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Class Actions For Punitive Damages, Michigan Law Review
Class Actions For Punitive Damages, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note argues that a Rule 23 class action offers the best way to manage multiple actions for punitive damages. It begins by examining the policy underlying punitive damages and the plaintiffs interest in recovering them. It then explains why a limited fund is created when courts deny punitive damage recovery as a matter of law or when punitive claims exceed defendant's assets. The Note contends that a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action provides the best means to manage this limited fund and reviews the circumstances in which a district court may properly certify a class action for punitive damages. It …
Claim Requirements Of The Federal Tort Claims Act: Minimal Notice Or Substantial Documentation?, Michigan Law Review
Claim Requirements Of The Federal Tort Claims Act: Minimal Notice Or Substantial Documentation?, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note finds both the Adams and Swift positions unsatisfactory. Part I contends that Adams misconstrued the legislative history of the FTCA amendments by applying a minimal notice standard and then argues that Swift contravenes the amendments' fairness policy by permitting ambiguous, overreaching documentation requests. Part II contends that courts should interpret section 2675's "presented the claim" language as an accommodation between two competing Congressional objectives: presuit claims settlement and fair treatment of claimants. The Note proposes that until the Department of Justice modifies its current claims regulations, courts should toll the statute of limitations whenever an individual's claim includes …
Controlling Jury Damage Awards In Private Antitrust Suits, Michigan Law Review
Controlling Jury Damage Awards In Private Antitrust Suits, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note takes the position that the courts should better control jury manipulation in private antitrust actions. Part One suggests that manipulation is likely in such actions, and argues that this manipulation off ends the legislative judgment reflected in the trebling provision without leading to more equitable results. Part Two presents two complementary proposals to control jury manipulation of treble damage awards. These proposals aim to induce the jury to return accurate awards based on the economic loss actually suffered by the plaintiff.