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Legislative branch

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Political Wine In A Judicial Bottle: Justice Sotomayor's Surprising Concurrence In Aurelius, Christina D. Ponsa-Kraus Jan 2020

Political Wine In A Judicial Bottle: Justice Sotomayor's Surprising Concurrence In Aurelius, Christina D. Ponsa-Kraus

Faculty Scholarship

For seventy years, Puerto Ricans have been bitterly divided over how to decolonize the island, a U.S. territory. Many favor Puerto Rico’s admission into statehood. But many others support a different kind of relationship with the United States: they believe that in 1952, Puerto Rico entered into a “compact” with the United States that transformed it from a territory into a “commonwealth,” and they insist that “commonwealth” status made Puerto Rico a separate sovereign in permanent union with the United States. Statehood supporters argue that there is no compact, nor should there be: it is neither constitutionally possible, nor desirable …


Pick A Card, Any Card, Ronald J. Mann Jan 2008

Pick A Card, Any Card, Ronald J. Mann

Faculty Scholarship

At the heart of all serious thought about consumer financial products is the difficulty of understanding the mental processes by which consumers evaluate, compare, and use those products. Usury proposals from scholars and policy makers depend on explicit or implicit assumptions about how interest-rate caps will affect the mix of products available in the marketplace and the choices that consumers make among them. Legislators and lobbyists that decry a torrent of consumer bankruptcy filings rely explicitly on the claim that consumers abuse credit products. Proposals to outlaw products like payday loans assume that those who use the products are so …


Congress And The Legislative Web Of Trust, Alan L. Feld Apr 2001

Congress And The Legislative Web Of Trust, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

Trust in the legislative arena does not flow from altruism. It rests on two related foundations: personal interactions and rational incentives. Legislators must engage with each other over at least a two-year term and usually far longer. Their encounters reflect the dynamic of continuing players rather than one-time participants. Thus, failure to carry out commitments chills the possibility of future advantageous agreements with the aggrieved party. Moreover, the process of shared experience and personal interaction can create friendships that make the foundation for trust personal as well as professional. Further, each House of Congress has many of the characteristics of …