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Full-Text Articles in Law

Normative Powers, Joseph Raz Jan 2022

Normative Powers, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

The chapter provides an analysis of normative powers as the ability to change a normative condition, and distinguishes and analyses several kinds of such powers. It distinguishes between wide normative powers possessed by any act that non-causally results in a normative change, and narrow normative powers, which are the main topic of the chapter. The most important theses of the chapter are: First, the distinction between basic normative powers and chained normative powers (the latter being powers created by the exercise of other powers) and second, defending the apparently surprising claim that people have narrow powers when and because there …


Edward Snowden, National Security Whistleblowing, And Civil Disobedience, David E. Pozen Jan 2019

Edward Snowden, National Security Whistleblowing, And Civil Disobedience, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

No recent whistleblower has been more lionized or vilified than Edward Snowden. He has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize and denounced as a "total traitor" deserving of the death penalty. In these debates, Snowden's defenders tend to portray him as a civil disobedient. Yet for a range of reasons, Snowden's situation does not map neatly onto traditional theories of civil disobedience. The same holds true for most cases of national security whistleblowing.

The contradictory and confused responses that these cases provoke, this essay suggests, are not just the product of polarized politics or insufficient information. Rather, they reflect …


Sovereignty And Complex Interdependence: Some Surprising Indications Of Their Compatibility, Charles F. Sabel Jan 2019

Sovereignty And Complex Interdependence: Some Surprising Indications Of Their Compatibility, Charles F. Sabel

Faculty Scholarship

Even as democratic sovereignty and globalization are increasingly seen as incompatible in theory, this chapter argues that, in some important realms, they are proving compatible in practice. As tariffs have fallen to negligible levels, trade agreements among rich countries have come to focus on reconciling regulatory differences. In many sectors, novel forms of cooperation have emerged that allow trade partners deliberately to investigate and learn from one another’s practices, eventually recognizing the equivalence of regimes that are not strictly identical — and in the process extending domestic political oversight to relations among states while often heightening domestic accountability. The emergent …


On Waldron's Critique Of Raz On Human Rights, Joseph Raz Jan 2018

On Waldron's Critique Of Raz On Human Rights, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

This commentary responds to Waldron’s “Human Rights: A Critique of the Raz/Rawls Approach”. It points out that some supposed criticisms are nothing more than observations on conditions that any account of rights must meet, and that Waldron’s objections to Raz are due to misunderstanding his thesis and its theoretical goal. The short comment tries to clarify that goal.


Value And The Weight Of Practical Reasons, Joseph Raz Jan 2016

Value And The Weight Of Practical Reasons, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

Assuming that the value of options (actions, activities, or omissions) constitutes the proximate reason for pursuing them, this chapter considers whether we have reason to promote or maximise value. A proper argument would require establishing a negative, but raising doubts is less demanding — explaining some aspects of the relation between values and reasons that enable us to dispense with the doubtful thesis by illustrating alternative relations between values and reasons. Theses that value should be promoted are accompanied by a way of determining the strength of reasons (the stronger reason promotes more value). This chapter develops theoretical doubts about …


A Hedgehog's Unity Of Value, Joseph Raz Jan 2016

A Hedgehog's Unity Of Value, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

The paper examines various interpretations of Dworkin’s thesis of the Unity of Value, as expressed and defended in his book Justice for Hedgehogs. Dworkin’s arguments for various aspects of his unity of value thesis are relied on in interpreting the which is then compared with versions of value pluralism.


Intuition And Feminist Constitutionalism, Suzanne B. Goldberg Jan 2012

Intuition And Feminist Constitutionalism, Suzanne B. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In any constitutional system, we must ask, as a foundational inquiry, when and why a government may distinguish between groups of constituents for purposes of allocating benefits or imposing penalties. For feminists and others with a stake in challenging inequalities, the rationales that a society deems acceptable for justifying these classifications are centrally important. Heightened scrutiny jurisprudence for sex-based and other distinctions may help capture some of the rationales that rest on stereotypes and outmoded biases. However, at the end of the day, whatever level of scrutiny is applied, the critical question at any level of review is whether, according …


Reasons: Explanatory And Normative, Joseph Raz Jan 2011

Reasons: Explanatory And Normative, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

‘A reason’ has two meanings: explanatory reasons are facts that contribute to an explanation (of anything explained); normative reasons are facts that favour and guide responses, in one’s emotions, beliefs, actions, etc., to how things are. The two kinds of reasons are connected by their connection to the capacity of Reason, or rationality, and by the normative/explanatory nexus, i.e. by the fact that normative reasons can explain the response that they favour. Normative reasons are — potentially — explanatory reasons, but the explanations they provide are of a special kind that presupposes their normative character. The chapter builds on …


