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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Cyberattacks And The Covert Action Statute: Toward A Domestic Legal Framework For Offensive Cyberoperations, Aaron P. Brecher
Cyberattacks And The Covert Action Statute: Toward A Domestic Legal Framework For Offensive Cyberoperations, Aaron P. Brecher
Michigan Law Review
Cyberattacks are capable of penetrating and disabling vital national infrastructure, causing catastrophic economic harms, and approximating the effects of war, all from remote locations and without the use of conventional weapons. They can be nearly impossible to attribute definitively to their sources and require relatively few resources to launch. The United States is vulnerable to cyberattacks but also uniquely capable of carrying out cyberattacks of its own. To do so effectively, the United States requires a legal regime that is well suited to cyberattacks' unique attributes and that preserves executive discretion while inducing the executive branch to coordinate with Congress. …
The Institutions Of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, William E. Kovacic
The Institutions Of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, William E. Kovacic
Michigan Law Review
Daniel Crane's The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement ("Institutional Structure") may do for antitrust law what Essence of Decision did for public administration. Unlike most literature on antitrust law, this superb volume does not address pressing issues of substantive analysis (e.g., when can dominant firms offer loyalty discounts?). Instead, Institutional Structure studies the design and operation of the institutions of U.S. antitrust enforcement. Professor Crane skillfully advances a basic and powerful proposition: to master analytical principles without deep knowledge of the policy implementation mechanism is dangerously incomplete preparation for understanding the U.S. antitrust system, or any body of competition law. …
Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey
Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey
Michigan Law Review
A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past, Congress was the leading actor, and courts and commentators focused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue to its intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in statutory interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy …