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Full-Text Articles in Law

Separation Of Powers By Contract: How Collective Bargaining Reshapes Presidential Power, Nicholas Handler Apr 2024

Separation Of Powers By Contract: How Collective Bargaining Reshapes Presidential Power, Nicholas Handler

Faculty Scholarship

This Article demonstrates for the first time how civil servants check and restrain presidential power through collective bargaining. The executive branch is typically depicted as a top-down hierarchy. The President, as chief executive, issues directives with vast implications for federal policy. Usually, the tenured bureaucracy of civil servants below him follow these directives. Occasionally, when the President’s policies appear corrupt or ill-advised, bureaucrats may illicitly “resist” them. This presumed top-down structure shapes many influential critiques of the modern administrative state. Proponents of a strong President decry civil servants as an unelected “deep state” usurping popular will. Skeptics of presidential power …


Bureaucratic Overreach And The Role Of The Courts In Protecting Representative Democracy, Katie Cassady Oct 2023

Bureaucratic Overreach And The Role Of The Courts In Protecting Representative Democracy, Katie Cassady

Liberty University Journal of Statesmanship & Public Policy

The United States bureaucracy began as only four departments and has expanded to address nearly every issue of public life. While these bureaucratic agencies are ostensibly under congressional oversight and the supervision of the President as part of the executive branch, they consistently usurp their discretionary authority and bypass the Founding Fathers’ design of balancing legislative power in a bicameral Congress.

The Supreme Court holds an indispensable role in mitigating the overreach of executive agencies, yet the courts’ inability to hold bureaucrats accountable has diluted voters’ voices. Since the Supreme Court’s 1984 ruling in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense …


Bureaucratic Overreach And The Role Of The Courts In Protecting Representative Democracy, Katie Cassady May 2023

Bureaucratic Overreach And The Role Of The Courts In Protecting Representative Democracy, Katie Cassady

Helm's School of Government Conference - 2021-2024

Although only four departments at the United States’ founding, the American bureaucracy has expanded to address nearly every issue of public life. While these agencies are ostensibly under congressional oversight through monetary allowance and the supervision of the President as part of the executive branch, they consistently usurp their discretionary authority and bypass the Founders’ design of legislative power vested solely in a bicameral legislature.

The Supreme Court holds an indispensable role in mitigating the overreach of bureaucratic agencies. However, despite their obligation to protect the rights of the American people, the courts’ inability to hold bureaucrats accountable has diluted …


De-Democratizing Criminal Law, Benjamin Levin Jan 2020

De-Democratizing Criminal Law, Benjamin Levin

Publications

No abstract provided.


The Progressive Idea Of Democratic Administration, William J. Novak Jan 2019

The Progressive Idea Of Democratic Administration, William J. Novak

Articles

The first thing to acknowledge about administration is that administration is coincident with governance. Far from being a modern invention or some kind of radical departure from an original political or legal tradition, administration is among the oldest practices of governments. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive of government without administration. Laws need to be enforced, legislation needs to be implemented, and collective goods need to be secured. Governance is mostly a matter of actions and practices, making administration perhaps the most truly reflective aspect of legal and political culture.


The Semi-Autonomous Administrative State, Cary Coglianese Jan 2019

The Semi-Autonomous Administrative State, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

Conflicting views about presidential control of the administrative state have too long been characterized in terms of a debate over agency independence. But the term “independent” when used to describe administrative agencies carries with it the baggage of an unhelpful and unrealistic dichotomy: administrative agencies that are (or should be) subservient to presidential control versus those that are (or should be) entirely free from such influence. No agency fits into either category. This essay proposes reorienting the debate over presidential control around agency “autonomy,” which better conveys that the key issue is a matter of degree. Contrary to some proponents …


The American Deep State, Jon D. Michaels Mar 2018

The American Deep State, Jon D. Michaels

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article, written for the Notre Dame Law Review Symposium on Administrative Lawmaking in the Twenty-First Century, considers the notion of bureaucratic depth and what it means in the American context. In what follows, I argue that the American deep state has very little in common with those regimes usually understood to harbor deep states; that, far from being shadowy or elitist, the American bureaucracy is very much a demotic institution, demographically diverse, highly accountable, and lacking financial incentives or caste proclivities to subvert popular will; that demotic bureaucratic depth of the American variety should be celebrated, not feared; …


