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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Reconsidering Section 1983'S Nonabrogation Of Sovereign Immunity, Katherine Mims Crocker
Reconsidering Section 1983'S Nonabrogation Of Sovereign Immunity, Katherine Mims Crocker
Faculty Publications
Motivated by civil unrest and the police conduct that prompted it, Americans have embarked on a major reexamination of how constitutional enforcement works. One important component is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows civil suits against any "person" who violates federal rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that "person" excludes states because Section 1983 flunks a condition of crystal clarity.
This Article reconsiders that conclusion--in legalese, Section 1983's nonabrogation of sovereign immunity--along multiple dimensions. Beginning with a negative critique, this Article argues that because the Court invented the crystal-clarity standard so long after Section 1983's enactment, the caselaw …
Eager To Follow: Methodological Precedent In Statutory Interpretation, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Eager To Follow: Methodological Precedent In Statutory Interpretation, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Faculty Publications
An important recent development in the field of statutory interpretation is the emergence of a movement calling for "methodological precedent"--a regime under which courts give precedential effect to interpretive methodology. In such a system, a case would establish not only what a particular statute means but could also establish binding rules of methodology--which tools are valid, in what order, and so on. The movement for methodological precedent has attracted sharp criticism on normative grounds. But both sides of the normative debate agree on the premise that the federal courts generally do not give precedential effect to interpretive methodology today.
This …
Communicating The Canons: How Lower Courts React When The Supreme Court Changes The Rules Of Statutory Interpretation, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Communicating The Canons: How Lower Courts React When The Supreme Court Changes The Rules Of Statutory Interpretation, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Felix Cohen On Legislation, Michael S. Green
Felix Cohen On Legislation, Michael S. Green
Faculty Publications
Felix Cohen's and Walter Wheeler Cook's prediction theory of law was a fundamentally positivist theory, according to which the law of a jurisdiction is reducible to regularities of official behavior. Cohen used the prediction theory to argue for philosophical anarchism - that is, the view that the existence of law does not entail a duty, even a prima facie duty, of obedience. In particular, Cohen extended philosophical anarchism to adjudication. The fact that officials in a jurisdiction regularly behave in a certain way does not give a judge adjudicating a case a moral reason to do the same. In deciding …
Burying The “Continuing Body” Theory Of The Senate, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Burying The “Continuing Body” Theory Of The Senate, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Faculty Publications
In the U.S. Senate, only one-third of the members stand for election every two years; the rest carry over from one congressional term to the next. In this regard the Senate differs from the House of Representatives, where all members stand for election every two-year cycle. That much is familiar, but what legal consequences flow from this structural difference? According to some legislators, courts, and commentators, this difference is very important in that it makes the Senate, but not the House, a "continuing body." The continuing-body idea is invoked to defend highly controversial aspects of Senate practice. By far the …
Congressional Procedure And Statutory Interpretation, Larry Evans, Jarrell Wright, Neal Devins
Congressional Procedure And Statutory Interpretation, Larry Evans, Jarrell Wright, Neal Devins
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Wordiness In Legislation, Lucian Minor