Law Commons^™

Anti-Press Bias: A Response To Andersen Jones And West's Presuming Trustworthiness, Erin C. Carroll

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Professors RonNell Andersen Jones and Sonja R. West’s Presuming Trustworthiness is a deeply depressing read. That is what makes it so good. The article is a clear-eyed, data-driven approach to assessing just how endangered the legal status of the free press is. Given the universality of the agreement that a free press is central to democracy, Andersen Jones and West’s message is vital. Presuming Trustworthiness should raise alarms.

In response, I hope this essay can serve as a bullhorn. I want to amplify what Andersen Jones and West’s research and data bear out. Not only has the Supreme Court ceased …

Two Excursions Into Current U.S. Supreme Court Opinion-Writing, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In the last weeks in June, 2015, as the present term of the U.S. Supreme Court drew to a close, many controversial and important decisions were handed down by the Court. The substance of the decisions has been written about extensively. Two of the decisions in particular, though, caught my eye as a teacher of legal techniques, not for the importance of the subject of the particular decision, but for what they may illustrate in a teachable fashion about at least some opinion writing. The two cases are Ohio v. Clark (June 18, 2015) interpreting the Confrontation Clause of the …

Healthcare Reform Hangs In The Balance, Lawrence O. Gostin

O'Neill Institute Papers

In this timely new briefing, Professor Lawrence O. Gostin, University Professor and Faculty Director, O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown University writes:

Prior to Tuesday’s arguments, I believed that the Supreme Court would uphold the health insurance purchase mandate by a comfortable margin. But now I believe that health care reform hangs in the balance. Here are the key arguments on which the future of President Obama’s health care reform depends: a greater freedom, cost-shifting, the health care market, acts versus omissions, limiting principles, the population-base approach, and what is necessary and proper. If the Court strikes …

Why The Affordable Care Act's Individual Purchase Mandate Is Both Constitutional And Indispensable To The Public Welfare, Lawrence O. Gostin

O'Neill Institute Papers

Integral to the Affordable Care Act's (ACA’s) conceptual design is the individual purchase mandate, which requires most individuals to pay an annual tax penalty if they do not have health insurance by 2014. Despite the vociferous opposition, the mandate is the most “market-friendly” financing device because it relies on the private sector. Ironically, less market-oriented reforms such as a single-payer system clearly would have been constitutional.

It is common sense for everyone to purchase health insurance and thus gain security against the potentially catastrophic costs of treating a serious illness or injury. However, Congress’ method of ensuring that everyone has …

Fisher V. Grutter, Girardeau A. Spann

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There is no reason for the Supreme Court to have granted certiorari in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. Unless, of course, the Court plans to overrule Grutter v. Bollinger—the case on which the Texas affirmative action plan at issue in Fisher was based. If that is its plan, the Court can invalidate the Texas program on some narrow ground that masks the magnitude of what it is doing. Or it can explicitly overrule Grutter—a case that no longer commands majority support on a Supreme Court whose politics of affirmative action has now been refashioned by …

The Disdain Campaign, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A response to Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court 2011 Term Forward: Democracy and Disdain, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2012).

In her Foreword, Professor Pamela Karlan offers a quite remarkable critique of the conservative Justices on the Supreme Court. She faults them not so much for the doctrines they purport to follow, or outcomes they reach, but for the attitude they allegedly manifest toward Congress and the people. “My focus here is not so much on the content of the doctrine but on the character of the analysis.” She describes Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion of the Court as …

Reconstructing The Rule Of Law, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The action taken in Bush v. Gore by the five conservative Justices on the United States Supreme Court, Bugliosi argued, was not just wrong as a matter of law, but criminal: It was a malem in se, fully intended, premeditated theft of a national election for the Presidency of the United States. Now, as Balkan and Levinson would argue, this seventh, "prosecutorial" response -- that the Court's action was not just wrong but criminal -- is also not available to a devotee of either radical or moderate indeterminacy. Even assuming both criminal intent and severe harm-a wrongful, specific intent to …

Toward A "Due Foundation" For The Separation Of Powers: The Federalist Papers As Political Narrative, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

During the past quarter century, lawyers have become strangely comfortable with descriptions of our government's structure that would, to an untutored ear, speak contradiction. We are quite satisfied to say that governmental powers are separate and shared, departments distinct and overlapping, functions autonomous and interdependent. We have settled into these contradictions as we would a roomy chair: talking this way is no longer controversial but taken for granted, uttered with a knowing wink, perceived as the starting point of sophisticated analysis. A not "entirely separate," but "entirely free," set of departments is the only way we can think about the …

Progressive And Conservative Constitutionalism, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

American constitutional law in general, and fourteenth amendment jurisprudence in particular, is in a state of profound transformation. The "liberal-legalist" and purportedly politically neutral understanding of constitutional guarantees that dominated constitutional law and theory during the fifties, sixties, and seventies, is waning, both in the courts and in the academy. What is beginning to replace liberal legalism in the academy, and what has clearly replaced it on the Supreme Court, is a very different conception - a new paradigm - of the role of constitutionalism, constitutional adjudication, and constitutional guarantees in a democratic state. Unlike the liberal-legal paradigm it is …