Bureaucratic Speech: Language Choice And Democratic Identity In The Taipei Bureaucracy, Anya Bernstein May 2017

Bureaucratic Speech: Language Choice And Democratic Identity In The Taipei Bureaucracy, Anya Bernstein

Journal Articles

This article illuminates the social nature of bureaucratic practice. Analyzing the everyday speech of bureaucrats in a polyglossic society reveals both their intensely interactive conduct and their recognition that the government they comprise is itself a participant in a social world of institutions and values. My ethnography shows how Taipei city government administrators mobilize ideologies associated with Taiwan’s two primary languages, and stereotypes associated with bureaucracy, to undermine both. Instead, they present themselves as a post-ethnonational and post-bureaucratic avant garde of their new democracy. In doing so, they draw on local values and tropes of legitimation, which place a premium …


Who Controls Immigration Judges?: Towards A Multi-Institutional Model Of Administration Judge Behavior, Mark Richard Beougher Dec 2016

Who Controls Immigration Judges?: Towards A Multi-Institutional Model Of Administration Judge Behavior, Mark Richard Beougher

Dissertations

Numerous studies have shown dramatic variations in the rates that immigration judges grant asylum. What these studies have failed to adequately explain as of yet is why? In attempting to understand the behavior of immigration judges in asylum cases, scholars have generally taken one of two approaches, either examining immigration judge behavior through top-down bureaucratic models or with models developed through the study of the judiciary. From these studies we have learned that similarly situated asylum applicants have different chances of success based merely on the ideological leanings of the judge who decides their case. We also have learned that …


Agenda-Setting In The Regulatory State: Theory And Evidence, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters Jan 2016

Agenda-Setting In The Regulatory State: Theory And Evidence, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Government officials who run administrative agencies must make countless decisions every day about what issues and work to prioritize. These agenda-setting decisions hold enormous implications for the shape of law and public policy, but they have received remarkably little attention by either administrative law scholars or social scientists who study the bureaucracy. Existing research offers few insights about the institutions, norms, and inputs that shape and constrain agency discretion over their agendas or about the strategies that officials employ in choosing to elevate certain issues while putting others on the back burner. In this article, we advance the study of …


Agenda-Setting In The Regulatory State: Theory And Evidence, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters Jan 2016

Agenda-Setting In The Regulatory State: Theory And Evidence, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters

All Faculty Scholarship

Government officials who run administrative agencies must make countless decisions every day about what issues and work to prioritize. These agenda-setting decisions hold enormous implications for the shape of law and public policy, but they have received remarkably little attention by either administrative law scholars or social scientists who study the bureaucracy. Existing research offers few insights about the institutions, norms, and inputs that shape and constrain agency discretion over their agendas or about the strategies that officials employ in choosing to elevate certain issues while putting others on the back burner. In this article, we advance the study of …


Economics-Based Environmentalism In The Fourth Generation Of Environmental Law, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2014

Economics-Based Environmentalism In The Fourth Generation Of Environmental Law, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Environmental protection and economic concerns are not mutually exclusive. This article explores some of the issues of economic analysis that might arise as we approach the fourth generation of environmental law. It explains ways that economic analysis can be employed to generate the best environmental rules, including measures under what this article terms as "economics-based environmentalism." Economics-based environmentalism contends that the advantages of using economic principles within a “polycentric toolbox” of environmental law come from the benefits available in private ordering, markets, property rights, liability regimes and incentives structures that will better protect the environment than alternatives like state-based interventionist, …


Time For A Top-Tier Law School In Arkansas, Richard J. Peltz-Steele Jun 2013

Time For A Top-Tier Law School In Arkansas, Richard J. Peltz-Steele

Richard J. Peltz-Steele

A simple change in state law could improve the quality of legal education in Arkansas and the quality of legal services available to our consumers - and save significant amounts of taxpayers' money. With an Afterword on academic freedom. Also available from Advance Arkansas Institute website.


Time For A Top-Tier Law School In Arkansas, Richard J. Peltz-Steele Feb 2011

Time For A Top-Tier Law School In Arkansas, Richard J. Peltz-Steele

Faculty Publications

A simple change in state law could improve the quality of legal education in Arkansas and the quality of legal services available to our consumers - and save significant amounts of taxpayers' money. With an Afterword on academic freedom. Also available from Advance Arkansas Institute website.


