Law Commons^™

Corporate Behavior And The Social Efficiency Of Tort Law, John A. Siliciano

Michigan Law Review

This article examines this dissonance between accepted theory and observed reality, between what the model envisions and what the tort system seems to deliver. After sketching the model in greater detail, the first section of the article reviews restraints within tort law on the achievement of efficient outcomes. The analysis then turns to the broader legal environment, and describes how legally sanctioned means of liability evasion - such as the corporate law doctrine of limited liability and the bankruptcy rules permitting discharge of obligations - may further undermine the practical utility of the social efficiency model of tort. The final …

Asbestos And The Dalkon Shield: Corporate America On Trial, Joseph A. Page

Michigan Law Review

A Review of At Any Cost: Corporate Greed, Women, and the Dalkon Shield by Morton Mintz and Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial by Paul Brodeur

Survival Of Rights Of Action After Corporate Merger, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Once a corporation ceases to exist, most courts permit neither primary nor derivative suits to be brought in its name. If a merger precipitates that corporate demise, courts usually hold that standing to sue, like other assets of the "merged" corporation, passes to the surviving corporation. This Note ponders the merit of that rule of passage.

Section I categorizes the cases defining the rule of passage. Some courts have steadfastly adhered to the rule and denied standing to the merged corporation's shareholders. Other courts, fearing that the rule would preclude meritorious actions, have created exceptions allowing these shareholders to sue …

Watered Stock Commissions Blue Sky Laws Stock Without Par Value, William W. Cook

Michigan Law Review

Stockholders' exemption from liability for corporate debts is a modern invention. It was not until 18x1 that New York extended that exemption to stockholders in manufacturing corporations.' Massachusetts did not grant it until 1830.2 England did not allow it to stockholders in business and manufacturing cornpanies until I855. s As President Eliot of Harvard has pointed out, this privilege of limited liability is "the corporation's most precious characteristic."'