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Full-Text Articles in Law
Toward A Theory Of Motion Practice And Settlement: Comment, Adam C. Pritchard
Toward A Theory Of Motion Practice And Settlement: Comment, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
"Scott Baker (2017) has provided a thought-provoking contribution to this symposium volume, helping us to better understand the strategic game of litigation. In terms of both resources and actual disputes resolved, pretrial practice is vastly more important than actual trials. Trials are a rarity in the American civil justice system, as the overwhelming majority of disputes are resolved via settlement. Indeed, rational-choice scholars have struggled to explain why all disputes are not resolved via settlement, as settlement avoids the expense of a trial, which is a dead-weight loss to both sides of the dispute. The parties’ mutual incentive toward settlement …
A Theory Of Representative Shareholder Suits And Its Application To Multijurisdictional Litigation, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
A Theory Of Representative Shareholder Suits And Its Application To Multijurisdictional Litigation, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
We develop a theory to explain the uses and abuses of representative shareholder litigation based on its two most important underlying characteristics: the multiple sources of the legal rights being redressed (creating dynamic opportunities for arbitrage) and the ability of multiple shareholders to seek to represent the collective group in such litigation (creating increased risk of litigation agency costs by those representatives and their attorneys). Placed against the backdrop of controlling managerial agency costs, our theory predicts that: (1) the relative strength of the different forms of shareholder litigation will shift over time; (2) these shifts can result in new …
The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner
The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner
Articles
We study the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs—“pay to play”—on the level of attorney fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorney fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity, and larger funds negotiate for lower fees. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to offcials with infuence over state pension funds. This effect is most pronounced when we focus on state pension funds that receive the largest campaign contributions and that associate repeatedly as lead …
Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, John C. Coffee Jr.
Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Both Europe and the United States are rethinking their approach to aggregate litigation. In the United States, class actions have long been organized around an entrepreneurial model that uses economic incentives to align the interest of the class attorney with those of the class. But increasingly, potential class members are preferring exit to voice, suggesting that the advantages of the U.S. model may have been overstated. In contrast, Europe has long resisted the United States's entrepreneurial model, and the contemporary debate in Europe centers on whether certain elements of the U.S. model – namely, opt-out class actions, contingent fees, and …
Conflicting Ideologies Of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge Settlements In Class Actions And Derivative Suits?, Susanna Ripken
Conflicting Ideologies Of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge Settlements In Class Actions And Derivative Suits?, Susanna Ripken
Susanna K. Ripken
The article discusses the rights of unnamed class members in class actions and shareholders in corporate derivative suits to appeal court orders approving the settlement of their claims. As representative actions, class actions and derivative suits by definition necessarily determine the rights and duties of absent parties. Unnamed class members and shareholders must rely on the named plaintiff representative to protect their interests, especially when the case is settled prior to a judgment on the merits. The federal courts are sharply divided over the question whether absent parties who are dissatisfied with the class action or derivative suit settlement may …