Law Commons^™

The Failed Regulation Of U.S. Treasury Markets, Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In trading the preeminent risk-free security, the $21 trillion U.S. Treasury market supports the country's borrowing needs, financial stability, and investor appetite for a safe asset. Straddling the nexus between a securities market and a systemically essential institution, the Treasury market must function at all costs, even if other markets fail.

This Article shows that Treasury market structure is fragile, weakened by a regulatory model poorly suited to match its design. First, public oversight of Treasuries is fragmented, divided between five or more agencies. The rulebook for Treasuries is sparse, lacking basic guardrails common to other markets. Without effective rules …

Energy Federalism's Aim, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Federal Power Act (FPA) has endured for eighty-five years, in part because it does not embrace a single regulatory approach for the energy industry. Nor does the FPA favor a single approach to federal- ism: it delegates broad authority to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to regulate the wholesale sale and transmission of energy in interstate commerce, while leaving states considerable leeway to regulate not only retail rates but also power generation and distribution. The statute expanded federal authority over wholesale electric power sales, with the primary purpose of closing regulatory gaps in interstate energy markets.

For the …

Deal Breakage In Domestic And Cross-Border Mergers, Morgan Ricks

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article presents a newly constructed mergers and acquisitions (M&A) data set that can support detailed analysis of deal outcomes, including deal breakage. The main novelty of the data set is a detailed classification scheme for characterizing deal outcomes, using information drawn from public announcements and news reports. The data set also includes a number of variables, hand gathered from press releases and merger agreements, that are unavailable in existing data sets in reliable form, or at all. The data set consists of all definitive, signed M&A transactions involving US public company targets with a deal value of at least …

Fintech And International Financial Regulation, Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article shows that fintech exacerbates the difficulties of standard setting in international financial regulation. Earlier work introduced the "Innovation Trilemma" (the Trilemma). When seeking to balance the goals of achieving market integrity and innovation through clear and simple rulemaking, regulators can-at best-achieve only two out of these three objectives. Fintech's unique characteristics- a reliance on automation and artificial intelligence, novel types of big data, as well as the use of disintermediating financial supply chains comprising a mix of traditional firms as well as technology specialists and newcomers-complicates the application of the Trilemma. Rulemaking struggles to achieve needed clarity where …

The Long Rise And Quick Fall Of Appraisal Arbitrage, Randall S. Thomas, Wei Jiang, Tao Li

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Appraisal is a legislatively created right for shareholders to seek a judicial determination of the fair value of their stock in certain transactions. For many decades, appraisal was a little-used and frequently maligned corporate law remedy. Beginning at the turn of the twenty-first century, this all changed when a group of financial investors, including some hedge funds, began filing appraisal cases. Appraisal arbitrage, as it became known, grew rapidly in popularity.

Appraisal arbitrage's success soon attracted negative attention. In 2016, the Delaware legislature amended its appraisal statute to eliminate most small shareholders' appraisal rights and to permit companies to prepay …

Insider Trading And Market Structure, Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that the emergence of algorithmic trading raises a new challenge for the law and policy of insider trading. It shows that securities markets comprise a cohort of algorithmic “structural insiders” that – by virtue of speed and physical proximity to exchanges – systematically gain first access to information and play an outsize role in price formation. This Article makes three contributions. First, it introduces and develops the concept of structural insider trading. Securities markets increasingly rely on automated traders utilizing algorithms – or pre-programmed electronic instructions – for trading. Policy allows traders to enjoy important structural advantages: …

How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency In Capital Markets, Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that the rise of algorithmic trading undermines efficient capital allocation in securities markets. It is a bedrock assumption in theory that securities prices reveal how effectively public companies utilize capital. This conventional wisdom rests on the straightforward premise that prices reflect available information about a security and that investors look to prices to decide where to invest and whether their capital is being productively used. Unsurprisingly, regulation relies pervasively on prices as a proxy for the allocative efficiency of investor capital.

Algorithmic trading weakens the ability of prices to function as a window into allocative efficiency. This …

The Case For A Market In Debt Governance, Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Scholars have long lamented that the growth of modern finance has given way to a decline in debt governance. According to current theory, the expansive use of derivatives that enable lenders to trade away the default risk of their loans has made these lenders uninterested, even reckless, when it comes to exercising creditor discipline. In contrast to current theory, this Article argues that such derivatives can prove a positive and powerful influence in debt governance. Theory has overlooked those who sell credit protection to lenders and assume default risk on the borrower. These protection sellers are left holding the economic …

Better Bounty Hunting, Amanda Rose

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program has provoked significant controversy. That controversy has centered on the failure of the implementing rules to make internal reporting through corporate compliance departments a prerequisite to recovery. This Article approaches the new program with a broader lens, examining its impact on the longstanding debate over fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) class actions. The Article demonstrates how the bounty program, if successful, will replicate the fraud deterrence benefits of FOTM class actions while simultaneously increasing the costs of such suits — rendering them a pointless yet expensive redundancy. If instead the SEC proves incapable of effectively administering the …

The Multienforcer Approach To Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, Amanda Rose

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Participants in the U.S. capital markets can be sued for securities fraud by a mishmash of enforcers, including the SEC, class action plaintiffs, and state regulators. Does this multi-enforcer approach make sense from a deterrence perspective? This Article suggests that the answer is probably no. Although in theory there are conditions under which a multi-enforcer approach would promote optimal deterrence, it is unclear at best that those conditions exist in the United States. And further empirical research, while warranted, is unlikely to resolve the issue definitively. The status quo tends to persevere in the face of this sort of irreducible …

Prediction Markets And Law: A Skeptical Account, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Enthusiasm for "many minds" arguments has infected legal academia. Scholars now champion the virtues of groupthink, something once thought to have only vices. It turns out that groups often outperform individuals in aggregating information, weighing alternatives, and making decisions. And although some of our legal institutions, such as Congress and juries, already harness the power of the crowd, others could be improved by multiplying the number of minds at work. "Multiplying" implies a simple mathematical formula for improving decisionmaking; modern many minds arguments are more sophisticated than that. They use incentive analyses, game theory, and statistics to study how and …

Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects Of Private Equity And Derivatives On Corporate Governance, Randall Thomas, Ronald W. Masulis

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Private equity has reaped large rewards in recent years. We claim that one major reason for this success is due to the corporate governance advantages of private equity over the public corporation. We argue that the development of substantial derivative contracts and trading has significantly weakened the governance of public corporations and has created a need for financially sophisticated directors and much closer supervision of management. The private equity model delivers these benefits and allows corporations to be better governed, creating wealth gains for investors.

Explaining The International Ceo Pay Gap: Board Capture Or Market Driven?, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

If we look at convergence through the lens of the Risk Adjustment Theory, then international pay convergence will only occur if U.S. and foreign CEOs' firm-specific risk levels converge. Empirically, this is a difficult claim to test because of the paucity of data available on CEOs' individual wealth levels and stockholdings. The one component we can most easily observe, stock option usage, is presently quite different, with U.S. levels far exceeding those abroad. For the near future, this trend seems likely to continue, making it difficult to forecast convergence any time soon. The international executive pay gap is one of …

Market Incentives For Safety, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In the heated atmosphere generated by inch-high headlines and multimillion-dollar liability suits, two important facts often get lost. First, society's awareness of what ensuring reasonably complete safety would cost rarely matches the intensity of its demands for such assurance. And second, the most powerful forces working to make products and workplaces safer are not the edicts of government but the dynamics of the market. True, there are situations in which the market cannot by itself create effective incentives for safety, but in the vast majority of cases it can-and does. Drawing on his extensive research into the regulation of risk, …