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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Permissibility Of Acting Officials: May The President Work Around Senate Confirmation?, Nina A. Mendelson
The Permissibility Of Acting Officials: May The President Work Around Senate Confirmation?, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Recent presidential reliance on acting agency officials, including an acting Attorney General, acting Secretaries of Defense, and an acting Secretary of Homeland Security, as well as numerous below-Cabinet officials, has drawn significant criticism from scholars, the media, and members of Congress. They worry that the President may be pursuing illegitimate goals and seeking to bypass the critical Senate role under the Appointments Clause. But Congress has authorized—and Presidents have called upon—such individuals from the early years of the Republic to the present. Meanwhile, neither formalist approaches to the constitutional issue, which seem to permit no flexibility, nor current Supreme Court …
Contemporary Practice Of The United States Relating To International Law, Kristina Daugirdas, Julian Davis Mortenson
Contemporary Practice Of The United States Relating To International Law, Kristina Daugirdas, Julian Davis Mortenson
Articles
In this section: Congress Enacts Sanctions Legislation Targeting Russia • United States and Qatar Sign Memorandum of Understanding over Terrorism Financing • Trump Reverses Certain Steps Toward Normalizing Relations with Cuba • United States Announces Plans to Withdraw from Paris Agreement on Climate Change • President Trump Issues Trade-Related Executive Orders and Memoranda • United States, Russia, and Jordan Sign Limited Ceasefire for Syria • Trump Administration Recertifies Iranian Compliance with JCPOA Notwithstanding Increasing Concern with Iranian Behavior
Making Treaty Implementation More Like Statutory Implementation, Jean Galbraith
Making Treaty Implementation More Like Statutory Implementation, Jean Galbraith
Michigan Law Review
Both statutes and treaties are the “supreme law of the land,” and yet quite different practices have developed with respect to their implementation. For statutes, all three branches have embraced the development of administrative law, which allows the executive branch to translate broad statutory directives into enforceable obligations. But for treaties, there is a far more cumbersome process. Unless a treaty provision contains language that courts interpret to be directly enforceable, they will deem it to require implementing legislation from Congress. This Article explores and challenges the perplexing disparity between the administration of statutes and treaties. It shows that the …
Taking Care Of Federal Law, Leah Litman
Taking Care Of Federal Law, Leah Litman
Articles
Article II of the Constitution vests the “executive power” in the President and directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” But do these provisions mean that only the President may execute federal law? Two lines of Supreme Court precedent suggest conflicting answers to that question. In several prominent separation-of-powers cases, the Court has suggested that only the President may execute federal law: “The Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.” Therefore, the Court has reasoned, Congress may not create private rights of action that allow nonexecutive …
Contemporary Practice Of The United States Relating To International Law, Kristina Daugirdas, Julian Davis Mortenson
Contemporary Practice Of The United States Relating To International Law, Kristina Daugirdas, Julian Davis Mortenson
Articles
In this section: • United States Adjusts Aid to Egypt in Light of Legal and Political Developments • P51 and Iran Reach Agreement on Iranian Nuclear Program; Obama Administration Seeks Congressional Approval • United States Authorizes New Sanctions Program Aimed at Foreign Perpetrators ofCyberattacks and Cyberexploits • Normalization of Cuba-U.S. Relations Continues • U.S. Navy Continues Freedom of Navigation and Overflight Missions in the South China Sea Despite China’s “Island-Building” Campaign • U.S. Department of Justice Charges Leaders of FIFA, Affiliate Soccer Organizations, and Sports Marketing Companies in 47-Count Indictment
A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash
A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash
Michigan Law Review
The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-ofpowers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors. Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …
Contemporary Practice Of The United States Relating To International Law, Kristina Daugirdas, Julian Davis Mortenson
Contemporary Practice Of The United States Relating To International Law, Kristina Daugirdas, Julian Davis Mortenson
Articles
• Another Mexican National Executed in Texas in Defiance of Avena Decision • Manhattan Arrest of Indian Consular Official Sparks Public Dispute Between the United States and India • United States Questions Claims Based on China’s “Nine-Dash Line” in the South China Sea • United States Takes Steps to Combat Illegal Trade in Wildlife • U.S. Compromises Facilitate Agreement on World Trade Organization’s Bali Package; Question Remains Whether Bali Package Requires Congressional Approval • Destruction of Syrian Chemical Arms Delayed • Iran Nuclear Agreement Is Implemented Notwithstanding Expressions of Distrust by Iran and the U.S. Congress
Power Games, Aneil Kovvali
Power Games, Aneil Kovvali
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
According to the traditional account, Congress has the "necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments" by the president. As commentators have recognized, however, the traditional account does not match reality. Individuals in Washington, D.C., are more interested in fighting for their political party than for their branch of government, and the essentially reactive legislative branch lacks the capacity to respond to a rapidly changing policy environment. But the traditional account suffers from a more basic flaw. The president can decide whether or not to cooperate with Congress on a situation-by-situation basis. By contrast, Congress's tools for disciplining the …
Legislative Diplomacy, Ryan M. Scoville
Legislative Diplomacy, Ryan M. Scoville
Michigan Law Review
