Law Commons^™

War Powers Reform: A Skeptical View, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Debates about war powers focus too much on legal checks and on the President’s power to start wars. Congressional checks before and during crises work better than many reform-ists suppose, and there are ways to improve Congress’s political checking without substantial legal reform.

War Is More Than A Political Question: Reestablishing Original Constitutional Norms, John C. Dehn

Faculty Publications & Other Works

Since World War II, it has become increasingly common practice for presidents to use non-defensive military force abroad without obtaining congressional pre-approval, thereby leaving Congress with no meaningful role in the decision. This modern practice is clearly at odds with the Constitution’s text and original meaning. A wealth of scholarly commentary concludes that the Constitution grants Congress alone the power to authorize non-defensive military force. Although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, ample commentary also concludes that a president has inherent constitutional power only to defend the nation from an actual or impending attack.

This Essay rejects the notion that …

The Virtues Of Abstention: Separation Of Powers In Al-Nashiri Ii, Nicholas A. Dimarco

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Part I examines various scholarly approaches to judicial deference, then considers deference in the context of military commissions. In Part II, the history of military commissions in the United States is examined, paying particular attention to the extended dialogue among the coordinate federal branches that created the system currently in operation. The decision in Al-Nashiri II not to adjudicate a collateral attack on one of these commissions is the focus of Part III. That Part embraces the underlying jurisdictional challenge at stake in Al-Nashiri II, the development of abstention doctrine generally and as applied to the current commissions, …

Why Federal Courts Apply The Law Of Nations Even Though It Is Not The Supreme Law Of The Land, Anthony J. Bellia, Bradford R. Clark

Journal Articles

We are grateful to the judges and scholars who participated in this Symposium examining our book, The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution. One of our goals in writing this book was to reinvigorate and advance the debate over the role of customary international law in U.S. courts. The papers in this Symposium advance this debate by deepening understandings of how the Constitution interacts with customary international law. Our goal in this Article is to address two questions raised by this Symposium that go to the heart of the status of the law of nations under the Constitution. …

The Commander In Chief's Authority To Combat Climate Change, Mark P. Nevitt

Mark P Nevitt

Climate change is the world’s greatest environmental threat. And it is increasingly understood as a threat to domestic and international peace and security. In recognition of this threat, the President has taken the initiative to prepare for climate change’s impact – in some cases drawing sharp objections from Congress. While both the President and Congress have certain constitutional authorities to address the national security threat posed by climate change, the precise contours of their overlapping powers are unclear. As Commander in Chief, the President has the constitutional authority to repel sudden attacks and take care that the laws are faithfully …

The Conflict Of Laws In Armed Conflicts And Wars, John C. Dehn

John C. Dehn

After over thirteen years of continuous armed conflict, neither courts nor scholars are closer to a common understanding of whether, or how, international and U.S. law interact to regulate acts of belligerency by the United States. This Article articulates the first normative theory regarding the relationship of customary international law to U.S. domestic law that fully harmonizes Supreme Court precedent. It then applies this theory to customary international laws of war to better articulate the legal framework regulating the armed conflicts of the United States. It demonstrates that the relationship of customary international law to U.S. law differs in cases …

Standing And Covert Surveillance, Christopher Slobogin

Pepperdine Law Review

This Article describes and analyzes standing doctrine as it applies to covert government surveillance, focusing on practices thought to be conducted by the National Security Agency. Primarily because of its desire to avoid judicial incursions into the political process, the Supreme Court has construed its standing doctrine in a way that makes challenges to covert surveillance very difficult. Properly understood, however, such challenges do not call for judicial trenching on the power of the legislative and executive branches. Instead, they ask the courts to ensure that the political branches function properly. This political process theory of standing can rejuvenate the …

Interpreting Force Authorization, Scott Sullivan

Scott Sullivan

Rostker V. Goldberg: A Step Backward In Equal Protection, Or A Justifiable Affirmation Of Congressional Power?, Gilbert L. Purcell, Janet Rappaport

Pepperdine Law Review

The Supreme Court in Rostker v. Goldberg upheld a Congressional decision which excluded women from registration for service in the Armed Forces of the United States. Although the case was brought based upon equal protection grounds, the majority took a separation of powers stance and based its decision upon the fact that the Court has traditionally granted deference to the decisions of Congress in the area of military affairs. The minority opinions disagreed with the majority's analysis and claimed that the central issue in Rostker was not military in nature, but was that Congress' plan to register males only, promoted …

Defining, Punishing, And Membership In The Community Of Nations: Material Support And Conspiracy Charges In Military Commissions, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Boland In The Wind: The Iran-Contra Affair And The Invitation To Struggle , Bretton G. Sciaroni

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Can The President And Congress Establish A Legislative Veto Mechanism For Jointly Drawing Down A Long And Controversial War?, Charles Tiefer

All Faculty Scholarship

In the simplest case: Congress declares war, and does not intrude on the President's solo decision about when the troops come home. However, in our time, long wars, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, occur with great tension between the two elected branches of government over the pace of a drawdown. Sometimes it may be a hawkish Congress that disagrees with a President reluctant to continue the war at full troop levels. To find a joint way to draw down the American troops in the war zone, they may seek congressional mechanisms to resolve their differences with interactive processes. Then, …

