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Political Science

Duke Law

United States. Congress

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Supplying Compliance: Why And When The United States Complies With Wto Rulings, Rachel Brewster, Adam Chilton Jan 2014

Supplying Compliance: Why And When The United States Complies With Wto Rulings, Rachel Brewster, Adam Chilton

Faculty Scholarship

In studies of compliance with international law, the focus is usually on the “demand side” – that is, how to increase the pressure on the state to comply. Less attention has been paid, however, to the consequences of the “supply side” – who within the state is responsible for the compliance. This Article is the first study to systematically address the issue of how different actors within the United States government alter national policy in response to the violations of international law. The Article does so by examining cases initiated under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). …


Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior And Policy Outcomes, John M. De Figueiredo Jan 2013

Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior And Policy Outcomes, John M. De Figueiredo

Faculty Scholarship

The literature on congressional committees has largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theory of how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why a) senior members and young members in safe districts are most likely to challenge a committee’s jurisdiction; b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer’s ideal point in order to obtain jurisdiction; c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars. We empirically investigate these results examining proposed Internet intellectual property protection …


Administrative Law Agonistes, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast, Daniel B. Rodriguez Jan 2008

Administrative Law Agonistes, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast, Daniel B. Rodriguez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Congressional Representation Of Black Interests: Recognizing The Importance Of Stability, Guy-Uriel Charles, Vincent L. Hutchins, Harwood K. Mcclerking Jan 2004

Congressional Representation Of Black Interests: Recognizing The Importance Of Stability, Guy-Uriel Charles, Vincent L. Hutchins, Harwood K. Mcclerking

Faculty Scholarship

The relationship between black constituency size and congressional support for black interests has two important attributes: magnitude and stability. Although previous research has examined the first characteristic, scant attention has been directed at the second. This article examines the relationship between district racial composition and congressional voting patterns with a particular emphasis on the stability of support across different types of votes and different types of districts. We hypothesize that, among white Democrats, the influence of black constituency size will be less stable in the South, owing in part to this region’s more racially divided constituencies. Examining LCCR scores from …


Presidential Influence On Congressional Appropriations Decisions, D.Roderick Kiewiet, Mathew D. Mccubbins Jan 1988

Presidential Influence On Congressional Appropriations Decisions, D.Roderick Kiewiet, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

We investigate the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important implication of our analysis is that the influence the veto conveys is asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than Congress does; it does not provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he prefers to spend more than it does. This asymmetry derives from constitutional limitations on the veto, in combination with the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure …