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Full-Text Articles in Law

Kadhi's Courts And Kenya's Constitution: An International Human Rights Perspective, Joseph M. Isanga Mar 2018

Kadhi's Courts And Kenya's Constitution: An International Human Rights Perspective, Joseph M. Isanga

Joseph Isanga

This article examines Kenya's international human rights obligations and finds that there is support for religious courts, provided relevant human rights guarantees are ensured. Kenya's Kadhi's courts have existed in the constitution since independence from the British. So why do some religious groups now oppose them or their enhancement under Kenya's Constitution? Opponents of Kadhi's courts advance, inter aha, the following arguments. First, Kadhi's courts provisions favour one religion and divide Kenyans along religious lines. Second, they introduce Sharia law. Third, the historical reasons for their existence have been overtaken by events. Fourth, non-Muslims shouldn't be taxed to fund a …


Implementing The Lessons From Wrongful Convictions: An Empirical Analysis Of Eyewitness Identification Reform Strategies, Keith A. Findley Aug 2015

Implementing The Lessons From Wrongful Convictions: An Empirical Analysis Of Eyewitness Identification Reform Strategies, Keith A. Findley

Keith A Findley

Learning about the flaws in the criminal justice system that have produced wrongful convictions has progressed at a dramatic pace since the first innocent individuals were exonerated by postconviction DNA testing in 1989. Application of that knowledge to improving the criminal justice system, however, has lagged far behind the growth in knowledge. Likewise, while considerable scholarship has been devoted to identifying the factors that produce wrongful convictions, very little scholarly attention has been devoted to the processes through which knowledge about causes is translated into reforms.

Using eyewitness misidentification—one of the leading contributors to wrongful convictions and the most thoroughly …


Workshop | Body Worn Video Recorders: The Socio-Technical Implications Of Gathering Direct Evidence, Katina Michael, Alexander Hayes Jun 2015

Workshop | Body Worn Video Recorders: The Socio-Technical Implications Of Gathering Direct Evidence, Katina Michael, Alexander Hayes

Alexander Hayes Mr.

- From in-car video recording to body-worn video recording

- Exploring available technologies: how do they work, pros and cons

- Storing direct evidence in secure storage: factors to consider

- Citizens “shooting” back with POV tech – what are their rights?

- Crowdsourced sousveillance- harnessing public data for forensic profiling

- Police force policies and practices on the application of new media


Breaking The Ice: How Plaintiffs May Establish Premises Liability In "Black Ice" Cases Where The Dangerous Condition Is By Definition Not Visible Or Apparent To The Property Owner, Hon. Mark Dillon Jul 2014

Breaking The Ice: How Plaintiffs May Establish Premises Liability In "Black Ice" Cases Where The Dangerous Condition Is By Definition Not Visible Or Apparent To The Property Owner, Hon. Mark Dillon

Hon. Mark C. Dillon

Plaintiffs that are injured as a result of encounters with "black ice," as distinguished from regular ice, face peculiar difficulties in establishing liability against property owners for the dangerous icy conditions on their premises. Black ice results from a unique process under certain conditions by which air bubbles are expelled from water during the freezing process, rendering the ice virtually invisible to the naked eye. Property owners therefore are not typically on actual or constructive notice of black ice conditions as to become subject to the legal requirement of undertaking measures to remedy the conditions. This article explores the law …


Back To The Future: The Constitution Requires Reasonableness And Particularity—Introducing The “Seize But Don’T Search” Doctrine, Adam Lamparello, Charles E. Maclean Feb 2014

Back To The Future: The Constitution Requires Reasonableness And Particularity—Introducing The “Seize But Don’T Search” Doctrine, Adam Lamparello, Charles E. Maclean

Adam Lamparello

Issuing one-hundred or fewer opinions per year, the United States Supreme Court cannot keep pace with opinions that match technological advancement. As a result, in Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie, the Court needs to announce a broader principle that protects privacy in the digital age. That principle, what we call “seize but don’t search,” recognizes that the constitutional touchstone for all searches is reasonableness.

When do present-day circumstances—the evolution in the Government’s surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship between the NSA and telecom companies—become so thoroughly unlike those considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years …


Tell Us A Story, But Don't Make It A Good One: Resolving The Confusion Regarding Emotional Stories And Federal Rule Of Evidence 403, Cathren Page Feb 2014

Tell Us A Story, But Don't Make It A Good One: Resolving The Confusion Regarding Emotional Stories And Federal Rule Of Evidence 403, Cathren Page

Cathren Page

Abstract: Tell Us a Story, But Don’t Make It A Good One: Resolving the Confusion Regarding Emotional Stories and Federal Rule of Evidence 403 by Cathren Koehlert-Page Courts need to reword their opinions regarding Rule 403 to address the tension between the advice to tell an emotionally evocative story at trial and the notion that evidence can be excluded if it is too emotional. In the murder mystery Mystic River, Dave Boyle is kidnapped in the beginning. The audience feels empathy for Dave who as an adult becomes one of the main suspects in the murder of his friend Jimmy’s …


"Introduction" (Chapter 1) Of Stories About Science In Law: Literary And Historical Images Of Acquired Expertise (Ashgate 2011), David S. Caudill Jul 2013

"Introduction" (Chapter 1) Of Stories About Science In Law: Literary And Historical Images Of Acquired Expertise (Ashgate 2011), David S. Caudill

