Law Commons^™

The Immigration Court System: Unconstitutionality At The Hands Of The Executive To Push Nativism, Chloe Wigul

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

The United States’ immigration court system is located within the U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review and operated under the power of the attorney general. Consequently, the attorney general can review and overrule decisions made by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the immigration appellate body. If the attorney general uses this authority, his decision cannot be reconsidered, and his opinion becomes precedent. Immigration courts are unique in that no other court system is located within or controlled by the executive branch. Focusing on key historical eras, this Comment compares the development of immigration law and policy with …

Table Of Contents

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents

Madison 2.0—Applying The Constitution’S Taxing And Spending Clause To Revitalize American Federalism, Mohamed Akram Faizer

Seattle University Law Review

This article introduces the proposal entitled Madison 2.0 which calls for an enlightened federal government to enact legislation—using its broad ability to tax and spend for the general welfare—to revitalize, as opposed to undermine, American federalism. Part I discusses American Federalism today and the need for an updated approach. Part II explores the government's dysfunctional response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Part III proposes how to revitalize American federalism through the Spending Clause. Part IV discusses how to claw back funds in situations of state recalcitrance and replacing funds with a basic income. Lastly, this article concludes by explaining why the …

The President And Individual Rights, Mark Tushnet

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.

The Emerging Lessons Of Trump V. Hawaii, Shalini Bhargava Ray

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

In the years since the Supreme Court decided Trump v. Hawaii, federal district courts have adjudicated dozens of rights-based challenges to executive action in immigration law. Plaintiffs, including U.S. citizens, civil rights organizations, and immigrants themselves, have alleged violations of the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause with some regularity based on President Trump’s animus toward immigrants. This Article assesses Hawaii’s impact on these challenges to immigration policy, and it offers two observations. First, Hawaii has amplified federal courts’ practice of privileging administrative law claims over constitutional ones. For example, courts considering …

The Original Meaning Of The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause, The Right Of Natural Liberty, And Executive Discretion, John Harrison

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9, is primarily a limit on Congress’s authority to authorize detention by the executive. It is not mainly concerned with the remedial writ of habeas corpus, but rather with the primary right of natural liberty. Suspensions of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are statutes that vest very broad discretion in the executive to decide which individuals to hold in custody. Detention of combatants under the law of war need not rest on a valid suspension, whether the combatant is an alien or a citizen of the United States. …

Destructive Federal Decentralization, David Fontana

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Article—written for a symposium hosted by the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal—focuses on the efforts by the Trump administration to relocate federal officials outside of Washington to reduce the capacity of the federal government. Federalism and the separation of powers are usually the twin pillars of structural constitutional law. Locating federal officials outside of Washington— federal decentralization—has been an additional tool of diffusing power that has started to gain some scholarly attention. These debates largely focus on structural constitutional law as constructive—as improving the capacity and operation of the federal and state governments. The power …

Who Constrains Presidential Exercise Of Delegated Powers?, Rebecca L. Brown

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Building on the work of administrative law scholars who have identified and illuminated the several components of the problem over the years, this Article will seek to show what has happened when a cluster of separate circumstances have come together to create a new and serious threat to individual liberty when the President exercises expansive delegated authority. Several doctrinal components lead to this confluence: First, the moribund “intelligible principle” test has evolved to provide little or no constraint on this or any other delegation. Second, a delegation to the President, specifically, is not subject to the procedural requirements of the …

Robert Jackson's Critique Of Trump V. Hawaii, William R. Casto

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Over seventy years ago, United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson accurately predicted the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii. As he foresaw, the Court rubberstamped a President’s purposeful discrimination against a minority religion. This brief Essay explains Trump using Jackson’s critique of judicial review in national-security cases. The Essay also uses Trump to examine a flaw—probably structural—in the constitutional theory of process jurisprudence. The Trump case involved the Court’s construction of congressional legislation apparently limiting the President’s authority, but the present Essay does not address that aspect of the opinion.

Court Expansion And The Restoration Of Democracy: The Case For Constitutional Hardball, Aaron Belkin

Pepperdine Law Review

Neither electoral politics, norms preservation, nor modest good government reform can restore the political system because they cannot mitigate the primary threat to the American democracy, Republican radicalism. Those who believe otherwise fail to appreciate how and why radicalism will continue to impede democratic restoration regardless of what happens at the ballot box, misdiagnose the underlying factors that produce and sustain GOP radicalism, and under-estimate the degree of democratic deterioration that has already taken place. Republicans do not need to prevail in every election to forestall the restoration of democracy or to prevent Democrats from governing. The only viable path …

Understanding The Spirit Of The Constitution On Corruption: Emoluments, Impeachment, And The Primacy Of Political Virtue, Lea Mano

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.

Black Women And Girls And The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Constitutional Connections, Activist Intersections, And The First Wave Youth Suffrage Movement, Mae C. Quinn

Seattle University Law Review

On this 100th anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment—and on the cusp of the fiftieth anniversary of the Twenty-sixth Amendment—this article seeks to expand the voting rights canon. It complicates our understanding of voting rights history in the United States, adding layers to the history of federal constitutional enfranchisement and encouraging a more intersectional telling of our suffrage story in the days ahead.

Thus, this work not only seeks to acknowledge the Twenty-sixth Amendment as important constitutional content, as was the goal of the article I wrote with my law student colleagues for a conference held at the University of Akron …

A Gun To Whose Head? Federalism, Localism, And The Spending Clause, Daniel S. Cohen

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

President Trump’s executive order rescinding federal funds from “sanctuary jurisdictions” has brought a critical, but overlooked, question of constitutional law to the forefront of the political debate: how does the Spending Clause apply to local governments? The purpose of the Spending Clause is to empower the federal government to bargain with the states to enact policies it cannot enact itself. This power, however, is constrained within the confines of federalism. The Supreme Court has sought to restrict the Spending Clause by crafting the Dole-NFIB framework, a test to determine whether a federal grant has compromised federalism. At its …

Trump, The Court, And Constitutional Law, Erwin Chemerinsky

Indiana Law Journal

In this Essay, I want to offer initial thoughts on what the Trump presidency is likely to mean for constitutional law. First, I want to focus on the lost opportunity: what might have happened had Hillary Clinton replaced Scalia and filled other vacancies on the Court. Second, I want to focus on the reality of what we are likely to see as a result of Neil Gorsuch replacing Antonin Scalia and of other possible vacancies being filled by President Trump. Finally, I want to discuss how progressives should react to this and to the foreseeable future of constitutional law. These, …

Trump As Constitutional Failure, Jamal Greene

Indiana Law Journal

As Part I explains, the American constitutional system assumes a certain sort of democratic culture. That assumption is encapsulated in Chief Justice John Marshall’s dictum, in M’Culloch v. Maryland, that the Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” The U.S. Constitution indeed lacks “the prolixity of a legal code,” but subsequent history confirms that its relative sparseness is not, as Marshall maintained, because it is “a constitution we are expounding.” The U.S. Constitution is among the world’s least prolix and most difficult to amend. These attributes …

The Abraham Lincoln Lecture On Constitutional Law, Steven G. Calabresi

Northwestern University Law Review

These introductory remarks to the Inaugural Abraham Lincoln Lecture on Constitutional Law were delivered at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law on April 6, 2017.

The Vice Presidency In The Twenty-First Century, Jody C. Baumgartner

Pepperdine Law Review

The vice presidency has undergone almost revolutionary change since its inception 227 years ago. Conceived as a convenient solution to a problem created by the Electoral College, the Vice President has only two constitutional functions—to serve as a successor to the President and as the President of the Senate. However, over the past sixty years, vice presidents have become increasingly part of and integral to American governance, and the last three (Al Gore, Dick Cheney, and Joe Biden) have been exceptionally active executive actors. What was once an all-but forgotten office is now an essential part of a president’s administration. …

The Vice President-More Than An Afterthought?, Richard B. Cheney, Edwin Meese Iii, Douglas W. Kmiec

Pepperdine Law Review

A round-table discussion among former U.S. Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Caruso Family Professor of Law and retired U.S. Ambassador Douglas Kmiec, and former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese III considered the practical implications of conceiving the Vice President as a legislative officer, an executive officer, or both. It was noted that until the second half of the twentieth century, the Office of the Vice President was conceived as legislative. Funding for the Office appeared in budget lines relating to Congress and physically, the Vice President’s office was in the Capitol. Beginning with Walter Mondale’s service as Vice President, presidents …

A Constitutional Afterthought: The Origins Of The Vice Presidency, 1787 To 1804, Edward J. Larson

Pepperdine Law Review

At the origins of the office, even though the Vice President was, as its first occupant John Adams declared, “only one breath” away from the presidency, the Office of the Vice President was an afterthought of the Constitutional Convention. Never discussed during the first three months of the four-month long Convention, the Committee of Eleven introduced the vice presidency as a byproduct of how it resolved to fix the presidential selection process. Under this process, the Electoral College emerged, with each state assigned the same number of electors as its members in the House of Representatives and Senate. Each elector …

The Architecture Of Constitutional Time, Richard Alexander Izquierdo

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Bruce Ackerman’s account in his We the People series urges the legal recognition of constitutional amendments enacted outside of Article V as part of a larger descriptive project concerning the creation of distinct republics within the Constitution of 1787. One of its limitations is that he and other scholars have not fully appreciated the way in which the original institutional design of the Constitution has facilitated—and perhaps even anticipated—the construction of subregimes during extraordinary times. This Article presents constitutional time and presidential incentives for a lasting legacy as the most important factors influencing constitutional meaning. It is constitutional time—the extraordinary …

The Transformative Twelfth Amendment, Joshua D. Hawley

William & Mary Law Review

Scholars have long treated the Twelfth Amendment as a constitutional obscurity, a merely mechanical adjustment to the electoral college—and perhaps a less than successful one at that. This consensus is mistaken. In fact, the Twelfth Amendment accomplished one of the most consequential changes to the structure of our constitutional government yet. It fundamentally altered the nature of the Executive and the Executive’s relationship to the other branches of government. The Amendment changed the Executive into something it had not been before: a political office. The presidency designed at Philadelphia was intended to be neither a policymaking nor a representative institution, …

Executive Orders And The Development Of Presidential Power, William Hebe

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis Of The Electoral College, John F. Banzhaf Iii

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Comment, Karl E. Mundt

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Comment, Birch Bayh

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Comment, Neal R. Peirce

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Toward The Techno-Corporate State - An Essay In American Constitutionalsim, Arthur Selwyn Miller

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Some Doubts Concerning The Proposal To Elect The President By Direct Popular Vote, Albert J. Rosenthal

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Comment, John J. Sparkman

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Power Index And The Electoral College: A Challenge To Banzhaf's Analysis, Robert J. Sickels

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.