A traditional view in legal scholarship holds that the U.S. Constitution assigns the president exclusive power to carry on official diplomatic communications with foreign governments. But in fact, Congress and its members routinely engage in communications of their own. Congress, for example, receives heads of state and maintains official contacts with foreign parliaments. And individual members of the House and Senate frequently travel overseas on congressional delegations (“CODELs”) to confer with foreign leaders, investigate problems that arise, promote the interests of the United States and constituents, and even represent the president. Moreover, many of these activities have occurred ever since …
Toward Comprehensive Reform Of America's Emergency Law Regime, Patrick A. Thronson
Toward Comprehensive Reform Of America's Emergency Law Regime, Patrick A. Thronson
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Unbenownst to most Americans, the United States is presently under thirty presidentially declared states of emergency. They confer vast powers on the Executive Branch, including the ability to financially incapacitate any person or organization in the United States, seize control of the nation's communications infrastructure, mobilize military forces, expand the permissible size of the military without congressional authorization, and extend tours of duty without consent from service personnel. Declared states of emergency may also activate Presidential Emergency Action Documents and other continuity-of-government procedures, which confer powers on the President-such as the unilateral suspension of habeas corpus-that appear fundamentally opposed to …
Congress Underestimated: The Case Of The World Bank, Kristina Daugirdas
Congress Underestimated: The Case Of The World Bank, Kristina Daugirdas
Articles
This article challenges the oft-repeated claim that international organizations undermine democracy by marginalizing national legislatures. Over the past forty years, Congress has established itself as a key player in setting U.S. policy toward the World Bank. Congress has done far more than restrain executive branch action with which it disagrees; it has affirmatively shaped the United States’ day-to-day participation in this key international organization and successfully defended its constitutional authority to do so.
Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey
Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey
Michigan Law Review
A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past, Congress was the leading actor, and courts and commentators focused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue to its intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in statutory interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy …
Midnight Rulemaking And Congress, Nina A. Mendelson
Midnight Rulemaking And Congress, Nina A. Mendelson
Book Chapters
This chapter focuses on Congress, our most democratic federal institution. Congress is generally responsible for defining the authorities possessed by the administrative state, and congressional oversight is key to holding agencies accountable for their actions. Midnight rulemaking also has the potential to increase congressional engagement. Two commentators have recently argued that relative inattention from Congress can facilitate midnight rulemaking, because Congress may meet less frequently during the lame duck period and there is no “repeat player” relationship between the outgoing president and the Congress. To the contrary, however, Congress retains considerable formal power to respond to and override presidential decisions, …
Limited War And The Constitution: Iraq And The Crisis Of Presidential Legality, Bruce Ackerman, Oona Hathaway
Limited War And The Constitution: Iraq And The Crisis Of Presidential Legality, Bruce Ackerman, Oona Hathaway
Michigan Law Review
We live in an age of limited war. Yet the legal structure for authorizing and overseeing war has failed to address this modern reality. Nowhere is this failure more clear than in the recent U.S. conflict in Iraq. Congress self-consciously restricted the war's aims to narrow purposes-expressly authorizing a limited war. But the Bush Administration evaded these constitutional limits and transformed a well-defined and limited war into an open-ended conflict operating beyond constitutional boundaries. President Obama has thus far failed to repudiate these acts of presidential unilateralism. If he continues on this course, he will consolidate the precedents set by …
Another Word On The President's Statutory Authority Over Agency Action, Nina A. Mendelson
Another Word On The President's Statutory Authority Over Agency Action, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
In this short symposium contribution, I attempt first to add some further evidence on the interpretive question. That evidence weighs strongly, in my view, in favor of Kagan's conclusion that the terminology does not communicate any particular congressional intent regarding presidential directive authority. Assessed in context, the "whole code" textual analysis presented by Stack does not justify the conclusion that Congress, by delegating to an executive branch official, meant to limit presidential control. Independent agencies excluded, interpreting the terms of simple and presidential delegations to speak to directive authority fails, in general, to make sense of the various statutes. Absent …
Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, And Torrents Of E-Mail, Nina A. Mendelson
Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, And Torrents Of E-Mail, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
This Foreword is meant as an initial foray into the question of what agencies should do with mass public comments, particularly on broad questions of policy. Part I discusses the extent to which congressional control, presidential control, and agency procedures themselves can ensure that agency decisions are democratically responsive. In view of shortcomings in both congressional and presidential control, I underscore the need to focus closely on rulemaking procedures as a source of democratic responsiveness. The possibility that agencies may be systematically discounting certain public submissions raises difficulties, and I present some examples. Part II makes a preliminary case that …
Once More Unto The Breach: American War Power And A Second Legislative Attempt To Ensure Congressional Input, Jonathan T. Menitove
Once More Unto The Breach: American War Power And A Second Legislative Attempt To Ensure Congressional Input, Jonathan T. Menitove
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Once again embroiled in an unpopular overseas armed conflict, the United States faces difficult questions concerning the constitutional use of military force. Records from the Constitutional Convention suggest the Framers intended to lodge America's power to go to war with the Congress. While American presidents' early use of military force displays deference to the legislature, more recent military actions illustrate the executive's dominance in making war. Notwithstanding a few early court decisions in Congress 's favor, the judiciary has been unhelpful in restoring the constitutional Framers' vision for the administration of the war power Congress, therefore, has been forced to …
Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley
Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
Prof. Bagley notes that reshaping captured agencies using the structural reforms suggested by Prof. Barkow may be politically infeasible and offers an alternative solution for eliminating interest-group capture. First, he suggests establishing a body within the Executive Branch that proactively investigates and documents capture dynamics. Second, he suggests creating legislative mechanisms that will encourage Congressional action on the body’s recommendations, and perhaps, more provocatively, requiring the Executive Branch to enact any such recommendations in the absence of Congress’s formal objection.
Nothing Improper? Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan Motivation, And Pretextual Justification In The U. S. Attorney Removals, David C. Weiss
Michigan Law Review
The forced mid-term resignations of nine U.S. Attorneys was an unprecedented event in American history. Nearly one year after the administration executed the removals, the House Judiciary Committee was still reviewing and publicizing emails, memoranda, and other documents in an effort to understand how the firings were effectuated. This Note examines many of those documents and concludes that the removals were likely carried out for partisan reasons. It then draws on the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and separation of powers principles to argue that Congress is constitutionally empowered to enact removal limitations for inferior officers such as U.S. Attorneys so …
The Justiciability Of Eligibility: May Courts Decide Who Can Be President?, Daniel P. Tokaji
The Justiciability Of Eligibility: May Courts Decide Who Can Be President?, Daniel P. Tokaji
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The 2008 election cycle has been a busy one for legal disputes over the qualifications of presidential candidates, with federal cases having been filed to challenge both major candidates’ eligibility under the “natural born Citizen” clause. These cases unquestionably present vital questions of constitutional law, touching on matters of self-evident national importance. It is doubtful, however, that they are justiciable in lower federal courts. Standing requirements and the political question doctrine make it unlikely that a federal court will reach the merits in cases of the type filed to date.
A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, Nina A. Mendelson
A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Federal agencies are increasingly taking aim at state law, even though state law is not expressly targeted by the statutes the agencies administer. Starting in 2001, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued several notices saying that state laws would apply to national bank operating subsidiaries (incorporated under state law) to the same extent as those laws applied to the parent national bank. In 2003, the OCC specifically mentioned state consumer protection laws and took the position that the state laws were preempted and did not apply to mortgage lenders owned by national banks. In December 2006, …
The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision And Agency Interpretation: A Response To Galle And Seidenfeld, Nina A. Mendelson
The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision And Agency Interpretation: A Response To Galle And Seidenfeld, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld add some important strands to the debate on agency preemption, particularly in their detailed documentation of the potential advantages agencies may possess in deliberating on preemption compared with Congress and the courts. As they note, the quality of agency deliberation matters to two different debates. First, should an agency interpretation of statutory language to preempt state law receive Chevron deference in the courts, as other agency interpretations may, or should some lesser form of deference be given? Second, should a general statutory authorization to an agency to administer a program and to issue rules …
International Law And Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander In Chief Clause Reconsidered, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth
International Law And Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander In Chief Clause Reconsidered, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth
Michigan Law Review
The Commander in Chief Clause is a difficult, underexplored area of constitutional interpretation. It is also a context in which international law is often mentioned, but not fully defended, as a possible method of interpreting the Constitution. This Article analyzes why the Commander in Chief Clause is difficult and argues that international law helps resolve some of the problems that the Clause presents. Because of weaknesses in originalist analysis, changes over time, and lack of judicial competence in military matters, the Court and commentators have relied on second-order interpretive norms like congressional authorization and executive branch practice in interpreting the …
Irrational War And Constitutional Design: A Reply To Professors Nzelibe And Yoo, Paul F. Diehl, Tom Ginsburg
Irrational War And Constitutional Design: A Reply To Professors Nzelibe And Yoo, Paul F. Diehl, Tom Ginsburg
Michigan Journal of International Law
This Reply proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the argument of the Nzelibe and Yoo paper. Part II considers their principal-agent analysis in the context of the American political system. Part III elaborates on the "democratic peace" literature, demonstrating that it does not support the conclusions that they draw. Part IV addresses the argument that we are in a new strategic situation, such that old rules ought not apply. Part V concludes.