Black Tuesday And Graying The Legitimacy Line For Governmental Intervention: When Tomorrow Is Just A Future Yesterday, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2009

Black Tuesday And Graying The Legitimacy Line For Governmental Intervention: When Tomorrow Is Just A Future Yesterday, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Black Tuesday in October 1929 marked a major crisis in American history. As we face current economic woes, it is appropriate to recall not only the event but also reflect on how it altered the legal landscape and the change it precipitated in the acceptance of governmental intervention into the marketplace. Perceived or real crises can cause us to dance between free markets and regulatory power. Much like the events of 1929, current financial concerns have led to new, unprecedented governmental intervention into the private sector. This Article seeks caution, on the basis of history, arguing that fear and crisis …


Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson Oct 2008

Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson

Michigan Law Review

It is widely believed that insulating an administrative agency from the influence of elected officials, whatever its other benefits orjustifications, reduces the agency's responsiveness to the preferences of political majorities. This Article argues, to the contrary, that a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political control alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking. An elected politician, though responsive to majoritarian preferences, will almost always deviate from the majority in one direction or the other Therefore, even if the average policy position of a given elected official tends to track the policy views of the median voter …


Much Ado About Nothing?, Cary Coglianese Jan 2008

Much Ado About Nothing?, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

Policy scholars and decision makers should be careful before concluding that President Bush's recent Executive Order 13422 will result in "paralysis by analysis." That lament has been heard about other changes to rule making procedures over the last seven decades, yet steady increases in the cost and volume of federal regulations during that time period clearly indicate that paralysis has yet to set in. Administrative procedures are embedded within a complex web of politics, institutions, and organizational behavior. Within that web, procedures are but one factor influencing government agencies.


Time For A Twenty-First Century Justice Department, Samuel W. Buell Jan 2008

Time For A Twenty-First Century Justice Department, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

This is a brief contribution to an issue of The Federal Sentencing Reporter directed to criminal justice policy discussions relevant to the 2008 election season. The United States Department of Justice is a uniquely valuable domestic institution. After a period of stunning ascendancy at the end of the last century, the institution has faltered—perhaps as much from strategic neglect as from deliberate diversion of its mission in service of political and foreign policy objectives that most Americans have concluded were misguided. A twenty-first-century executive branch should set as a priority thoughtful consideration of how to confine the powerful tools of …


Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security And The Political Design Of Legal Mandates, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar Aug 2006

Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security And The Political Design Of Legal Mandates, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

Policymakers fight over bureaucratic structure because it helps shape the legal interpretations and regulatory decisions of agencies through which modern governments operate. In this article, we update positive political theories of bureaucratic structure to encompass two new issues with important implications for lawyers and political scientists: the implications of legislative responses to a crisis, and the uncertainty surrounding major bureaucratic reorganizations. The resulting perspective affords a better understanding of how agencies interpret their legal mandates and deploy their administrative discretion. We apply the theory to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Two principal questions surrounding this creation are …


Harry Potter And The Half-Crazed Bureaucracy, Benjamin H. Barton May 2006

Harry Potter And The Half-Crazed Bureaucracy, Benjamin H. Barton

Michigan Law Review

What would you think of a government that engaged in this list of tyrannical activities: tortured children for lying; designed its prison specifically to suck all life and hope out of the inmates; placed citizens in that prison without a hearing; ordered the death penalty without a trial; allowed the powerful, rich, or famous to control policy; selectively prosecuted crimes (the powerful. go unpunished and the unpopular face trumped-up charges); conducted criminal trials without defense counsel; used truth serum to force confessions; maintained constant surveillance over all citizens; offered no elections and no democratic lawmaking process; and controlled the press? …


Why Judicial Review Fails: Organizations, Politics, And The Problem Of Auditing Executive Discretion, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar Oct 2005

Why Judicial Review Fails: Organizations, Politics, And The Problem Of Auditing Executive Discretion, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

Every day executive branch officials make thousands of decisions affecting our security and welfare. Homeland security officials screen tens of thousands of people at the border. They decide whose name gets on government “no fly lists.” Agencies freeze suspected terrorist assets, choose what companies to inspect for environmental violations, and decide whom to prosecute. This article describes how judicial review predictably and systematically fails to prevent abuse and promote organizational learning when government officials make many such choices using their discretion to target individuals or groups. It then proposes the use of quasi-judicial audits of executive discretion as a remedy. …


Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy, And Corporatism, Lawrence G. Baxter Jan 1981

Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy, And Corporatism, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.