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A Short History Of The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, Gregory Klass
A Short History Of The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, Gregory Klass
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This document collects for ease of access and citation three of my posts on the New Private Law Blog, which chart the conceptual history of the interpretation-construction distinction. The posts begin with Francis Lieber’s 1939 introduction of the concepts, then describes Samual Williston’s 1920 account of the distinction in the first edition of Williston on Contracts, and concludes with Arthur Linton Corbin’s 1951 reconceptualization in the first edition of Corbin on Contracts. The posts identify two different conceptions of the distinction. Under the first (Lieber and Williston), construction supplements interpretation. Under the second (Corbin), the two activities complement one …
The Rise And Fall Of Unconscionability As The 'Law Of The Poor', Anne Fleming
The Rise And Fall Of Unconscionability As The 'Law Of The Poor', Anne Fleming
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
What happened to unconscionability? Here’s one version of the story: The doctrine of unconscionability experienced a brief resurgence in the mid-1960s at the hands of naive, left-liberal, activist judges, who used it to rewrite private consumer contracts according to their own sense of justice. These folks meant well, no doubt, much like present-day consumer protection crusaders who seek to ensure the “fairness” of financial products and services. But courts’ refusal to enforce terms they deemed "unconscionable” served only to increase the cost of doing business with low-income households. Judges ended up hurting the very people they were trying to help. …
Foreword: Is Reliance Still Dead?, Randy E. Barnett
Foreword: Is Reliance Still Dead?, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
One thing I found out when I was a prosecutor is that you should never tell a police officer he cannot do something, for that just serves as an open invitation for him to do it. In recent years, I have learned a similar lesson about legal scholarship which I should probably keep to myself but won't. If you proclaim the existence of a scholarly "consensus," this is an open invitation for academics to try to demolish such a claim.