The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard
The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
As one grows older, birthdays gradually shift from being celebratory events to more reflective occasions. One's 40th birthday is commemorated rather differently from one's 2lst, which is, in turn, celebrated quite differently from one's first. After a certain point, the individual birthdays become less important and it is the milestone years to whch we pay particular attention. Sadly for entities like the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is only the milestone years (the ones ending in five or zero, for some reason), that draw any attention at all. No one held a conference to celebrate the SEC's 67th anniversary. Clearly …
The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard
The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the pathologies of the SEC and explores the relation between those pathologies and the SEC's status as an independent agency. Part II then outlines an alternative regulatory structure primarily situated within the executive branch. I also argue that such a relocation of authority would enhance regulatory effectiveness while simultaneously reducing the cost of excessive regulation. The Article concludes with some thoughts about the viability of my proposal.
Foreign Affairs: Presidential Initiative And Congressional Control, David P. Currie
Foreign Affairs: Presidential Initiative And Congressional Control, David P. Currie
Michigan Law Review
Jefferson Powell is one of our foremost scholars of constitutional history. He is particularly adept at bringing extrajudicial sources to bear on constitutional issues. Owing perhaps in part to his extensive service in the Department of Justice, he has a special facility for the use of executive materials; he is surely our leading academic expert on executive interpretation of the Constitution. In his latest book Professor Powell applies his enviable skills to the recurring, fundamental, and controversial question of the division of authority between the President and Congress in the realm of foreign affairs. As is always the case when …
Choosing Justices: A Political Appointments Process And The Wages Of Judicial Supremacy, John C. Yoo
Choosing Justices: A Political Appointments Process And The Wages Of Judicial Supremacy, John C. Yoo
Michigan Law Review
William H. Rehnquist is not going to be Chief Justice forever - much to the chagrin of Republicans, no doubt. In the last century, Supreme Court Justices have retired, on average, at the age of seventy-one after approximately fourteen years on the bench. By the end of the term of the President we elect this November, Chief Justice Rehnquist will have served on the Supreme Court for thirty-two years and reached the age of eighty. The law of averages suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist is likely to retire in the next presidential term. In addition to replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist, …
Executive-Branch Rulemaking And Dispute Settlement In The World Trade Organization: A Proposal To Increase Public Participation, Aubry D. Smith
Executive-Branch Rulemaking And Dispute Settlement In The World Trade Organization: A Proposal To Increase Public Participation, Aubry D. Smith
Michigan Law Review
This Note argues that, because the Executive Branch increasingly will be promulgating domestic regulatory rules intended to comply with the rules of the world-trading system, it is necessary to increase formal oversight of the Executive Branch's role in that context. Part I argues that the United States' participation in the WTO implies a substantial increase in the impact of foreign policy on domestic policy. Part II points out a loophole in Congress's attempt to compensate for this increase by installing various devices to ensure political oversight of the Executive: the Executive Branch is subject, under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act …
Pragmatism And Parity In Appointments, Yxta Maya Murray
Pragmatism And Parity In Appointments, Yxta Maya Murray
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law
This review uses Carter's two foci as a springboard for analyzing the Article II, Section II appointment process. First, Carter's discussion of indecency in modern appointments may be a valuable theoretical insight into the process instead of a mere sociological observation. "Indecency" in appointments, or what is known as "borking" in Carter parlance, may also be a symptom of race and gender bias in the administration of the Article II, Section II power. To ameliorate the effects of this bias, I suggest the incorporation of pragmatism (a thread of philosophical and legal thought) and parity concepts into the existing appointments …