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Organizations Law

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Brooklyn Law School

2019

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Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Law

Chipping Away At Compliance: How Compliance Programs Lose Legitimacy And Its Impact On Unethical Behavior, David Hess Dec 2019

Chipping Away At Compliance: How Compliance Programs Lose Legitimacy And Its Impact On Unethical Behavior, David Hess

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Employee perceptions of an organization’s compliance program are critical. A program that has lost legitimacy with its employees is not just ineffective, but it creates more harm than good by leading to more unethical behavior. This Article identifies ways in which compliance programs can start to lose legitimacy, explains how that lost legitimacy leads to increased wrongdoing, and then concludes by setting out some basic reforms focused on helping stop this downward spiral and protecting the legitimacy of the compliance function.


Social Responsibility Regulation And Its Challenges To Corporate Compliance, Stephen Kim Park Dec 2019

Social Responsibility Regulation And Its Challenges To Corporate Compliance, Stephen Kim Park

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

This Article addresses the intersection of corporate social responsibility and corporate compliance. In this context, the focus of this Article is on regulation that seeks to enhance socially responsible corporate conduct and its implications for the compliance function. Social responsibility regulation raises operational concerns for companies, including problems associated with assessing social performance, the proliferation and fragmentation of legal obligations, and the contested nature of the social issues that it addresses. As laws mandating socially responsible corporate conduct continue to grow in number and expand in scope, corporations will increasingly need to acknowledge and respond to these challenges.


Artificial Intelligence & Artificial Prices: Safeguarding Securities Markets From Manipulation By Non-Human Actors, Daniel W. Slemmer Dec 2019

Artificial Intelligence & Artificial Prices: Safeguarding Securities Markets From Manipulation By Non-Human Actors, Daniel W. Slemmer

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Securities traders are currently competing to use Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) in order to make more profitable decisions in the marketplace. While A.I. provides superior abilities in recognizing market patterns, its complexity can obscure its decision-making process beyond human comprehension. Problematically, the current securities laws prohibiting manipulation of securities prices rest liability for violations on a trader’s intent. In order to prepare for A.I. market participants, both courts and regulators need to accept that human concepts of decision-making will be inadequate in regulating A.I. behavior. However, the wealth of case law in the market manipulation doctrine need not be cast aside. …


Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, And Bias In Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation, Frank Pasquale, Kristin Johnson, Jennifer Elisa Chapman Nov 2019

Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, And Bias In Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation, Frank Pasquale, Kristin Johnson, Jennifer Elisa Chapman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Emerging Trends In Corporate Enforcement And Corporate Compliance: Symposium Introduction, James Fanto, Miriam Baer Oct 2019

Emerging Trends In Corporate Enforcement And Corporate Compliance: Symposium Introduction, James Fanto, Miriam Baer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Activist Shareholders At De Facto Controlled Companies, Gaia Balp May 2019

Activist Shareholders At De Facto Controlled Companies, Gaia Balp

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Activist campaigns are likely to increasingly target controlled companies. Studies concerning activism at controlled companies focus on shareholder-empowering tools, such as the right to nominate and elect minority directors on the board, as a pathway for limiting the principal-principal agency problem. However, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between de jure and de facto controlled companies. Building on a recent case concerning a leading Italian corporation, this Article analyzes the possible unexpected corporate governance consequences of successful activist intervention at de facto controlled companies, showing that, where minority shareholders are granted the right to appoint directors on …