On The Guise Of The Good, Joseph Raz Jan 2010

On The Guise Of The Good, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

The chapter examines the main argument for, and the presuppositions of the claim that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An analysis of intentional actions, and of action for a (normative) reason, followed by a consideration of a number of objections to the thesis of the Guise of the Good force various revisions and refinements of the thesis yielding a defensible version of it. It is argued that the revised thesis is supported by the same argument that inspired the Guise of the Good from the beginning and …


Human Rights Without Foundations, Joseph Raz Jan 2010

Human Rights Without Foundations, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

This is a good time for human rights. Not that they are respected more than in the past. The flagrant resort to kidnapping, arbitrary arrests, and torture by the United States of America (USA), and the unprecedented restriction of individual freedom in the USA, and in Great Britain (GB), cast doubt about that. It is a good time for human rights in that claims about such rights are used more widely in the conduct of world affairs than before. There are declarations of and treaties about human rights, international courts and tribunals with jurisdiction over various human right violations. They …


Being In The World, Joseph Raz Jan 2010

Being In The World, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

Actions for which we are responsible constitute our engagement with the world as rational agents. What is the relationship between such actions and our capacities for rational agency? I take this to be a question about responsibility in a particular use of that term, which I shall call ‘responsibility’. We are not responsible for all our intentional actions (actions under hypnosis, for example), but we can nevertheless be responsible for actions we do not adequately control, for negligent actions, and for non‐intentional omissions. Appreciating this helps show that familiar principles of responsibility are false: those which delimit responsibility to intentional …


Susan Wolf On The Meaning Of Life: A Review, Joseph Raz Jan 2010

Susan Wolf On The Meaning Of Life: A Review, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

The book comprises the two Tanner Lectures given by Susan Wolf at Princeton in 2007; helpful comments by John Koethe, Robert M. Adams, Nomy Arpaly, and Jonathan Haidt;Wolf ’s replies; and a brief introduction by Stephen Macedo. Wolf writes elegantly and thoughtfully, and the book, which seems to preserve in length and style its origins as two lectures, is full of sensible, suggestive ideas. The Tanner Lectures are meant to reach a nonspecialist audience, and some specialist readers may wish to have more on less, a desire likely to affect especially those who, like myself, share Wolf ’s basic approach …


Reasons: Practical And Adaptive, Joseph Raz Jan 2009

Reasons: Practical And Adaptive, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

I will consider some of the differences between epistemic reasons and reasons for action, and use these differences to illuminate a major division between types of normative reasons, which I will call ‘adaptive’ and ‘practical’ reasons. A few clarifications of some aspects of the concept of epistemic reasons will lead to a distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (section 1). Some differences between epistemic and practical reasons will be described and explained in section 2, paving the way to generalising the contrast and explaining the difference between adaptive and practical reasons (section 3). sections 4 and 5 further explain and …


Secularism, Religion, And Liberal Democracy In The United States, Kent Greenawalt Jan 2009

Secularism, Religion, And Liberal Democracy In The United States, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This essay is divided into three categories: some brief remarks about forms of secularism, an outline of American constitutional law as it relates to religion, and a discussion from the standpoint of political philosophy of the proper place of religion (and other similar perspectives) in making political decisions within liberal democracies. Because the audience for whom the oral comments from which the essay is derived was mainly non-American, the middle part of the essay sets out many propositions familiar to anyone acquainted with this branch of constitutional law. And because of the informal nature of the original presentation, I offer …


Personal Practical Conflicts, Joseph Raz Jan 2004

Personal Practical Conflicts, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

This preliminary reflection about practical conflicts confronting single agents does little to solve the problems conflicts create. Rather, it attempts to explain what conflicts are and what questions they raise. I suggest that we have two distinct notions of single-agent conflicts reflecting two distinct theoretical questions. The first concerns the possibility of there being a right action in conflict situations. It is the question of whether and, if so, how reasons deriving from different concerns or affecting different people can be of comparable strengths. The second concerns a sense that there is something unfortunate about conflicts and that when facing …


Church-State Relations And Religious Convictions, Kent Greenawalt Jan 1987

Church-State Relations And Religious Convictions, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

Since the title of my talk is hardly self-explanatory, I want to begin by outlining my topic. My overall concern is with the proper place of religious convictions in lawmaking in our society. My special focus is on the place of religious convictions in the political resolution of churchstate issues.


Vietnam Amnesty – Problems Of Justice And Line-Drawing, Kent Greenawalt Jan 1977

Vietnam Amnesty – Problems Of Justice And Line-Drawing, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

The troublesome issue of pardon for crimes connected with the Vietnam War raises some of the most complex and difficult questions in the philosophy of law. What are the purposes of criminal punishment? Under what conditions is violation of obligations imposed by law morally justified? When, and on what conditions, is it proper to excuse those who have violated the law for conscientious reasons? How much should decisions whether to pardon turn on what offenders "deserve" and how much should they turn on what will be socially acceptable and promote future social harmony? How far should the desirability of dispositions …