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Full-Text Articles in Law
Supplying Compliance: Why And When The United States Complies With Wto Rulings, Rachel Brewster, Adam Chilton
Supplying Compliance: Why And When The United States Complies With Wto Rulings, Rachel Brewster, Adam Chilton
Faculty Scholarship
In studies of compliance with international law, the focus is usually on the “demand side” – that is, how to increase the pressure on the state to comply. Less attention has been paid, however, to the consequences of the “supply side” – who within the state is responsible for the compliance. This Article is the first study to systematically address the issue of how different actors within the United States government alter national policy in response to the violations of international law. The Article does so by examining cases initiated under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). …
Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions, Rachel Brewster
Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions, Rachel Brewster
Faculty Scholarship
The conventional wisdom in international law is that dispute resolution institutions sharpen the reputational costs to states. This article challenges this understanding by examining how the inclusion of dispute resolution tribunals and remedy regimes can alter reputational analysis by shifting the audience¹s understanding of how mandatory a treaty's substantive obligations are. Drawing on the distinction between prices and sanctions, this article contests the assumption that the introduction of a remedy regime in international agreements will regularly increase compliance with the treaty¹s substantive terms. Instead, some remedy regimes may 'price' deviations from the treaty¹s terms and thereby facilitate breaches of the …
The Domestic Origins Of International Agreements, Rachel Brewster
The Domestic Origins Of International Agreements, Rachel Brewster
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines how international agreements are substitutes for statutes. The statutory law-making system and international agreement negotiations are separate, but sometimes rival, processes for setting national-level policy. International agreements have several advantages over domestic statutes. Under United States law, international agreements can entrench policies that might otherwise be subject to change; they can transfer agenda-setting power from the Congress to the President; and they can delegate authority to international organizations. Each of these effects can lead domestic interest groups to seek international negotiations rather than domestic legislation. Little difference exists between the politics of international and domestic law: Interest …