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Full-Text Articles in Law
Takings, Efficiency, And Distributive Justice: A Response To Professor Dagan, Glynn S. Lunney Jr.
Takings, Efficiency, And Distributive Justice: A Response To Professor Dagan, Glynn S. Lunney Jr.
Glynn Lunney
In A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, I addressed an efficiency problem that arises when the government attempts to change property rights in a manner that burdens a very few for the benefit of the very many. Specifically, in the absence of compensation, the collective action advantage of the few in organizing to oppose the proposed measure will often give them a decided edge against the many. As a result of that advantage, the few will too often be able to persuade the legislature not to act, even when an objective evaluation of the proposal's costs and benefits would …
Resilience And Raisins: Partial Takings And Coastal Climate Change Adaptation, Joshua Galperin, Zahir Hadi Tajani
Resilience And Raisins: Partial Takings And Coastal Climate Change Adaptation, Joshua Galperin, Zahir Hadi Tajani
Articles
The increased need for government-driven coastal resilience projects will lead to a growing number of claims for “partial takings” of coastal property. Much attention has been paid to what actions constitute a partial taking, but there is less clarity about how to calculate just compensation for such takings, and when compensation should be offset by the value of benefits conferred to the property owner. While the U.S. Supreme Court has an analytically consistent line of cases on compensation for partial takings, it has repeatedly failed (most recently in Horne v. U.S. Department of Agriculture) to articulate a clear rule. The …
Does The Compensation Clause Burden The Government Or Benefit The Owner? The Compensation Clause As Process, Joshua Galperin
Does The Compensation Clause Burden The Government Or Benefit The Owner? The Compensation Clause As Process, Joshua Galperin
Articles
One of many ideas indelibly drawn in the legal vernacular is that “if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” This workhorse of a phrase has shouldered the bulk of the regulatory takings doctrine since the first half of the last century. So much ink has been spilled in an attempt to parse the meaning of “too far,” and yet the academic and judicial communities have made little progress towards a better understanding. This article, therefore, seeks to divert some attention away from the meaning of “taking”, and put a little more focus on the …
Just Compensation, Incentives, And Social Meanings, Hanoch Dagan
Just Compensation, Incentives, And Social Meanings, Hanoch Dagan
Michigan Law Review
In Takings and Distributive Justice, I proposed a progressive interpretation of the Compensation Clause. In his response, published in this issue, Professor Lunney challenges the plausibility and the desirability of my interpretation and proposes an alternative. This Essay compares our approaches. It concludes that Professor Lunney's careful examination of the public choice analysis of takings does refine my theory. Contrary to Professor Lunney's claims, however, these refinements reinforce - rather than undermine - the viability of a progressive takings doctrine. Parts I and II set the stage by summarizing the principal claims made, respectively, in my original Article and in …
Takings, Efficiency, And Distributive Justice: A Response To Professor Dagan, Glynn S. Lunney Jr.
Takings, Efficiency, And Distributive Justice: A Response To Professor Dagan, Glynn S. Lunney Jr.
Michigan Law Review
In A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, I addressed an efficiency problem that arises when the government attempts to change property rights in a manner that burdens a very few for the benefit of the very many. Specifically, in the absence of compensation, the collective action advantage of the few in organizing to oppose the proposed measure will often give them a decided edge against the many. As a result of that advantage, the few will too often be able to persuade the legislature not to act, even when an objective evaluation of the proposal's costs and benefits would …