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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer
Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer
Michigan Law Review
In the critically important area of preemption, the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation differs from the approach it follows elsewhere. Whether in politically salient matters, like challenges to Arizona’s immigration laws, or in more conventional cases, such as those in which state tort liability overlaps with federal regulation, the Court’s preemption decisions reflect a highly purposive approach to reading statutes, most notably through the application of “obstacle preemption” analysis. Recently, however, Justice Thomas has objected to the Court’s failure in preemption cases to respect its more textualist approach to issues of statutory interpretation, and he has urged that obstacle …
Scaled Legislation & The Legal History Of The Common Good, Jill M. Fraley
Scaled Legislation & The Legal History Of The Common Good, Jill M. Fraley
Jill M. Fraley
None available.
Scaled Legislation & The Legal History Of The Common Good, Jill M. Fraley
Scaled Legislation & The Legal History Of The Common Good, Jill M. Fraley
Scholarly Articles
None available.
Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The proposition that treaties can increase the power of Congress is inconsistent with the text of the Treaty Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. It is inconsistent with the fundamental structural principle that "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and limited."S It implies, insidiously, that that the President and the Senate can increase their own power by treaty. And it implies, bizarrely, that the President alone--or a foreign government alone--can decrease Congress's power and render federal statutes unconstitutional. Finally, it creates a doubly perverse incentive: an incentive to enter into foreign entanglements simply to increase …
Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil
Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the circumstances under which the federal legislative apparatus may be unable to respond to a politically objectionable statutory interpretation from the Supreme Court. The Article builds upon existing economic models of statutory interpretation, for the first time incorporating transaction costs into the analysis. The Article concludes by identifying recent real-world disputes in which transaction costs constrained Congress and the President from overriding the Court.
Reconsidering Statutory Interpretive Divergence Between Elected And Appointed Judges, Bertrall L. Ross
Reconsidering Statutory Interpretive Divergence Between Elected And Appointed Judges, Bertrall L. Ross
Bertrall L Ross
No abstract provided.
Book Review - 'The Elements Of Legislation' By Neil Duxbury, Brian Christopher Jones
Book Review - 'The Elements Of Legislation' By Neil Duxbury, Brian Christopher Jones
Brian Christopher Jones
No abstract provided.