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Full-Text Articles in Law
From Tether To Terra: The Current Stablecoin Ecosystem And The Failure Of Regulators, Mary E. Burke
From Tether To Terra: The Current Stablecoin Ecosystem And The Failure Of Regulators, Mary E. Burke
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
The Tether controversy and Terra crash have placed stablecoins in the regulatory spotlight. Stablecoins are often portrayed as posing systemic risks to financial markets, with some pundits labelling them “the villain of the finance world.” Global regulatory bodies, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank of International Settlement (BIS), and political leaders, including the Biden Administration, have all called for stablecoin regulation. These officials allege that stablecoins’ structure, combined with their exponential growth, pose a unique risk to global markets. Before the May 2022 Terra crash, government reports superficially treated stablecoins by exclusively focusing on asset-backed coins. Post …
Proxy Access And Optimal Standardization In Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Reilly S. Steel
Proxy Access And Optimal Standardization In Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Reilly S. Steel
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
According to the conventional wisdom, “one size does not fit all” in corporate governance. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their governance needs, implying that the optimal corporate governance structure must also vary from firm to firm. This one-size-does-not-fit-all axiom has featured prominently in arguments against numerous corporate law regulatory initiatives, including the SEC’s failed Rule 14a-11—an attempt to impose mandatory, uniform “proxy access” on all public companies—which the D.C. Circuit struck down for inadequate cost–benefit analysis.
This Article presents an alternative theory as to the role of standardization in corporate governance—in which investors prefer standardized terms—and empirical …
Lessons From The Flash Crash For The Regulation Of High-Frequency Traders, Edgar Ortega Barrales
Lessons From The Flash Crash For The Regulation Of High-Frequency Traders, Edgar Ortega Barrales
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Are equity markets vulnerable to a sudden collapse if the traders who account for about half of the volume have no regulatory obligations to stabilize prices? After the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010, policymakers have resoundingly answered this question in the affirmative. During the worst of the crash, some of the so-called high-frequency trading firms that dominate equity markets stopped trading and prices collapsed, momentarily wiping out almost $1 trillion in market value. In response, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is considering whether high-frequency trading firms should be required to act as the traders of last resort. This …