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Is Law? Constitutional Crisis And Existential Anxiety, Alice G. Ristroph
Is Law? Constitutional Crisis And Existential Anxiety, Alice G. Ristroph
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In the recurring discussions of constitutional crises, one may find three forms of existential anxiety. The first, and most fleeting, is an anxiety about the continued existence of the nation. A second form of anxiety—to my mind, the most interesting form—is an anxiety about the possibility of the rule of law itself. Third, and most solipsistically, references to crisis in constitutional law scholarship could be the product of a kind of professional anxiety in the legal academy. We may be asking ourselves, “Constitutional theory: what is it good for?” and worrying that the answer is, “Absolutely nothing.” And yet, I …
After The Reasonable Man: Getting Over The Subjectivity Objectivity Question, Victoria Nourse
After The Reasonable Man: Getting Over The Subjectivity Objectivity Question, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article challenges the conventional notion of the “reasonable man.” It argues that we make a category mistake when we adopt the metaphor of a human being as the starting point for analysis of the criminal law and instead offers an alternate approach based on heuristic theory, reconceiving the reasonable man as a heuristic that serves as the site for debate over majoritarian norms. The article posits that the debate over having a purely subjective standard and a purely objective standard obscures the commonsense necessity of having a hybrid standard, one which takes into account the characteristics of a particular …
Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, Victoria Nourse
Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In 1933, one of the leading theorists of the criminal law, Jerome Michael, wrote openly of the criminal law "as an instrument of the state." Today, criminal law is largely allergic to claims of political theory; commentators obsess about theories of deterrence and retribution, and the technical details of model codes and sentencing grids, but rarely speak of institutional effects or political commitments. In this article, the author aims to change that emphasis and to examine the criminal law as a tool for governance. Her approach is explicitly constructive: it accepts the criminal law that we have, places it in …