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Full-Text Articles in Law

Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice And The Ethics Of Nudging, Jessica L. Roberts Apr 2018

Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice And The Ethics Of Nudging, Jessica L. Roberts

Michigan Law Review

A review of Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Influence: Government in the Age of Behavioral Science.


Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn Stout, Sergio Gramitto Feb 2018

Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn Stout, Sergio Gramitto

Seattle University Law Review

In this Article, we show how our society can use corporate governance shifts to address, if not entirely resolve, a number of currently pressing social and economic problems. These problems include: rising income inequality; demographic disparities in wealth and equity ownership; increasing poverty and income insecurity; a need for greater innovation and investment in solving problems like disease and climate change; the “externalization” of many costs of corporate activity onto third parties such as customers, employees, creditors, and the broader society; the corrosive influence of corporate money in politics; and discontent and loss of trust in the capitalist system among …


Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe Feb 2018

Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe

Seattle University Law Review

In the corporate governance debate, the short-term versus longterm contention has grown into perhaps today’s most controversial topic. In this debate, descriptions of institutional investors tend to present a dichotomic nature. These investors are alternatively portrayed as homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on targeting underperforming companies. This Article moves beyond this dichotomy. It shows empirically that aggregate institutional investor behavior presents nuances that depend on a variety of factors, including individual firm characteristics, institutional ownership levels, and institutional propensity toward activism.