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Full-Text Articles in Law
What Would Congress Want? If We Want To Know, Why Not Ask?, Danieli Evans
What Would Congress Want? If We Want To Know, Why Not Ask?, Danieli Evans
Articles
Judges often disagree about which interpretation of a statute is most faithful to 'legislative intent.' If judges are concerned about adhering to democratic preferences when interpreting statutes, why not ask Congress what it would prefer? I propose a procedure that would enable the Court, in a case where Justices are divided over the meaning of a statute, to submit both sides' reasoning to Congress, and Congress may choose to vote on its preferred of the alternative rulings the Court puts before it. Congress's preferences would be evidentiary only; they would not bind the Court to make one decision or another. …
Scaled Legislation & The Legal History Of The Common Good, Jill M. Fraley
Scaled Legislation & The Legal History Of The Common Good, Jill M. Fraley
Scholarly Articles
None available.
Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil
Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the circumstances under which the federal legislative apparatus may be unable to respond to a politically objectionable statutory interpretation from the Supreme Court. The Article builds upon existing economic models of statutory interpretation, for the first time incorporating transaction costs into the analysis. The Article concludes by identifying recent real-world disputes in which transaction costs constrained Congress and the President from overriding the Court.
Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The proposition that treaties can increase the power of Congress is inconsistent with the text of the Treaty Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. It is inconsistent with the fundamental structural principle that "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and limited."S It implies, insidiously, that that the President and the Senate can increase their own power by treaty. And it implies, bizarrely, that the President alone--or a foreign government alone--can decrease Congress's power and render federal statutes unconstitutional. Finally, it creates a doubly perverse incentive: an incentive to enter into foreign entanglements simply to increase …