse the conciliation difficulties between what is stipulated in each relevant field after the death of one of the spouses. The surviving spouse’s situation often depends on the simultaneous effect of the matrimonial property regime and also of Succession Law. In fact, this study deals with …

Property, Rules, And Property Rules, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

This essay examines two aspects of “property rules” in the sense defined by Judge Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed. In each case, the form in which property rules are cast is critically important.

The first question addressed is the capacity of property rules to affect behavior prior to and outside litigation. Most economic analysis of property rules and liability rules assumes that the choice between them will guide decisionmaking at the time of a contemplated rights violation, and possibly prior to that time. To have this effect, property rules (and liability rules) must be established by determinate legal rules that …

Three Reasons Why Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral Anxiety, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Entirely apart from the substantive justification for existing private property rights, there are several reasons why property is, unavoidably, a morally uncomfortable subject.

First, legal property rights are and must be the products of determinate legal rules. As such, they inevitably will diverge in some of their applications from the moral principles that support them.

Second, property rights suffer, more than other legal rights, from problems of transition. Most or all justifications for private property envisage secure rights on which people can and will rely. As a result, there may be genuine moral value in the preservation of rights that …

Commentaries: The Ambiguous Work Of “Natural Property Rights”, Gregory S. Alexander

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The three fascinating papers by Dick Helmholz, Jim Ely, and Mark Tushnet prompt me to ask, why was there so much talk among late 18th and 19th century American lawyers about property as a "natural" right and why has the language persisted today? More specifically, what work is the rhetoric of "natural property rights" intended to do? This is not the proper occasion for developing anything like complete answers to those questions, but I do want to offer three lines of thought that might begin to approach a fuller explanation of the puzzling persistence of natural-property-rights talk.