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Full-Text Articles in Law
Challenges To The Independence Of Inspectors General In Robust Congressional Oversight, Fernando R. Laguarda
Challenges To The Independence Of Inspectors General In Robust Congressional Oversight, Fernando R. Laguarda
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Congressional oversight of the Executive is among the chief responsibilities of the legislative branch. Inspectors General ("IGs") are among the most important tools available to Congress because they are "hard-wired" into the Executive itself. The value of IGs to Congress depends on their expertise in the workings of their host agencies and their "independence" from those agencies. But "independence" is not a statutorily defined term. As the agencies, and sometimes Congress itself, expand the role of IGs to engage in activities that parallel the regulatory programs of their host agencies, IG independence is compromised and the value IGs provide to …
Congress As A Catalyst Of Patent Reform At The Federal Circuit, Jonas Anderson
Congress As A Catalyst Of Patent Reform At The Federal Circuit, Jonas Anderson
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the dominant institution in patent law. The court’s control over patent law and policy has led to a host of academic proposals to shift power away from the court and towards other institutions, including the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and federal district courts. Surprisingly, however, academics have largely dismissed Congress as a potential institutional check on the Federal Circuit. Congress, it is felt, is too slow, too divided, and too beholden to special interests to effectively monitor changes in innovation and respond with appropriate reforms. …
Acta’S Constitutional Problem: The Treaty Is Not A Treaty, Sean Flynn
Acta’S Constitutional Problem: The Treaty Is Not A Treaty, Sean Flynn
Joint PIJIP/TLS Research Paper Series
The planned entry of the U.S. into the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) poses a unique Constitutional problem. The problem is that the President lacks constitutional authority to bind the U.S. to the agreement without congressional consent; but that lack of authority may not prevent the U.S. from being bound to the agreement under international law. If the administration succeeds in its plan, ACTA may be a binding international treaty (under international law) that is not a treaty (under U.S. Constitutional law).