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Full-Text Articles in Law
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.
Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?
The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …
Major Questions About Presidentialism: Untangling The “Chain Of Dependence” Across Administrative Law, Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Jodi L. Short
Major Questions About Presidentialism: Untangling The “Chain Of Dependence” Across Administrative Law, Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Jodi L. Short
Faculty Scholarship
A contradiction about the role of the president has emerged between the Roberts Court’s Article II jurisprudence and its Major Questions Doctrine jurisprudence. In its appointment and removal decisions, the Roberts Court claims that the president is the “most democratic and politically accountable official in Government” because the president is “directly accountable to the people through regular elections,” an audacious new interpretation of Article II; and it argues that tight presidential control of agency officials lends democratic legitimacy to the administrative state. We identify these twin arguments about the “directly accountable president” and the “chain of dependence” as the foundation …
Freehold Offices Vs. 'Despotic Displacement': Why Article Ii 'Executive Power' Did Not Include Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Freehold Offices Vs. 'Despotic Displacement': Why Article Ii 'Executive Power' Did Not Include Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
The Roberts Court has relied on an assertion that Article II’s “executive power” implied an “indefeasible” or unconditional presidential removal power. In the wake of growing historical evidence against their theory, unitary executive theorists have fallen back on a claim of a “backdrop” or default removal rule from English and other European monarchies. However, unitary theorists have not provided support for these repeated assertions, while making a remarkable number of errors, especially in the recent “The Executive Power of Removal” (Harvard L. Rev. 2023).
This Article offers an explanation for the difficulty in supporting this historical claim: Because …
Vesting, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Vesting, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." The Executive Vesting Clause is one of three originalist pillars for the unitary executive theory, the idea that the President possesses executive powers like removal without congressional limitations (that is, the powers are indefeasible). An underlying assumption is that "vest" connotes a formalist approach to separation of powers rather than a more functional system of Madisonian checks and balances. Assumptions about "vesting" for official powers are likely the result of semantic drift from property rights and ahistoric projections back from the later Marshall Court doctrine …
The Executive Branch Anticanon, Deborah Pearlstein
The Executive Branch Anticanon, Deborah Pearlstein
Faculty Articles
Donald Trump’s presidency has given rise to a raft of concerns not just about the wisdom of particular policy decisions but also about the prospect that executive actions might have troubling longer term “precedential” effects. While critics tend to leave undefined what “precedent” in this context means, existing constitutional structures provide multiple mechanisms by which presidential practice can influence future executive branch conduct: judicial actors rely on practice as gloss on constitutional meaning, executive branch officials rely on past practice in guiding institutional norms of behavior, and elected officials outside the executive branch and the people themselves draw on past …
Presidential Whim, Matthew J. Steilen
Presidential Whim, Matthew J. Steilen
Journal Articles
This article describes a new body of legal literature on the presidency. In contrast to older bodies of writing, which emphasize presidential independence, this body of writing emphasizes the dependence of the executive power, and a set of moral values associated with the office: faith, faithfulness, responsibility, honesty, due care, and professionalism, among others. The article considers prospects for enforcing this vision of the presidency in light of the particular problems posed by the Trump presidency. Many writers have complained of President Trump's leadership style, which is abrupt, reflexive, dissembling, and unilateral. I refer to this as the problem of …
Faithful Execution And Article Ii, Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faithful Execution And Article Ii, Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
Article II of the U.S. Constitution twice imposes a duty of faithful execution on the President, who must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" and take an oath or affirmation to 'faithfully execute the Office of President." These Faithful Execution Clauses are cited often, but their background and original meaning have never been fully explored. Courts, the executive branch, and many scholars rely on one or both clauses as support for expansive views of presidential power, for example, to go beyond standing law to defend the nation in emergencies; to withhold documents from Congress or the courts; or …
Article Ii Vests Executive Power, Not The Royal Prerogative, Julian Davis Mortenson
Article Ii Vests Executive Power, Not The Royal Prerogative, Julian Davis Mortenson
Articles
Article II of the United States Constitution vests “the executive power” in the President. For more than two hundred years, advocates of presidential power have claimed that this phrase was originally understood to include a bundle of national security and foreign affairs authorities. Their efforts have been highly successful. Among constitutional originalists, this so-called “Vesting Clause Thesis” is now conventional wisdom. But it is also demonstrably wrong. Based on an exhaustive review of the eighteenth-century bookshelf, this Article shows that the ordinary meaning of “executive power” referred unambiguously to a single, discrete, and potent authority: the power to execute law. …
Getting Past The Imperial Presidency, Deborah Pearlstein
Getting Past The Imperial Presidency, Deborah Pearlstein
Faculty Articles
In an age in which the “imperial presidency” seems to have reached its apex, perhaps most alarmingly surrounding the use of military force, conventional wisdom remains fixed that constitutional and international law play a negligible role in constraining executive branch decision-making in this realm. Yet as this Article explains, the factual case that supports the conventional view, based largely on highly selected incidents of presidential behavior, is meaningless in any standard empirical sense. Indeed, the canonical listing of presidential decisions to use force without prior authorization feeds a compliance-centered focus on the study of legal constraint rooted in long-since abandoned …
The Depravity Of The 1930s And The Modern Administrative State, Gary S. Lawson, Steven Calabresi
The Depravity Of The 1930s And The Modern Administrative State, Gary S. Lawson, Steven Calabresi
Faculty Scholarship
Gillian Metzger’s 2017 Harvard Law Review foreword, entitled 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, is a paean to the modern administrative state, with its massive subdelegations of legislative and judicial power to so-called “expert” bureaucrats, who are layered well out of reach of electoral accountability yet do not have the constitutional status of Article III judges. We disagree with this celebration of technocratic government on just about every level, but this Article focuses on two relatively narrow points.
First, responding more to implicit assumptions that pervade modern discourse than specifically to Professor Metzger’s analysis, we challenge the normally unchallenged …
Placing Your Faith In The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Placing Your Faith In The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.