David S Caudill

This is the introductory chapter of Stories About Science in Law: Literary and Historical Images of Acquired Expertise (Ashgate, 2011), explaining that the book presents examples of how literary accounts can provide a supplement to our understanding of science in law. Challenging the view that law and science are completely different, I focus on stories that explore the relationship between law and science, and identify cultural images of science that prevail in legal contexts. In contrast to other studies on the transfer and construction of expertise in legal settings, the book considers the intersection of three interdisciplinary projects-- law and …


Full Disclosure: Cognitive Science, Informants, And Search Warrant Scrutiny, Mary Bowman Mar 2013

Full Disclosure: Cognitive Science, Informants, And Search Warrant Scrutiny, Mary Bowman

Mary N. Bowman

Full Disclosure: Cognitive Science, Informants, and Search Warrant Scrutiny

By Mary Nicol Bowman

This article posits that cognitive biases play a significant role in the gap between the rhetoric regarding Fourth Amendment protection and actual practices regarding search warrant scrutiny, particularly for search warrants based on informants’ tips. Specifically, this article examines the ways in which implicit bias, tunnel vision, priming, and hindsight bias can affect search warrants. These biases can affect each stage of the search warrant process, including targeting decisions, the drafting process, the magistrate’s decision whether to grant the warrant, and post-search review by trial and appellate …


Timeless Trial Strategies And Tactics: Lessons From The Classic Claus Von Bülow Case, Daniel M. Braun Feb 2013

Timeless Trial Strategies And Tactics: Lessons From The Classic Claus Von Bülow Case, Daniel M. Braun

Daniel M Braun

In this new Millennium -- an era of increasingly complex cases -- it is critical that lawyers keep a keen eye on trial strategy and tactics. Although scientific evidence today is more sophisticated than ever, the art of effectively engaging people and personalities remains prime. Scientific data must be contextualized and presented in absorbable ways, and attorneys need to ensure not only that they correctly understand jurors, judges, witnesses, and accused persons, but also that they find the means to make their arguments truly resonate if they are to formulate an effective case and ultimately realize justice. A decades-old case …


Persuasive Visions: Film And Memory, Jessica M. Silbey Jan 2012

Persuasive Visions: Film And Memory, Jessica M. Silbey

Jessica Silbey

This commentary takes a new look at law and film studies through the lens of film as memory. Instead of describing film as evidence and foreordaining its role in truth-seeking processes, it thinks instead of film as individual, institutional and cultural memory, placing it squarely within the realm of contestability. Paralleling film genres, the commentary imagines four forms of memory that film could embody: memorabilia (cinema verite), memoirs (autobiographical and biographical film), ceremonial memorials (narrative film monuments of a life, person or institution), and mythic memory (dramatic fictional film). Imagining film as memory resituates film’s role in law (procedural, substantive …


Images In/Of Law, Jessica M. Silbey Jan 2012

Images In/Of Law, Jessica M. Silbey

Jessica Silbey

The proliferation of images in and of law lends itself to surprisingly complex problems of epistemology and power. Understanding through images is innate; most of us easily understand images without thinking. But arriving at mutually agreeable understandings of images is also difficult. Translating images into shared words leads to multiple problems inherent in translation and that pose problems for justice. Despite our saturated imagistic culture, we have not established methods to pursue that translation process with confidence. This article explains how images are intuitively understood and yet collectively inscrutable, posing unique problems for resolving legal conflicts that demand common and …


Moral Turpitude, Julia Simon-Kerr Dec 2011

Moral Turpitude, Julia Simon-Kerr

Julia Simon-Kerr

This Article gives the first account of the moral turpitude standard, tracing its history from the early American law of defamation to evidence law, where it has been used for witness impeachment, and then to legal areas as diverse as voting rights, juror disqualification, professional licensing, and immigration law, where it is used as a collateral sanctioning mechanism. "Moral turpitude" was formalized as a legal standard by common law courts seeking a manageable test for slander per se. As the standard spread and was appropriated for use in other fields, it functioned as a standard that purported to judge character …


Two Conceptions Of Relevance, Jonathan Yovel Jan 2003

Two Conceptions Of Relevance, Jonathan Yovel

Jonathan Yovel

Courts use complex modes of relevance judgments in regulating the introduction of information and construction of factual narratives; likewise, common law works both through and around relevance presuppositions in determining doctrine. This study examines different functions of relevance - conceived as different conceptions, at times competing, at times interdependent. The distinctions between these conceptions are arranged on three levels: 1) a normative/"causal" level, arguing for the status of relevance as a requirement for a "meaning-based" conception of entailment and drawing on discussions from relevance logic (RL) and modal logic; 2) a pragmatic/metapragmatic level that explores the ways in which law's …


Why Legal Scholars Get Daubert Wrong: A Contextualist Explanation Of Law's Epistemology, Alani Golanski Jan 2001

Why Legal Scholars Get Daubert Wrong: A Contextualist Explanation Of Law's Epistemology, Alani Golanski

Alani Golanski

Daubert requires the court to make judgments about scientific evidence. But judges, like jurors, are lay persons in relation to such evidence. So Daubert has been criticized as requiring too much of the court, and such alternatives as blue ribbon panels have been proposed. This article shows that, notwithstanding any problems that Daubert itself might have, the Daubert scholarship is significantly hampered by the way legal scholars categorize knowledge. A "contextualist" (as opposed to "invariantist") theory of knowledge is both philosophically best, and makes sense of law's relation to science.