Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating The Obama Administration’S Commitment To Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, William P. Marshall
Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating The Obama Administration’S Commitment To Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, William P. Marshall
Utah Law Review
This Article agrees with the premise that increased polarization in American politics has made the work of the executive branch more difficult and that this Congress in particular has failed to act responsibly. It also agrees that presidents may no longer be able to expect that members of Congress will abandon their partisan interests in favor of the common good.9 It does not agree, however, that separation-of-powers constraints on the presidency should be adjusted to reflect this new political dynamic.
Executive Power In The Obama Administration And The Decision To Seek Congressional Authorization For A Military Attack Against Syria: Implications For Theories Of Unilateral Action, Kenneth R. Mayer
Utah Law Review
The primary axiom of the unilateral-powers literature is that the institutional setting and political incentives that confront presidents push them to seek maximum discretion over policy. The straightforward implication is that presidents will seek control (Terry Moe calls it autonomy)—always contentious given the competitive political authority at the heart of separation of powers, but necessary to them given their interests and position in the political system. Empirically, presidents are expected to (and do) act unilaterally, moving first to put their stamp on policy and process, shape institutional structures, and alter the status quo to shift government outputs toward their preferred …
Holding The President Accountable To Constitutional Limits, Louis Fisher
Holding The President Accountable To Constitutional Limits, Louis Fisher
Utah Law Review
As with Congress and the judiciary, presidents have access to powers expressly stated in the Constitution and those necessarily implied in those grants. In highly limited circumstances, presidents may also exercise a “prerogative” (i.e., unilateral action), but that authority is frequently misunderstood and subject to abuse. Unlike those in the other branches, presidents lay claim to a host of powers far beyond enumerated and implied powers. In seizing steel mills in 1952 to prosecute the war in Korea, President Harry Truman acted on what he called an “inherent” power that was not subject to judicial or legislative checks. Presidents Richard …