The Constitutional Bond In Military Professionalism: A Reply To Professor Deborah N. Pearlstein, Diane H. Mazur

UF Law Faculty Publications

The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers is important and very persuasive. (In this Response, I will call it Separation of Powers to distinguish it clearly from The Soldier and the State,7 the classic work on civil–military relations referenced in the title.) Professor Pearlstein asks the right questions and reaches the right conclusions—no small task when law professors have typically deferred to expertise in other fields, if not avoided the subject entirely.8 What do we mean by civilian control of the military? Where is the line between a military that offers its professional expertise to civilian decision makers …

Can Congress Make A President Step Up A War?, Charles Tiefer

All Faculty Scholarship

May Congress use its appropriation power to direct the President to step up a war? When Congress uses its spending power for intensifying a war-stepping it up, pressing it more aggressively-against the resistance of a "less hawkish" Commander in Chief, who wins?

This Article posits differences of view in the 2010s toward the Afghanistan war as a way to revisit, generally, the history of constitutional disputes over war-related appropriation riders. Describing the differences in very simplistic terms, a "hawkish" opposition in Congress may gain political strength at any time, such as in 2010 or 2014, not necessarily because of the …

The Power To End War: The Extent And Limits Of Congressional Power., Adam Heder

St. Mary's Law Journal

Congress has several options in limiting the execution of war, however, Congress has no implied constitutional authority to terminate a war. Congress may limit the scope at the outset of the war, dissolve the army, or use its appropriation power. Congress may also impeach the President. Domestic statutes, the Court’s strong protection of essential liberties, and the democratic process further check the President’s power. Short of these, however, neither the Constitution nor subsequent case law gives Congress any definitive power to end or effectively limit the President’s ability to conduct a war. Congress gets its “bite at the apple” at …

An Overt Turn On Covert Action, Afsheen John Radsan

Faculty Scholarship

Long past the soul-searching of Watergate, very few people question the need for covert action as a part of American foreign policy. The world is so dangerous after 9/11 that it would be irresponsible to suggest that our intelligence agencies should be disbanded or that our government should acknowledge everything it does on the dark side. Today the question is not whether we should engage in covert action at all, but how often and under what circumstances.

Not everything stays secret. Our Nation has been conducting covert action with greater transparency and more congressional participation than during the Cold War. …

International Law And Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander In Chief Clause Reconsidered, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth

Michigan Law Review

The Commander in Chief Clause is a difficult, underexplored area of constitutional interpretation. It is also a context in which international law is often mentioned, but not fully defended, as a possible method of interpreting the Constitution. This Article analyzes why the Commander in Chief Clause is difficult and argues that international law helps resolve some of the problems that the Clause presents. Because of weaknesses in originalist analysis, changes over time, and lack of judicial competence in military matters, the Court and commentators have relied on second-order interpretive norms like congressional authorization and executive branch practice in interpreting the …

Holding Enemy Combatants In The Wake Of Hamdan, Ronald D. Rotunda

Ronald D. Rotunda

The article offers, inter alia, a succinct survey of the historical and jurisprudential background for the detainee cases and military commissions cases - including a number of important factual details glossed over in most reporting on the cases (e.g., Padilla has stipulated that he was an enemy spy sent to the United States; it was Hamdan's own defense counsel who had asked to exclude him from the voir dire portion of the proceedings) - as well as legal issues that may still arise.

Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit From Iraq?, Charles Tiefer

All Faculty Scholarship

To explore the implications of riders - provisions added to appropriation bills that "ride" on the underlying bill - on the United States' continued military force in Iraq, the author draws three hypotheticals, each focusing on the debate surrounding the policy and political disputes raised by the use of such riders. A "withdrawal" rider, which would authorize funding only if there exists a plan to withdraw American ground troops by a set deadline, remains the most important - and controversial - rider. Riders may also significantly affect wartime policies, like those that limit the President's use of reservists in combat …

The Constitution, The White House, And The Military Hiv Ban: A New Threshold For Presidential Non-Defense Of Statutes, Chrysanthe Gussis

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The President's constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" implies that the President is entrusted with the responsibility to defend those laws against court challenges. On occasion, however, Presidents faced with legislation that they deem unconstitutional have declined to defend that legislation against legal challenges. On February 10, 1996, President Clinton declined to defend a provision included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 that required discharge from the military of all HIV-positive servicemembers because he believed that the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Note explores whether …

Legislative Redistricting In 1991-1992: The Texas Bill Of Rights V. The Voting Rights Act., James C. Harrington, Judith Sanders-Castro

St. Mary's Law Journal

Every decade, after the federal government has taken the census, Americans endure the process of redistricting Congress, state legislatures, county commissioner precincts, school boards, city councils, and a host of other elected bodies. Governed by the interplay of federal, state, and local law, the reapportionment process would seem to be a relatively easy task in theory. Yet, overriding forces unique to the political arena and the judiciary’s voice in redistricting questions undermine the implementation of such a simple system. Narrow interpretation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by the United State Supreme Court and lower federal courts further intensify …