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Defense Counsel, Trial Judges, And Evidence Production Protocols, Darryl K. Brown
Defense Counsel, Trial Judges, And Evidence Production Protocols, Darryl K. Brown
Darryl K. Brown
This essay, a contribution to the 2012 Texas Tech Symposium on the Sixth Amendment, argues that constitutional criminal adjudication provisions are fruitfully viewed not primarily as defendant rights but as procedural components that, when employed, maximize the odds that adversarial adjudication will succeed in its various goals, notably accurate judgments. On this view, the state has an interest in how those procedural mechanisms, especially regarding fact investigation and evidence gathering, are invoked or implemented. Deficient attorney performance, on this view, can be understood as a problem of the state’s adversarial adjudication process, for which public officials—notably judges, whose judgments depend …
Why Padilla Doesn't Matter (Much), Darryl K. Brown
Why Padilla Doesn't Matter (Much), Darryl K. Brown
Darryl K. Brown
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky heralds a formal breakthrough in the representation provided to immigrants charged with crimes that trigger deportation, and the decision may signal as well the Court’s recognition of plea bargaining’s dominant role in criminal adjudication. There are good reasons to worry, however, that Padilla’s practical impact will be modest, and for many noncitizen criminal defendants, including probably Jose Padilla himself, nonexistent. The Padilla Court suggested that it expected attorneys to use their newly required awareness of law triggering deportation upon a criminal conviction to inform plea bargain negotiation and even change criminal …
Can Criminal Law Be Controlled?, Darryl K. Brown
Can Criminal Law Be Controlled?, Darryl K. Brown
Darryl K. Brown
This review of Douglas Husak's 2008 book, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law, summarizes and largely endorses Husak's normative argument about the indefensible expansiveness of much contemporary criminal liability. It then offers a skeptical (or pessimistic) argument about the possibilities for a normative theory such as Husak's to have much effect on criminal justice policy in light of the political barriers to reform.