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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Law
Back To The Future: Creating A Bipartisan Environmental Movement For The 21st Century, David M. Uhlmann
Back To The Future: Creating A Bipartisan Environmental Movement For The 21st Century, David M. Uhlmann
Articles
With a contentious presidential election looming amidst a pandemic, economic worries, and historic protests against systemic racism, climate action may seem less pressing than other challenges. Nothing could be further from the truth. To prevent greater public health threats and economic dislocation from climate disruption, which will disproportionately harm Black Americans, people of color, and indigenous people, this Comment argues that we need to restore the bipartisanship that fueled the environmental movement and that the fate of the planet—and our children and grandchildren—depends upon our collective action.
The Locked Gates To Tension City: The Commission On Presidential Debates, The Fec, And The Two-Party System, Tommy La Voy
The Locked Gates To Tension City: The Commission On Presidential Debates, The Fec, And The Two-Party System, Tommy La Voy
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
Since John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon walked into a Chicago television studio for the first general election presidential debate in 1960, candidate debates have been a fundamental aspect of presidential campaigns and have had broader effects on society at large. The Commission on Presidential Debates (“CPD”) has been in charge of organizing the general election debates since it was created in 1987 by the Democratic and Republican parties. In its tenure, the CPD has restricted its massive platform almost every election to the Republican and Democratic candidates through the use of criteria that seemingly follow the law’s requirement of …
The Uncertain Effects Of Senate Confirmation Delays In The Agencies, Nina A. Mendelson
The Uncertain Effects Of Senate Confirmation Delays In The Agencies, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
As Professor Anne O’Connell has effectively documented, the delay in Senate confirmations has resulted in many vacant offices in the most senior levels of agencies, with potentially harmful consequences to agency implementation of statutory programs. This symposium contribution considers some of those consequences, as well as whether confirmation delays could conceivably have benefits for agencies. I note that confirmation delays are focused in the middle layer of political appointments—at the assistant secretary level, rather than at the cabinet head—so that formal functions and political oversight are unlikely to be halted altogether. Further, regulatory policy making and even agenda setting can …
Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, Jack M. Beermann
Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, Jack M. Beermann
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
There is a documented increase in the volume of regulatory activity during the last ninety days of presidential administrations when the President is a lame duck, having either been defeated in a bid for re-election or being at the end of the second term in office. This includes an increase in the number of final rules issued as compared to other periods. The phenomenon of late-term regulatory activity has been called “midnight regulation,” based on a comparison to the Cinderella story in which the magic wears off at the stroke of midnight. This Article looks closely at one species of …
The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias
The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias
Articles
Enforcement of law is at the core of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care” that the laws are faithfully executed, and it is a primary mechanism for effecting national regulatory policy. Yet questions about how presidents oversee agency enforcement activity have received surprisingly little scholarly attention. This Article provides a positive account of the President’s role in administrative enforcement, explores why presidential enforcement has taken the shape it has, and examines the bounds of the President’s enforcement power. It demonstrates that presidential involvement in agency enforcement, though extensive, has been ad hoc, crisis-driven, and frequently opaque. The Article thus …
The $1.75 Trillion Lie, Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman
The $1.75 Trillion Lie, Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
A 2010 study commissioned by the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration claims that federal regulations impose annual economic costs of $1.75 trillion. This estimate has been widely circulated, in everything from op-ed pages to Congressional testimony. But the estimate is not credible. For costs of economic regulations, the estimate reflects a calculation that rests on a misunderstanding of the definition of the relevant data, flunks an elementary question on the normal distribution, pads the analysis with several years of near-identical data, and fails to recognize the difference between correlation and causation. For costs of environmental regulation, …
Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley
Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
Prof. Bagley notes that reshaping captured agencies using the structural reforms suggested by Prof. Barkow may be politically infeasible and offers an alternative solution for eliminating interest-group capture. First, he suggests establishing a body within the Executive Branch that proactively investigates and documents capture dynamics. Second, he suggests creating legislative mechanisms that will encourage Congressional action on the body’s recommendations, and perhaps, more provocatively, requiring the Executive Branch to enact any such recommendations in the absence of Congress’s formal objection.
Disclosing 'Political' Oversight Of Agency Decision Making, Nina A. Mendelson
Disclosing 'Political' Oversight Of Agency Decision Making, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Scholars and courts have divided views on whether presidential supervision enhances the legitimacy of the administrative state. For some, that the President can supervise administrative agencies is key to seeing agency action as legitimate, because of the President's accountability to the electorate. Others, however, have argued that such supervision may simply taint, rather than legitimate, an agency action. The reality is that presidential supervision of agency rulemaking, at least, appears to be both significant and opaque. This Article presents evidence from multiple presidential administrations suggesting that regulatory review conducted by the White House's Office of Management and Budget is associated …
Quick Off The Mark? In Favor Of Empowering The President-Elect, Nina A. Mendelson
Quick Off The Mark? In Favor Of Empowering The President-Elect, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
The United States’s presidential transition period is too long. Between November 7, 2008, and January 20, 2009, the media quickly identified a “‘leadership vacuum.’” In contrast to those of President-elect Obama, President Bush’s approval ratings were at historic lows. One reporter commented in late November, “The markets, at least, seem to be listening to one [P]resident—and he’s not the one in the Oval Office,” and another noted that “everyone . . . ignores the actions of the lame duck.”
Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson
Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson
Michigan Law Review
It is widely believed that insulating an administrative agency from the influence of elected officials, whatever its other benefits orjustifications, reduces the agency's responsiveness to the preferences of political majorities. This Article argues, to the contrary, that a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political control alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking. An elected politician, though responsive to majoritarian preferences, will almost always deviate from the majority in one direction or the other Therefore, even if the average policy position of a given elected official tends to track the policy views of the median voter …
Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies And Personnel Before A New President Arrives, Nina A. Mendelson
Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies And Personnel Before A New President Arrives, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
This Article examines executive branch agency actions concluded just before a new President takes office, such as "midnight" rulemaking and late-term hiring and promotion, which Professor Mendelson collectively refers to as "agency burrowing." Congress, the media, and some commentators have portrayed such activities as unsavory power grabs that undermine the President-elect's ability to direct the functions of administrative agencies. Rather than dismissing agency burrowing out of hand, however, Professor Mendelson argues for a more nuanced approach. In some cases, burrowing can make positive contributions to the democratic responsiveness of agencies, agency accountability, and the "rule of law." A fuller analysis …
Industry Influence In Federal Regulatory Agencies, Michigan Law Review
Industry Influence In Federal Regulatory Agencies, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies by Paul J. Quirk
Cary: Politics And The Regulatory Agencies, Donald C. Cook
Cary: Politics And The Regulatory Agencies, Donald C. Cook
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Politics and the Regulatory Agencies by William L. Cary